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WE'RE ALL CAPITALISTS Now:
THE IMPORTANCE, NATURE, PROVISION
AND REGULATION OF INVESTOR
EDUCATION
James A. Fantot
ABSTRACT
The Article studies investor education so as to evaluate and
guide increasing educational efforts. It first discusses the conditions
that have made investor education important in the United States.
The Article then presents a theoretical framework that identifies three
kinds of investor education-education about saving, investing and
financial fraudL In considering the parties best competent to provide
them, the Article suggests that families might accomplish each kind of
investor education, with schools also offering, as many now do, gen-
eral financial education. Consumer financial services and nonprofit
firms, moreover, should conduct-and do, in fact, provide-saving
and investing education as initial or "continuing" investor training.
Federal and state regulators of financial services should, therefore,
focus their tasks on educating consumers about financial fraud and
abuse, persuading them to save, invest and use available educational
products and services and on conveying basic saving and investing
norms. As an application of the theoretical perspective, the Article
analyzes the major investor educational initiatives of the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). The SEC should improve its
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educational efforts by redirecting them, in accordance with the Arti-
cle's guidance, to concentrate on anti-fraud education, to reinforce
the basic norms and to promote and facilitate private investor educa-
tion.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Parents with young children may occasionally find themselves
watching Mary Poppins.1 At one point in that movie, the father, ap-
propriately named Mr. Banks, takes his two young children, Jane and
Michael, on an outing to his place of employment, a well-established
British merchant bank in London, intending to counter the imagina-
(Walt Disney 1964).
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five influence of Mary Poppins with a healthy dose of reality. Mi-
chael wants to spend his savings of two pence on a bag of bird feed
sold by an old woman who sits on the steps of St. Paul's Cathedral.
Mr. Banks disallows this wasteful spending and leads the two chil-
dren into the bank, where the bank's partners, particularly its manag-
ing partner, the "elder Mr. Dawes" (played by Dick Van Dyke), con-
front them. Assisted by Mr. Banks, the partners give the children a
musical lesson on saving and investing. Yet Michael's vocal refusal
to follow their advice and invest his "tuppence' in the bank creates a
panic among the bank's customers that results in a run on, and closure
of, the bank and in the temporary loss of Mr. Banks' job.
The scene is a good introduction to the subject of this Article,
investor education, for it portrays a flawed educational attempt.
Without investor education there would likely be no investment in all
of the productive ventures enumerated in the partners' song. The
education must be properly conducted, however. The partners be-
come so carried away with their love of finance that they scare2 and
bewilder Michael with incomprehensible terms, such as "self-
amortizing notes." It is no surprise, then, that Michael refuses to part
with his money, especially when, in a beautiful song, Mary Poppins
has encouraged him to spend it on bird feed. If, as is the case here,
education is poorly done, it not only discourages investing, but, given
the "herd" behavior of existing investors, it disastrously undermines
capital-raising.
Investor education is important in the United States today mainly
because saving and investing activities are as common as finding a
job or an apartment. Saving and investing are critical for survival in
our society for those who, as children years ago, first watched Mary
Poppins. Because investing has assumed a si nificance in their lives
that it did not generally have for their parents, they must be educated
in how to invest. Their financial future and retirement income mainly
depend upon the success of their investments, for they can no longer
rely on the Social Security "safety net" that is projected to run out of
funds early in the next century. Their employers are less likely to
provide guaranteed retirement benefits, but more often offer them
contributions to a retirement fund to be invested at the individual em-
ployee's direction. To meet their retirement and other future needs,
they must also save and invest outside retirement plans. Develop-
ments in financial services, which give ordinary consumers numerous
saving and investing products that will enable them to assume their
new responsibilities, also require education to ensure that an individ-
2 His partners refer to the elderlyMr. Dawes as a "giant in the world of finance," but all
Michael understands is that Dawes is a "giant."
' See infra Part 11(A).
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ual will understand and choose knowledgeably among the many
products to design an optimal portfolio.
This kind of education means more than merely supplying a con-
sumer with information and is, therefore, radically different from the
disclosure about investment products and the companies selling them
that securities law has traditionally sought to provide. 4  Rather, it in-
volves an intellectual formation, which gives consumers the concep-
tual framework, intellectual skills and the language: in sum, the "cul-
ture" of saving and investing that will allow them to make sense of
financial information and to function intelligently in the investment
world. Investor education thus raises challenges and difficulties akin
to those of other kinds of education, such as identifying the appropri-
ate educational curriculum and instructors.5
Economists, consumer organizations, financial firms, govern-
ment regulators and even Congress and the Executive Branch have all
recognized the increasing significance of investor education and are
actively designing and contributing to educational programs and ma-
terials. Economists have inspired much of the educational activity
with their theoretical and empirical work, suggesting that investor
education can increase consumers' savings and improve their invest-
ing performance.6 Consumer groups have worked with state legisla-
tures and state and federal agencies to institute saving and investing
training even in grade schools. 7 Consumer financial services firms,
whether individually, in trade groups or in self-regulatory organiza-
tions ("SROs"), 8 provide consumers with useful educational materials
and services at little or no cost.9 Federal financial regulators, par-
4 See, e.g., HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DjSCLOSURE: REGULATION IN
SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 73 (1979) ("[Iln recent years the SEC has insisted that the purpose of
securities disclosure is to supply information for investment decisions.").
5 This analysis includes the basic question about the proper role of government in educa-
tion. Seee.g., OLIVER HART ET AL., THE PROPER SCOPE OF GOVERNMENT: THEORY AND AN
APPLICATION TO PRISONS 46-47 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 5744,
1996) (discussing the pros and cons of voucher arrangements).
6 See, e.g., B. DOUGLAS BERNHEIM & DANIEL M. GARRETT, THE DETERMINANTS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF FINANCIAL EDUCATION IN THE WORKPLACE: EVIDENCE FROM A SURVEY OF
HOUSEHOLDS 19 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 5667, 1996) (pre-
senting empirical research on effects of workplace financial education); B. DOUGLAS BERNHEIM
ET AL., EDUCATION AND SAVING: THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF HIGH SCHOOL FINANCIAL
CURRICULUM MANDATES 3 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6085,
1997) (presenting empirical research on results of high school financial education); B.
DOUGLAS BERNHEIM, THE VANISHING NEST EGG: REFLECTIONS ON SAVING IN AMERICA 3
(1991) [hereinafter BERNHEIM, THE VANISHING NEST EGG] (arguing that a public campaign
designed to promote frugal behavior will exploit motives for saving).
7 See infra text accompanying note 122.
8 A self-regulatory organization, or "SRO," is the term of art for the organizations of se-
curities market participants that, under the SEC's supervision, regulate and discipline their
members. See generally JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MA-
TERIALS 18-20 (2d ed. 1997).
9 See infra Part I(B)(3).
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ticularly the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and
banking and pension regulators, have established and sponsored edu-
cational programs for investors, often using the new Internet technol-
ogy, and have proposed and adopted regulations encouraging investor
education.10 Most significantly, recent federal legislation makes in-
vestor education the goal of a national campaign by federal and state
government officials (including the President) and interested private
parties."
Despite these major government and financial industry activities,
legal scholars have generally ignored investor education. 12 This Arti-
cle evaluates and seeks to help guide these important educational ef-
forts. Part II reviews in more detail the conditions that have made
investor education important and inevitable in the United States. The
inability of an aging "Baby Boom" generation to rely on Social Secu-
rity programs for its retirement needs, the increasing use by employ-
ers of retirement plans that place investment decision-making upon
employees and the major changes in consumer financial services are
specific conditions evidencing the need for investor education. Part II
also argues that the American cultural emphasis on individual respon-
sibility determines that, short of a financial cataclysm, ordinary peo-
ple expect to make their own saving and investing decisions, which
makes any appreciable increase in government paternalism in Social
Security or pension policy unlikely. Yet the same culture generates
consumers' expectations that they should receive the training and
tools to become capable saving and investing decision-makers, and
thus ensures that investor education must accompany consumers' in-
creased responsibilities. Part II contends that, given the cultural
situation, improving investor education as soon as possible to respond
to individuals' critical need for saving and investing training makes
the most pragmatic and policy sense. It admits, however, that educa-
tion is not the solution to the saving and investing crisis, but an im-
portant response to be used in conjunction with other solutions.
10 See infra Parts III(B)(4), Wv(A).
t' See infra Part IlI(B)(4)(a).
12 A major exception is Professor Henry Hu of the University of Texas Law School, who
insightfully discusses investor education when evaluating disclosure of investment products. See
Henry T.C. Hu, Illiteracy and Intervention: Wholesale Derivatives, Retail Mutual Funds, and
the Matter of Asset Class, 84 GEO. L.J. 2319, 2358-79 (1996) (observing that mutual fund dis-
closure includes a discussion of the attributes of the class of investments to which the fund
belongs and thus leads to issues of investor education); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees,
Pensions, and the New Economic Order, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1519, 1565 n.148 (1997) (men-
tioning education in passing); cf. Gregory S. Alexander, Pensions and Passivity, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1993, at 111, 130 (arguing that giving pension beneficiaries more
decision-making may enhance individual responsibility); Deborah M. Weiss & Marc A. Sgara-
glino, Prudent Risks for Anxious Workers, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 1175, 1212-14 (advocating a
"mild sort of paternalism" whereby employees can make investment choices among alternatives
that are appropriately diversified to eliminate nonsystematic risk).
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A serious inquiry on investor education requires a theoretical
framework that establishes the kinds of investor education and the
parties "best" suited to accomplish them. Part III identifies and ex-
amines three kinds of investor education: education about saving, in-
vesting and financial fraud. The first kind essentially involves ac-
quiring an understanding of the need to defer present consumption to
meet future goals (in Judge Posner's terms, to act responsibly towards
one's future "selves" 13), of the psychological impediments to saving
optimally and of the best available means of achieving deferred con-
sumption. The second kind of investor education basically concerns
optimal wealth creation through investing. Because this subject is at
the heart of finance, Part III relies upon finance theory to describe this
kind of education, which includes training about securities markets,
investment products, financial professionals, the language of finance,
investing strategy and, again, psychological impediments to optimal
investing. Investor education about financial fraud complements the
other two kinds of investor education, because it teaches consumers to
recognize and resist any fraud and abuse threatening them in the fi-
nancial world.
Part III identifies the parties, or combination of parties, who
should conduct each kind of education. It observes that families
would best accomplish all investor education since they can inculcate
individuals in the "culture of investing" from an early age. Because
there is no assurance that every family can and will adequately per-
form this task, schools should complement family training by offering
general saving and investing education. This education has, in fact,
become part of the high school curriculum in many states and uses
local and federal government, consumer organization and financial
industry resources. Since not every state requires, or, in the near
future, will likely require, this education and since, in any event, con-
sumers need "continuing" investor education, this Part argues that
financial services firms, as well as for-profit and nonprofit organiza-
tions in the financial information industry, should also conduct saving
and investing education. They are appropriate education providers
both because these kinds of education have become a commodity and
because, as empirical evidence demonstrates, firms in the highly
competitive consumer financial services market will supply educa-
tional services and products at low cost to attract and keep customers.
Part III concludes that, in light of this market activity, federal and
state regulators of financial services should accomplish two important
educational tasks for which they are well suited: (i) to educate con-
13 See RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 84 (1995) ("The idea that the individ-
ual can be modeled as a locus of competing selves (simultaneous or successive) is not new, but
it remains esoteric and is disregarded in most economic analysis.") (footnote omitted).
14 See infra Part uI(B)(2).
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sumers on financial fraud and abuse (the third kind of investor educa-
tion), including any abuse in private market educational efforts, and
(ii) to persuade and encourage consumers to save, invest and use the
investor education products and services of private firms, as well as to
give them some basic tools and guidelines for these activities. 15
As an application of this theoretical perspective, Part IV analyzes
the major investor education initiatives of the SEC, one of the federal
agencies most active in this area. It observes that, while the SEC's
educational efforts have been useful, it could greatly improve them by
redirecting its activities, in accordance with the Article's guidance, to
concentrate on anti-fraud education and to encourage consumers to
look to the education supplied by private firms, including nonprofit
organizations. The SEC's Office of Investor Education and Assis-
tance now educates consumers to guard against fraudulent and abu-
sive practices in financial services. However, the Office's saving and
investing education does not measure up to similar activities of pri-
vate firms and should thus be redesigned to be part of a government
campaign to encourage saving and investing, to provide consumers
with a few easily-understandable rules and guidelines about these ac-
tivities, and to publicize the firms' educational services. Part IV also
finds that SEC initiatives to simplify securities disclosure and to de-
sign new disclosure formats for mutual funds exhibit a valuable part-
nership with the financial services industry. This partnership should
allow consumers to receive basic information about investment prod-
ucts and companies in formats to which they can easily apply the
saving and investing education that they receive from the financial
firms. The SEC, however, should explicitly recognize the necessary
relationship between the consumer-oriented disclosure and the firms'
educational services, and take regulatory action to make firms link
their disclosure documents to these services. Finally, the SEC should
begin a sustained reflection on its role in investor education and
heighten awareness of education's importance by issuing a "concept
release" on investor education and inviting comment from all those
involved and interested in the subject. Part V concludes by restating
the need for a sustained reflection on investor education while cir-
cumstances are propitious-that is, while the stock market remains at
record high levels.
15 The state and federal governments can, and should, do much to address the saving and
investing crisis in the U.S., for example, by providing tax incentives to saving. See generally
BERNHEIM, THE VANISHING NEST EGG, supra note 6, at 93-121 (discussing potential govern-
ment policy options to increase rates of saving). This Article focuses, however, only on the
government's role in investor education.
1998]
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II. THE NEED FOR, AND CULTURAL INEVITABILITY OF,
INVESTOR EDUCATION
A. The Consequences of the Aging "Baby Boom" Generation
Investor education has become important because individual
wealth creation is critical, primarily on account of demographics.
16
The numerous children born in the two decades following World War
II (the "Baby Boom" generation) 17 have increasing financial needs.
As they begin to retire in 2010 with a longevity greater than that of
their parents,' 8 they will require considerable financial resources.
Many must now support their children's important, but expensive,
education 19 and may also have to take care of aging parents, who are
living longer as well.20 Since saving and investing performance can
contribute to meeting these needs, 21 a fundamental issue is whether
individuals are intellectually, and even psychologically, equipped to
save and invest optimally.22
That Americans can not expect federal government programs to
help them fully meet their retirement and other needs makes optimal
individual saving and investing particularly acute. The primary gov-
16 See Peter F. Drucker, The Future That Has Already Happened, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 20 ("The dominant factor for business in the next two decades-absent war,
pestilence, or collision with a comet-is not going to be economics or technology. It will be
demographics.").
17 See Barry Bosworth, Wat Economic Role for the Trust Funds?, in SOCIAL SECURITY
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 156, 156 (Eric R. Kingson & James H. Schulz eds., 1997) [hereinafter
SOCIAL SECuRrrY] (defining the baby-boomers as those individuals born between 1945 and
1965).
Is See id. at 161 (citing statistics related to the increase in life-spans); see also GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAOIHEHS-97-81, RETIREMENT INCOME: IMPLICATIONS OF
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY AND PENSION REFORM 17 (1997) [hereinafter
GAO, RETIREMENT INCOME] (showing steady longevity increase since 1940 and projected
increase in the future).
19 See STEVEN A. SASS, THE PROMISE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS: THE FIRST HUNDRED
YEARS 250 (1997) (explaining how parents jeopardize their financial futures when they absorb
their children's tuition costs). See generally JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M..MOE, POLITICS,
MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 105-11 (1990) (observing that school success is largely
determined by socioeconomic status of students' families); Simon Hakim et al., Introduction, in
PRIVATIZING EDUCATION AND EDUCATIONAL CHOICE: CONCEPTS, PLANS, AND EXPERIENCES 4
(Simon Hakim et al. eds., 1994) (discussing expenses of public education).
20 Cf. Marilyn Moon, Are Social Security Benefits too High or too Low?, in SOCIAL
SECURITY, supra note 17, at 62, 71-72 (observing that the elderly's perceived improved well-
being in relation to other age groups has generated a backlash).
21 Saving and investing also benefit investors indirectly by providing companies with
sources of inexpensive capital. This capital helps firms successfully compete in global product
and capital markets, and they can thus provide more jobs for investors and their children. See
Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control
Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 850-52 (1993). An active investment market also requires a successful
financial services industry. See, e.g., The Americans Are Coming, ECONOMIST, Apr. 15, 1995, at
23,23-25.
22 Cf. Gordon, supra note 12, at 1534-36 (explaining that low growth in wages has placed
additional importance on other forms of wealth creation, such as investing).
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ernment social insurance program, Social Security (officially, the
Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance ("OASDI") programs),
was never intended to be the major source of retirement income for
most people, but only a safety net for the lower-income elderly.23 Yet
the impending retirement of the "Baby Boomers" will create a deficit
in funds available for OASDI payments and could even cast doubt on
the continued viability of this minimum retirement amount.24 What-
ever solution to the projected funding deficit is adopted,25 the publi-
23 See Robert M. Ball & Thomas N. Bethell, Bridging the Centuries: The Case for Tra-
ditional Social Security, in SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 17, at 259, 259-60 (describing the
program as part of a three-pronged approach to retirement that also includes private pensions
and personal savings); cf. Edward D. Berkowitz, The Historical Development of Social Security
in the United States, in SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 17, at 22, 24-25 (discussing early history
of the Social Security program). In reality, Social Security payments provide most, and in some
cases nearly all, of the income for the lower-income elderly. See GAO, RETIREMENT INCOME,
supra note 18, at 24-26 (presenting statistics); Moon, supra note 20, at 66-67 (presenting per-
centages of income received from Social Security, which in the lowest-income families is more
than 75%). This result is due to the redistributive nature of the program: individuals with low
average earnings over their eligible working lives receive a greater percentage of these earnings
as Social Security benefits than do individuals with higher average earnings. See EMPLOYEE
BENEFr RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 20 (5th ed.
1997) [hereinafter FUNDAMENTALS OFEMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS]. Individuals can obtain
estimates about future benefits from the Social Security Administration, as well as from com-
mercial and noncommercial services. See id. at 27; see, e.g., American Savings Education
Council, Ballpark E$timate (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http://www.asec.orgfballpark.htn> (pro-
viding rough estimates for different income levels).
24 See Robert J. Myers, Will Social Security Be Therefor Me?, in SOCIAL SECURITY, su-
pra note 17, at 208, 209-11 (summarizing various actuarial reports on date of future deficit in
Social Security funds). OASDI is a pay-as-you-go program: present workers are taxed to pay
for the benefits of current retirees. Social Security now collects more than it pays out and has
generated a surplus that is invested in, and receives interest payments as, U.S. Treasury securi-
ties. Under current estimates, the Social Security surplus will rapidly fall in 2009 and disappear
in 2012. The federal government will then have to begin repaying its loan from Social Security
to make up the shortfall. Proceeds from this loan (also known as the Social Security trust funds)
will be used up in 2029. See GAO, RETIREMENT INCOME, supra note 18, at 40-41.
25 There is an ongoing national debate on the future design of Social Security. See gen-
erally Christopher Georges, Social-Security 'Privatization' Effort Makes Headway, WALL ST.
J., June 22, 1998, at A24 (summarizing reform movements); see, e.g., GAO, RETIREMENT
INCOME, supra note 18, at 29-41 (listing possible solutions, such as reducing initial benefits,
raising retirement age, reducing cost-of-living adjustments, means-testing benefits, increasing
income taxes on Social Security benefits, increasing payroll taxes, etc.); GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO/AIMDIHEHS-98-74, SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING: IMPLICATIONS OF
GOVERNMENT STOCK INVESTING FOR THE TRUST FUND, THE FEDERAL BUDGET, AND THE
ECONOMY 4-6 (1998) (discussing implications of shifting Social Security trust funds from gov-
ernment securities to stocks); NATIONAL COMM'N ON RETIREMENT POLICY, THE 21sr CENTURY
RETIREMENT SECURITY PLAN 2 (1998) (summarizing its reform recommendations); Bosworth,
supra note 17, at 164-75 (recommending that baby-boomers increase funding through higher
taxes, that Social Security trust funds be removed from the federal government's budget, and
that the program invest its funds in instruments other than Treasury securities); Myers, supra
note 24, at 212-14 (describing possible solutions to the deficit problem, including increasing
payroll taxes); see also RICHARD DISNEY, CAN WE AFFORD TO GROW OLDER? A PERSPECTIVE
ON THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 8-9, 104 (1996) (pointing out that "pay-as-you-go" social insur-
ance systems are premised on the unrealistic promises and assumptions that "current and future
generations could maintain positive real rates of return on contributions so long as both the
growth of real earnings and the growth of the population remained positive," and that there has
not been the necessary population growth in America). Proposals that would change the pay-as-
19981
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cized funding problems of Social Security have caused ordinary
Americans and policy-makers alike to realize that an individual must
rely primarily on two other means of generating income for retire-
ment and other future needs that primarily depend upon individual
effort: pensions and -individual savings.
6
Investor education is also required to inform the decision-maker
how to participate in a retirement plan. Since the late nineteenth
century, many employees have traditionally looked to their employers
for retirement income,27 and favorable tax treatment of pensions has
encouraged employer-sponsored plans?28 Yet the kinds of retirement
you-go system to individualized Social Security accounts invested in accordance with account
holders' directions would further emphasize individual investing and thus investor education.
See generally Gary Burtless & Barry Bosworth, Privatizing Social Security: The Troubling
Trade-Offs (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http:llwww.brook.eduleslpolicy/polbrfl4.htm)>.
26 See, e.g., Virginia P. Reno & Robert B. Friedland, Strong Support But Low Confi-
dence, in SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 17, at 178, 186-87 (discussing Americans' recent loss
of confidence in Social Security and increasing dependence upon personal investments); Dallas
L. Salisbury, Public Attitudes on Social Security: The UFO Fallacy, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RES.
INST. NOTES, March 1998, at 1, 1-3 (reviewing survey data suggesting Americans' concerns
about the viability of Social Security and confusion about the program's funding problems); cf
Alan Murray, Boomers May Not Like Social Security 'Return,' WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 1998, at
Al (referring to Heritage Foundation study showing declining rates of return for Social Security
for younger, affluent taxpayers). Popular and scholarly doubts have also increased about the
ability of federal and state governments to provide such an important service as education. See
generally MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 141 (1981) (discussing lack
of confidence in public education); Jonathan B. Cleveland, School Choice: American Elemen-
tary and Secondary Education Enter the "Adapt or Die" Environment of a Competitive Market-
place, 29 CLEV. MARSHALL L. REV. 77, 82-85 (1995) (summarizing studies that evidence the
poor academic performance of American students);
27 See SASS, supra note 19, at 227-28 (summarizing early history of pensions designed
by large businesses to attract and keep employees trained for specialized positions); see also
GAO, RETIREMENT INCOME, supra note 18, at 43 (noting that 45-47% of employees in the
private sector are covered by pensions, a number that remained constant from 1970 through
1993, the last date for which data is available). The economic literature explains how employee
retirement benefits fit into labor management: employers use these benefits to attract and retain
employees (e.g., by requiring lengths of service for the "vesting" of benefits and increasing
benefits with seniority). See generally E. PHILIP DAVIS, PENSION FUNDS: RETIREMENT-INCOME
SECURITY, AND CAPITAL MARKETS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 57 (1995) (discussing
the attraction of pension funds to employees); JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION
AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 5-16 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing history of U.S. pension plans with
reference to WILLIAM C. GREENOUGH & FRANCIS P. KING, PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC
POLICY 27-47 (1976)).
u While taxation regarding private pension plans is complex, the tax advantages can be
generally summarized as follows: "(1) within limits, employer contributions are deductible as a
business expense, (2) contributions are not counted as income to participants (and therefore not
subject to federal income tax) until paid in the form of benefits, and (3) investment earnings,
including capital gains, are not taxed until distribution." Kelly Olsen & Jack VanDerhei, De-
fined Contribution Plan Dominance Grows Across Sectors and Employer Sizes, While Mega
Defined Benefit Plans Remain Strong: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT RES. INST. SPECIAL REP. SR-33/IssUE BRIEF No. 190, Oct. 1997, at 5 n.12; see also
LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 27, at 149-51; Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Pol-
icy: Psychological Evidence and Economic Theory, 58 U. CHL L. REV. 1275, 1280-85 (1991)
(noting that the tax exemption for employer-sponsored plans is the largest tax preference in the
Internal Re-venue Code).
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plans employers are more frequently offering to their employees actu-
ally place responsibility on an individual employee to save and invest
funds for retirement and other future financial needs. 29 In recent
years, employers have perceptively shifted to offering employees "de-
fined contribution," 30 rather than "defined benefit," 1 pension plans.
In a defined contribution plan, an employer establishes individual ac-
counts for employees and, depending upon the kind of the plan, the
employers, the employees or both make contributions to the accounts
within statutorily prescribed limits.32 For many plans, an employee
specifies the investment of account funds in a number of investment
options permitted under the plan.33 Upon retirement, the employee
29 See SASS, supra note 19, at 243 (describing these plans as essentially thrift savings
plans, not pension plans); Weiss & Sgaraglino, supra note 12, at 1177 ('The average American
worker is increasingly asked to bear the risks of his own financial decisions.").
30 See Olsen & VanDerhei, supra note 28, at 3 (pointing out that "[d]uring 1975-1993,
the number of workers participating in a private [defined contribution] plan increased from 12
million to 44 million, while [defined benefit] plan participants remained roughly steady at 33-40
million"); id. at 22, 31 (observing that the greatest decrease in defined benefits plans occurred in
small plans (with 10-24 active participants) and was partly attributable to the loss of favorable
tax treatment for these plans acting as tax shelters for highly-paid persons and that the number
of large defined pension plans has remained stable); see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/GGD-97-1, PRIVATE PENSIONS: MOST EMPLOYERS THAT OFFER PENSIONS USE DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION PLANS 4-9 (1996) (presenting statistics of growth in defined contribution plans);
Olivia S. Mitchell et al., Introduction: Assessing the Challenges to the Pension System, in
POSITIONING PENSIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1, 2-5 (Michael S. Gordon et al. eds.,
1997) [hereinafter POSITIONING PENSIONS] (explaining shift to defined contribution plans).
31 Under a defined benefit plan, an employer provides an employee with a pension cal-
culated in accordance with some set formula (e.g., based upon years of service and a percentage
of pay). See generally FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFrr PROGRAMS, supra note 23, at
69-70. Defined benefit plans use different formulae: some pay a flat-dollar amount for each
eligible year of service, others use a percentage of pay for each eligible year or a percentage of
career-average pay and still others calculate benefits as a percentage of average pay in the final
employment years. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 27, at 44.
3 See FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS, supra note 23, at 57-59, 70-
72; LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 27, at 46-52 (describing kinds of defined contribution
plans); see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-98-23, PRIVATE PENSIONS: PLAN
FEATURES PROVIDED BY EMPLOYERS THAT SPONSOR ONLY DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS
11-18 (1997) [hereinafter GAO, PLAN FEATURES] (describing contribution features of a subset
of defined contribution plans). A well-known defined contribution plan is that pursuant to Sec-
tion 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code, in which an employee can defer, on a pre-tax basis, a
portion of her compensation as a contribution to an individual retirement account and receive a
matching contribution from an employer (generally, a percentage of an employee's earnings), at
the employer's option. See FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFrr PROGRAMS, supra note 23,
at 96-97 (summarizing "nondiscrimination" rules under which plans lose their favorable tax
treatment if they do not have adequate participation of "nonhighy compensated" employees vs.
"highly compensated" employees).
3 See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 27, at 741-42; GAO, PLAN FEATURES, supra note
32, at 21-23 (presenting data on employer-directed, as opposed to participant-directed, plans).
Section 404(c) of the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §
1104(c) (1974), authorizes an employer to provide a defined contribution individual account
plan. The Department of Labor's regulations, see 29 C.F.R. § 2550A04c-l(b)(1)(ii), (b)(3)
(1997), provide that, in such plans, an employer must offer an employee a minimum of three
diversified investment alternatives with different risk and return characteristics. See generally
Vickie L. Bajtelsmit & Jack L. VanDerhei, Risk Aversion and Pension Investment Choices, in
POSITIONING PENSIONS, supra note 30, at 45, 50-56 (discussing investment decision-making by
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receives the proceeds of the account's investment performance.34
Although defined benefit plans protect employees better against some
retirement risks, 5 employers prefer the defined contribution plans for
numerous reasons, particularly because they are less costly to admin-
ister.3
6
Americans can satisfy their retirement and other needs through
the classic third method-saving outside of Social Security and em-
ployer-sponsored pensions.37 In this method, saving and investing
responsibility falls almost exclusively upon an individual, which
again raises the issue of education. Since government incentives to
encourage saving have been, at best, mixed,38 individuals should not
employees in defined contribution plans). But see Weiss & Sgaraglino, supra note 12, at 1196-
97 (explaining that the Section 404(c) regulations do not require complete diversification in the
finance sense of diversification within and across asset types).
34 See generally FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS, supra note 23, at
70-71 (explaining that the benefit payable at retirement reflects employer and employee contri-
butions and investment gains or losses).
3- See Olsen & VanDerhei, supra note 28, at 7-8 (referring to discussion of risks in Zvi
Bodie, Pensions As Retirement Income Insurance, J. ECON. LIT., March 1990, at 28-49). But see
Gordon, supra note 12, at 1539-40 (observing that employers providing defined benefit plans
captured most of the growth in invested plan assets from 1980 to 1995, since their pension obli-
gations to employees were fixed). Other risks facing retirees include the risk that a retiree will
have insufficient assets to maintain a pre-retirement standard of living and that an employer/plan
sponsor will become bankrupt.
36 The costs of defined benefit plans include not only the actuariai help to calculate the
employer contributions needed to provide the agreed-upon benefits for retirees, but also the
premium paid to a government retirement insurance fund (the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpo-
ration) to protect employees of companies that fail to fund their pension liabilities. See Olsen &
VanDerhei, supra note 28, at 13-14 (discussing costs); see also Ball & Bethell, supra note 23, at
259, 289 n.1 (attributing the decline of defined benefit plans to employer cost savings); Haim A.
Mozes, The Role of Taxes in the Shift in Emphasis from Defined Benefit Plans to Defined
Contribution Plans 1 (Dec. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (associating
declining use of defined contribution plans with decreased corporate tax rates after 1986). But
see RICHARD A. IPPOLrIO, PENSION PLANS AND EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE,
ANALYSIS, AND POLICY 85-89 (1997) (arguing that the decline of defined benefit plans owes
much to the popularity of Section 401(k) plans). Yet the cost issue does not uniformly support
defined contribution plans (e.g., new workers may not accrue any benefits under defined benefit
plans, which is a cost advantage for these plans from an employer's perspective). Defined bene-
fit plans, like Sociai Security, are "pay-as-you-go" in nature and thus favor older workers at the
expense of younger workers and may thus lead employers in industries where new or younger
employees are more productive to abandon such plans. See DISNEY, supra note 25, at 110-21
(explaining how, in defined benefit plans, older workers benefit at the expense of others, as they
are given early retirement, which typically requires more contributions from younger workers).
Defined contribution plans might simply be more suitable in a labor environment where highly-
educated employees "rent" their services to many companies over their working lives, which
means that they could not take full advantage of defined benefit plans that require several years
for vesting. See SASS, supra note 19, at 240-41.
37 See Ball & Bethel, supra note 23.
38 See BERNHEIM, THE VANISHING NEST EGG, supra note 6, at 107-08, 116-17 (describ-
ing how low capital gains tax rates and favorable tax treatment of home mortgage deductions
encourage consumption, rather than saving). By contrast, the favorable tax treatment of the
Individual Retirement Account or "IRA" encourages saving. See FUNDAMENTALS OF EM-
PLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS, supra note 23, at 163-71 (describing how an employee (as well as
his or her spouse) not covered by a pension plan at work can make a deductible IRA contribu-
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shoulder all of the blame for the low national saving rate.39  Yet be-
cause individuals must rely at least partly upon income from their
savings for their future needs, their present saving rate and their deci-
sions about how to invest the saved funds are critical for their future.
Finally, as a result of the enormous changes in consumer finan-
cial services during the past several decades, financial firms offer or-
dinary people numerous investment products and options, which may
enable people to better assume the new burdens of saving and invest-
ing and may even help cause an increased use of defined contribution
plans. However, these products require financial literacy so that an
individual will understand and choose knowledgeably among the
many kinds of securities when designing an optimal portfolio. Indi-
viduals' investment options are not, as once was the case, merely
savings deposits or a few insurance products with a saving compo-
nent; brokerage services and most financial products are no longer
limited to the wealthy. Because of technological developments and
competition in financial services, individuals with modest financial
resources can now purchase sophisticated investment products and
services. 4° Most importantly, the investment company or asset man-
agement industry, which provides consumers with professional
tion). The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 substantially modified IRAs and established a "Roth
IRA" (named after a Senate sponsor) where, depending upon an income qualification, an indi-
vidual can make a nondeductible contribution to an IRA account and where accumulated earn-
ings and distributions are not taxed, provided that funds remain in the account for a minimum
period. See generally Paul Yakoboski & Bill Pierron, IRAs: It's a Whole New Ballgame,
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RES. INST. NOTES, Sept. 1997, at 1, 1-4. The new law facilitates (i.Le,
assesses no tax penalty on) withdrawals from all IRAs for special consumption purposes, such
as education and first-time home purchase, which could undermine the saving incentive aspect.
See, e.g., R. Glenn Hubbard & Jonathan S. Skinner, Assessing the Effectiveness of Saving In-
centives, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1996, at 73, 73-90 (reviewing debate over the value and costs of
saving incentives). But see James M. Poterba et al., How Retirement Saving Programs Increase
Saving, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1996, at 91, 111 (concluding, on the basis of empirical data, that
tax-favored accounts (IRAs and 401(k)s) do, in fact, increase saving, and do not involve a shift
of savings from other investment vehicles); Eric M. Engen & William G. Gale, Debt, Taxes, and
the Effects of 401(k) Plans on Household Wealth Accumulation 28-29 (May 1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (questioning whether eligibility for 401(k) plans has in fact
increased participants' wealth).
39 See generally BERNHEtM, THE VANISHING NEST EGG, supra note 6, at 5-35 (describ-
ing the decline in the U.S. saving rate since 1973, the poor saving rate in comparison to those in
other developed countries, and refuting arguments that such decline is illusory). See also
CHRISTOPHER CONTE, THE NATIONAL SUMMrr ON RETIREMENT SAVINGS: AGENDA
BACKGROUND MATERIALS 10-11 (1998) (presenting data on contemporary saving rates); Arthur
B. Kennickell et al., Family Finances in the U.S.: Recent Evidence from the Survey of Consumer
Finances, 83 FED. RESERVE BULL 1, 1 (Jan. 1997) (same).
40 Cf. ROY C. SMITH & INGO WALTER, GLOBAL BANKING 189 (1997) (describing how
new technology enables financial services companies to provide their services and investments
in a cost efficient manner). See generally David M. Bartholomew & Dena L. Murphy, The
Internet and Securities Regulation: What's Next?, 25 SEC. REG. LJ. 177, 177-79 (1997) (pro-
viding a review of the effects of the internet on securities regulation); Robert A. Robertson,
Personal Investing in Cyberspace and the Federal Securities Laws, 23 SEC. REG. L.J. 347, 362-
74 (1996) (discussing benefits to investors oftechnology advances).
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money management, has grown tremendously in the past two dec-
ades, and gives consumers a bewildering array of investment
choices.
B. The Culture of Individual Responsibility and Education
Therefore, developments in Social Security, pensions, saving and
consumer financial services all emphasize individual saving and in-
vesting responsibility and decision-making, and could support the
need for investor education. However, different, more paternalistic,
solutions to the saving and investing crisis are imaginable and may
even be preferable, particularly if one is doubtful that most people
could be trained to bear this responsibility. A government agency, for
example, could mandate the amount an individual should save and the
appropriate investment of the savings. In fact, government paternal-
ism is manifest in Social Security and pension law, for Social Secu-
rity forces individuals to put aside money for retirement (and dictates
the investment of these "trust funds"), and pension and tax law gener-
ally favor pension plans that remove decision-making from employ-
ees.42 Although economists debate the advantages and purposes of
paternalism in retirement programs, common sense suggests that it
beneficially addresses the failure of individuals, for a number of un-
derstandable psychological reasons, to plan adequately for their future
consumption.43 A powerful argument for paternalistic pension poli-
cies is that, according to the psychological and behavioral literature,
and data, people often do not act rationally in their saving and in-
vesting activities. 44
41 See Investment Company Institute, 1998 Mutual Fund Fact Book (visited Aug. 15,
1998) <http://www.ici.org/facts.figureslfactbook98_toc.html> [hereinafter 1998 Mutual Fund
Fact Book] (presenting charts illustrating such growth); see also Ingo Walter, Global Competi-
tion and Market Access in the Securities Industry, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS:
HARMONIZATION VERSUS COMPETITION 84, 92-94 (Claude E. Barfield ed., 1996) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS] (describing growth of investment companies and pen-
sion funds); All Aboard, ECONOMIST, Oct. 25, 1997, at 5, 5-10 [hereinafter All Aboard] (de-
scribing tremendous fund growth); Wall Street: Giants Go Hunting, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 1997,
at 81, 81 (documenting investment banks' acquisitions as a way of increasing access to retail
investors).
42 See generally Weiss, supra note 28, at 1279-85 (explaining that the largest tax subsidy
goes to employer-sponsored pension plans where employee participation is mandatory).
43 See id. at 1285-97 (surveying the debate among economists over paternalism); id. at
1297-1311 (discussing human behavior that justifies paternalism in pension policy); see also
Alexander, supra note 12, at 134-39 (reviewing arguments justifying paternalism).
44 See B. Douglas Bernheim et a., What Accounts for the Variation in Retirement
Wealth Among U.S. Households? 34-35 (Sept. 1997) (unpublished draft, on file with author)
(concluding that the life-cycle model of consumption can not explain data about individuals'
consumption pre- and post-retirement, because individuals are often surprised by their decline in
income following retirement); Gordon, supra note 12, at 1557-59 (discussing loss aversion and
salience as psychological barriers to making high levels of equity investments); Richard H.
Thaler, Psychology and Savings Policies, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 186, 186 (May 1994) (arguing
that psychological factors cause investors to fall to perform optimal life-cycle investing). See
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Constraints in American culture, however, significantly limit
paternalism because the culture favors, promotes and thus determines
a preference for individual responsibility and decision-making. Short
of a financial cataclysm, these constraints make unlikely any appre-
ciable increase in government paternalism in Social Security and pen-
sion policy that would significantly limit this preference. (This does
not mean that there will, and should, not be significant government
intervention in the saving and investing crisis that is paternalistic in
nature.45) The same culture that foregrounds individual responsibility
also assumes that individuals should be educated to accept this bur-
den. It thus ensures that investor education will inevitably accom-
pany the new saving and investing tasks placed on Americans, par-
ticularly since these activities have become a part of ordinary life.
Because investor education is, therefore, a cultural "given," scholars
should consider ways of improving it, instead of focusing most of
their attention on more paternalistic saving and investing policies.
It is assumed here that culture instills in each individual methods
of motivating and understanding their own behavior and also that of
others, while not placing them in a mental straightjacket. 46 What may
be drawn from this assumption is that in American culture, individu-
als look to, and expect to rely upon, their own efforts for many
achievements, including saving and investing success. Individuals
expect that much of their financial well-being should flow from these
savings and investment efforts. Because it is cultural, the "ideology"
of self-help animates both the wealthy and those with limited finan-
cial resources.47 The social- and self-understandings that the ideology
generates are powerful, and thus constraining, because they have been
generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471, 1477-78 (1998) (discussing data calling into question rationality of economic ac-
tors); Cass R. Sunstein, The Future of Law and Economics: Looking Forward: Behavioral
Analysis of Law, 64 U. CH. L. REV. 1175, 1179-92 (1997) (outlining psychological factors that
can affect rationality).
45 See, e.g., Weiss & Sgaraglino, supra note 12, at 1207-09 (proposing safe harbor rules
for small pension plans to encourage proper diversification of pension assets).
46 "Culture" does not explain all behavior, attitudes or viewpoints in a country, for within
any given culture there are innumerable subcultures, often at odds with the dominant culture.
Yet, just as nearly every human practice is to a degree conventional and made up of shared
goals, routines, and procedures, so also do citizens share certain common viewpoints. See gen-
erally STANLEY FISH, PROFESSIONAL CORRECTNESS: LrIERARY STUDIES AND POLITICAL
CHANGE 82 (1995) ("Each effort only makes sense in relation to the traditions, goals, obligatory
routines, and normative procedures that comprise its history and are the content of its distinct-
iveness ... ."); CLIFFORD GEERT'Z, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS 89
(1973) ("[culture] denotes an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols,
a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men commu-
nicate,lerpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.").
See, e.g., FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at xv (expressing this ideology).
But see ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOwARDs GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND
AMERICAN DECLINE 66-82 (1996) (arguing that current societal pressures undermine the tradi-
tional cultural emphasis upon individual responsibility).
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formed in history and by earlier common experiences. 48 Yet the past
alone does not determine the American cultural preference for indi-
vidual responsibility, for the present reinforces it in countless ways.
49
The shared perspectives of this culture that emphasize individual
responsibility do not leave individuals unaided. Rather, within the
culture, individuals accept a burden as an appropriate individual task
only if they receive a minimum of collective support and training to
develop their respective talents, and to recognize and make use of
opportunities, in the human activity in question.50  The culture thus
ensures that education inevitably accompanies individual growth and
responsibility. Under its central and traditional justifications, educa-
tion "forms" or "empowers" men and women so that they can func-
tion responsibly in our society. However, the "constraining" side of
education should not be ignored. In instructing individuals how best
to accomplish a given activity, education creates and reinforces the
collective understanding that the activity is an individual, as opposed
to social, undertaking and helps to limit the ways in which individuals
engage in the activity.
A culture that places responsibility on individuals and educates
them to bear it should similarly affect Americans' understanding of
saving and investing. Yet something more is needed for these activi-
ties to fall into the familiar cultural pattern. Saving and investing
must become everyday activities, similar to learning how to find a job
48 See, e.g., MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLmCAL ROOTS
OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 29-31 (1994) (citing American experiences of self-reliance
and resistance to centralized government and financial power as formative elements in an
American "way of thinking"); see also LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND
How THE BANKERS USE IT 163 (1914) (expressing characteristic American academic hostility
towards centers of financial and economic power). See generally Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evo-
lution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 643-44 (1996) (suggesting that certain
behavior and practices are "path dependent," or determined by historical circumstances).
49 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law
from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV.
627, 681-84 (1996) (discussing cases that impose a duty upon individuals to read information on
investments that has been given to them).
50 Cf. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 19, at 3-4 (discussing "scientific" progressive justifica-
tion for bureaucratic control of schools); FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at 144
("Mostly, [the establishment of the school system in the United States] simply reflected the
importance that was attached by the community to the ideal of equality of opportunity.");
Cleveland, supra note 26, at 85-88 (noting that universal elementary and secondary education in
the U.S. was the product of the Progressive Era); Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family
Law, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 1135, 1152 (discussing influence of the Enlightenment theory upon
provision and methods of education in the U.S.).
51 On the constraining side of education see, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND
PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 184-92 (1979) which criticizes traditional Enlightenment
justifications of education). Like all educators, those engaged in investor education must be
sensitive to, and constantly question, the limitations placed upon students through education.
See James A. Fanto, Investor Education, Securities Disclosure and the Creation and Enforce-
ment of Corporate Governance and Firm Norms, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. (Forthcoming 1998)
(manuscript at 18-20, on file with author) (discussing limiting or "reifying" aspect of education).
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or housing, that nearly all members of society must undertake, and
that are thus critical to one's individual and social development, sur-
vival and advancement. For all the reasons discussed earlier, par-
ticularly the transformations in retirement plans and consumer finan-
cial services, personal saving and investing have achieved this com-
monplace status. Individuals thus expect to depend upon their own
efforts and saving and investing decisions and also feel entitled to
investor education.
In fact, the very nature of American capitalism has made indi-
vidual investing an ordinary activity, which inevitably leads to in-
vestor education. Unlike capitalism in other countries, American
capitalism has always been characterized by capital market financing
in which companies primarily raise funds on securities markets from
dispersed investors, not privately from large financial intermediar-
ies. 52 In recent times, these capital markets have experienced tremen-
dous growth because an increased number of ordinary individuals are
participating in them, again often through defined contribution re-
tirement plans.53 This capitalism simply cannot grow, or exist at its
present level, unless the consumer capital providers know how to
participate in these markets, whether as direct investors or through
collective investment vehicles, such as mutual funds.
54
Indeed, another aspect of American culture-a longstanding
"Main Street" hostility to, suspicion of, and yet irresistible attraction
to the dominant market capitalism typified by Wall Street-reinforces
individuals' expectations of receiving investor education so that they
can participate in a "game!' where the deck has often been stacked
against them. Historically, many ordinary citizens, politicians and
intellectuals disliked Wall Street because, in their view, Wall Street
52 See, e.g., ROE, supra note 48, at 3-8; see also Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A
Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 748-73 (1997) (surveying corporate financing
and governance systems).
53 See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, FACT BOOK FOR THE YEAR 1997 57-59 (1998)
[hereinafter FAC BOOK] (discussing growth of individual stock ownership in America and
observing that one in three adults owns stock directly or indirectly); Edward Wyatt, Share of
Wealth in Stock Holdings Hits 50-Year High, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1998, at Al (observing that
Americans have more of their funds invested in the stock market than in other assets); cf. Bar-
tholomew & Murphy, supra note 40, at 177-78 (noting growth in the amount that individuals
invest through the Internet).
5 Indeed, investor education is becoming important in other countries that are moving
from bank-centered capitalism to market capitalism because consumers need to be taught to
save and invest if capital markets in these countries are to grow. See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN
SECURITIES COMM'N & FINANCIAL PLANNING ASSOCIATION OF AUSTRALIA LTD., DON'T KISS
YOUR MONEY GOODBYE: How TO CHOOSE A FINANCIAL ADVISOR (1997); SEC, Fiist-Ever
Hemisphere-Wide Investor Education Campaign Planned (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http://
www.sec.gov/newspress/97-1 11> (on file with author) (discussing investor education campaign
to be coordinated by financial regulators throughout the Americas). This Article is part of a
larger research agenda that also examines investor education outside the United States.
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professionals took advantage of investors and misused their money.55
The financial power of the investment community also potentially
undermined individual initiative since financial institutions dominated
many economic activities and thus eliminated areas for individual
economic expression and activity.56 Yet this suspicion of Wall Street
was always coupled with an attraction to investing, the possible in-
vestment gains and to the successful investors in ways often akin to
the love and hatred of gambling and gamblers. 57  From these addi-
tional cultural perspectives, investor education should correct the
"educational" asymmetry between ordinary investors and Wall Street
professionals to ensure that these investors could at least play the po-
tentially valuable investing "game" better.
While it is not easy to gather empirical evidence about a concept
as elusive as culture and while such evidence is not critical to estab-
lish the above argument, available data support the conclusions drawn
from this general overview of American culture. For example, data
suggests that Americans desire personal responsibility in investing
and value investor education to improve their investing performance.
Empirical studies have examined (and continue to examine) individ-
ual investing attitudes and behavior, particularly in retirement plans,
with the goal of developing policies that increase personal saving ac-
tivity and produce optimal investing behavior. The studies uniformly
show that individuals want to control, or at least to be significantly
involved in, investment decisions. Furthermore, investors want to
feel that their efforts matter in their financial future.58 More impor-
55 See ROE, supra note 48, at 31-32 (discussing Populist hostility to Wall Street); JOEL
SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 19-38 (1982) (discussing political
responses to the 1929 stock market crash); Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regula-
tion? 300 Years of Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 850-51 (1997) (describing popular Anglo-
American hostility to speculators). But see YANKELOVICH PARTNERS INC., 1997 ANNUAL SIA
INVESTOR SURVEY: INVESTORS' ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 5 (1997)
(showing that, in an investor survey prepared for the Securities Industry Association, 64% of
investors surveyed have a favorable view of the securities industry).
56 See BRANDEIS, supra note 48, at 1-27 (positing a classic statement of hostility towards
Wall Street).
-7 See ROBERT J. SHILLER, MARKET vOLATILITY 59 (1989) ("Investing in speculative
assets clearly shares with gambling the element of play .... The satisfaction afforded by gam-
bling is related to the individual's ego involvement in the activity; and thus individual investors
must themselves play to achieve satisfaction, and most do not rely on others for decisions.").
Even business law scholars show much respect for "great" investors. See, e.g., The Essays of
Warren Buffett: Lessons for Corporate America, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1997) (symposium on
this famous investor with a collection of his essays and contributions by over 20 well-known
scholars).
58 See, e.g., CONTE, supra note 39, at 8-9 (citing results of U.S. Department of Labor's
survey of focus groups); Arthur B. Kennickell et al., Saving and Financial Planning: Some
Findings from a Focus Group, 8 FIN. COUNSELING & PLAN. EDUC. 4 (1997) (emphasizing
"self-control" in saving and financial planning); Olsen & VanDerhei, supra note 28, at 32 (re-
viewing literature which suggests that employees favor defined contribution plans because they
like the control and the choice to use retirement savings for other uses, if the need arises; "While
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-tantly, the studies also strongly suggest that people want and use in-
vestor education, which appears both to increase their saving rate and
to make their investing decisions accord better with the financial
principles. 59
retirement planning is important, many workers find saving for children's education, purchasing
a home, and other consumption activities equally or more important.") (footnote omitted); Reno
& Friedland, supra note 26, at 189 (citing survey results that individuals place more emphasis
upon their own self-directed saving than Social Security in thinking about retirement funds and
noting that "[plerhaps individual discretion brings a sense of control, which leads to a sense of
security and confidence"). The desire for individual control is reflected in the popularity of
retirement or saving plans that permit an individual to have access, through loans or fund with-
drawals, to retirement funds for other needs. See General Accounting Office, 401(k) Pension
Plans: Loan Provisions Enhance Participation But May Affect Income Security for Some
(GAO/IHEHS-98-5, Oct. 1997) (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http://www.gao.gov/AindexFY98/
abstracts/he98005.html> (on file with author) (presenting data suggesting that participation and
contribution rates are higher in pension plans with loan provisions). Recent changes in IRAs
seem to embrace this perspective since they expand the allowable reasons for withdrawing
retirement funds without triggering a tax penalty. See Yakoboski & Pierron, supra note 38, at 4.
From a cultural perspective, this empirical data is predictable: if people are "taught" that in-
vesting is an individual activity, they obviously will want to control it themselves.
9 See, e.g., PATRICK J. BAYER ET AL, THE EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL EDUCATION IN THE
'WORKPLACE: EVIDENCE FROM A SURVEY OF EMPLOYERS 19 (National Bureau of Econ. Re-
search Working Paper No. 5655, 1996) ("Retirement education-and frequent seminars in par-
ticular-positively affect the size of contributions to self-directed plans."); BERNHEIM, ET AL.,
EDUCATION AND SAVING, supra note 6, at 3 (presenting statistical research, based on survey,
suggesting "strong indications that mandates [requiring financial education] not only increased
exposure to financial education, but also systematically altered adult behavior by stimulating
greater saving"); BERNHEIM & GARRETr, supra note 6, at 19 (using a database on household
interviews, the authors find that employees rely heavily on financial education in the workplace,
and that it affects financial choice); CONTE, supra note 39, at 23 (citing studies which show
"employees regard financial education as an important and attractive benefit"); EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE 1997 RETIREMENT CONFIDENCE SURVEY (RCS)
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 9 (1998) ("Worker education programs do appear to influence individ-
ual behavior. First, 45 percent of those using the educational material report that it led them to
begin contributing to the plan. In addition, the RCS found that among users of educational
material, 49 percent report that it led them to change the allocation of their money among the
investment options offered, and 38 percent said that it led them to change the amount they con-
tributed to the plan."); Deborah Milne et al., Can We Save Enough to Retire? Participant Edu-
cation in Defined Contribution Plans, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF NO. 160,
April 1995, at I (discussing positive results of investor education programs); Deborah Milne et
al., Participant Education: Actions and Outcomes, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF
No. 169, Jan. 1996, at 22 (concluding that pension plan education produces positive saving and
investing results and that investors like to be involved in investing decision-making); Paul Ya-
koboski & Jack VanDerhei, Worker Investment Decisions: An Analysis of Large 401(k) Plan
Data, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF NO. 176, Aug. 1996, at 3 (noting a survey of
employees in three major companies, AT&T, IBM and New York Life, shows that 46% of
individuals reallocated money on the basis of educational materials explaining asset allocation
and diversification); Zvi Bodie & Dwight B. Crane, Personal Investing: Advice, Theory, and
Evidence from a Survey of TIAA-CREF Participants 15 (May 28, 1997) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author) ("While TIAA-CREF participants are on average better informed and
more experienced at making their own investment choices than the general population, our
findings suggest that, given enough education, information, and experience, people will tend to
manage their self-directed investment accounts in an appropriate manner."); see also
YANKELOVICH PARTNERS INC., supra note 55, at 7 (reporting that surveyed investors desire
more investor education from financial firms). But see CONTE, supra note 39, at 9 (discussing
investors' confusion over educational materials).
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Since American culture thus gives investor education, an impor-
tant and inevitable, but not an exclusive, role in saving and investing,
scholars interested in financial markets, pension policy or related
fields should analyze this education from various theoretical perspec-
tives, compare current educational efforts with their theoretical con-
clusions, and propose improvements to the education. Legal scholars
have particularly neglected this agenda as they have seldom examined
investor education and, when they have, they have generally down-
played it,6° preferring to focus their attention on paternalistic saving
and investing policies that, at times, remove, or substantially restrict,
individual decision-making. 61 Although occasionally appearing to
reveal an academic hostility to market-oriented solutions,62 these
scholars believe-with considerable justification-that most consum-
ers, with little time, few assets and well-documented psychological
inhibitions to saving and investing optimally,63 do not belong in the
bewildering and often difficult investment world.64 Yet economists
60 Professor Hu, for example, gives equivocal support to investor education. See Hu, su-
pra note 12, at 2372 ("The road ahead is less clear. Investor education, through modified dis-
closure requirements or otherwise, will help. But there are limits to the efficacy of education.
A rethinking of the locus of investment decisionmaking is appropriate. Devising alternatives to
the need for universal literacy and universal decisionmaking is essential."); id. at 2377 ("Despite
all of these limitations, I think that efforts at investor education and more comprehensible forms
of mandated disclosure are worthwhile.").
61 See, e.g., LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 27, at 742 (supporting paternalism); Gordon,
supra note 12, at 1566 (recommending that finandial instruments allowing investors to capture
the upside of market with some downside protection be added to investment options in pension
plans); Hu, supra note 12, at 2378 ("regulatory steps that would have the effect of causing the
less financially sophisticated to more seriously consider asset allocation funds do make sense to
me."); Weiss, supra note 28, at 1311-19 (recommending a number of paternalistic policies,
including mandatory savings plans, that counter individuals' abilities to hurt themselves in
saving). But see Weiss & Sgaraglino, supra note 12, at 1212-13 (advocating a "mild sort of
paternalism" whereby "pension funds should be permitted to allow workers to choose the level
of rational risk they wish to bear.").
62 Cf RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS IN THE NEW
DEAL 1-13 (1995) (observing that legal academics in the United States have been historically
hostile to market solutions and private economic activity, including private law practice, and
favorable to government solutions to social problems).
63 See supra note 44.
64 See, e.g., Hu, supra note 12, at 2326 ("End runs around universal literacy and univer-
sal probabilistic decisionmaking are thus essential. Because of certain structural biases inherent
to existing investment arrangements, such end-runs are especially likely to benefit those who are
poorly educated and, educated or not, those who are simply unable to assume significant in-
vestment risks."); Weiss, supra note 28, at 1300-11 (exploring the psychological difficulties
facing investors). They may also simply express the despair of professors, who appreciate the
difficulties of their subject matter and wonder how ordinary people can comprehend it. See, e.g.,
Hu, supra note 12, at 2367-71 (discussing difficulties even the sophisticated investors face in
understanding the complexities of finance); see also DAVIS, supra note 27, at 29 (observing that
consumers' inability to understand financial information is an economic justification for social
security); KRIPKE, supra note 4, at 14 (discussing the SEC staff's traditional view that the ordi-
nary investor is incapable of making investment decisions by herself); Lawrence J. White, Com-
petition Versus Harmonization-An Overview of International Regulation of Financial Services,
in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note 41, at 17-18 (explaining that paternalism
in financial policy has traditionally been based on the belief that, even if ordinary individuals
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and financial economists-that is, the actual finance and investment
specialists-both hypothesize and find that financial education can
help a typical consumer in her saving and investing decisions. By
ignoring investor education, legal scholars are simply neglecting an
important policy tool in the mix of possible solutions to the emerging
saving and investing crisis.
Finally, the growing emphasis on investor education in America,
while historically contingent, demands scholarly attention not because
it is necessarily the preferred solution as a normative matter, although
a normative argument could be made for it.65 Rather, since it is a
major cultural solution, investor education's neglect or absence can
produce troubling, and potentially catastrophic, social consequences.
If nearly all Americans have saving and investing responsibility and
decision-making, particularly in defined contribution retirement
plans, their well-being in retirement and even the assets that they pass
on to their heirs will depend, if there is no organized investor educa-
tion, upon such circumstances as an individual's inherent financial
ability and/or the quality of her financial advisors. The significant
wealth disparities in the United States, between those with and with-
out such retirement plans, therefore, will be joined by further distinc-
receive information on investing, many of them either will not understand it, or can not invest
well despite it).
The argument would be that optimal saving and investing from an overall societal per-
spective will occur when, with an accompanying general social protection as a minimal Social
Security program, individuals have a major role in making decisions regarding their own saving
and investing behavior and are educated, as early as possible, as to the consequences of their
choices, before circumstances inevitably "educate" them. This normative statement generally
relies on the common sense observations that there exists a great range of individual prefer-
ences, attitudes, motivations and behavior and that any plan or policy to harness or modify them
will inevitably fail. An eloquent statement of this normative position is the following:
Not only do we not possess such an all-inclusive scale of values: it would be im-
possible for any mind to comprehend the infinite variety of different needs of dif-
ferent people which compete for the available resources and to attach a definite
weight to each. For our problem it is of minor importance whether the ends for
which any person cares comprehend only his own individual needs, or whether
they include the needs of his close or even those of his more distant fellows-that
is, whether he is egoistic or altruistic in the ordinary senses of these words. The
point which is so important is the basic fact that it is impossible for any man to
survey more than a limited field, to be aware of the urgency of more than a limited
number of needs. Whether his interests center [a]round his own physical needs, or
whether he takes a warm interest in the welfare of every human being he knows,
the ends about which he can be concerned will always be only an infinitesimal
fraction of the needs of all men.
FMIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 58-59 (1944); see also Alexander, supra note
12, at 130 ("A sense of responsibility develops only when a person has the opportunity to act
responsibly."); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Nature of Man, J. APPLIED
CORP. FiN., Summer 1994, at 5 ("Human beings are not only capable of learning about new
opportunities, they also engage in resourceful, creative activities that expand their opportunities
in various ways.").
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tions between people who, for whatever reason, save and invest well
in the plans and those who do not.66 Providing an adequate investor
education will help prevent this potential source of disparity of eco-
nomic well-being. It is admittedly, however, only one solution and
should not be used to foreclose others.67 Whatever its justification or
consequences, individual responsibility is with us, as is education.
The difficult, but necessary questions are what kinds of investor edu-
cation individuals need and who should deliver it to them.
Ill. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
As a preliminary matter, investor education, like any education,
means much more than supplying information to individuals.6 8 In-
vestor education suggests that individuals receive the cognitive and
conceptual means to make sense of information and to guide their
behavior. 69 Without this conceptual framework, they will not under-
stand any information given as relevant to their activity, and their be-
havior will be incomprehensible to those who already possess the
framework and operate within the activity. As they are educated re-
garding the activity, investors come to understand the relevance and
importance of information and the motivations and behavior of those
participating in it (e.g., what is important and what is not, how sig-
nificant is some, as opposed to other, information, and what behavior
66 I owe this observation to Professor Daniel Greenwood.
67 Such other solutions include forcing investors to place a certain percentage of their re-
tirement assets in particular kinds of investments. See Zvi BODIE & DWIGHT CRANE, TIE
DESIGN AND PRODUCTION OF NEW RETIREMENT SAVINGS PRODUCTS (Harvard Business School
Working Paper 98-070, 1998) (proposing retirement investment products placing a "floor" on
investment risk); Gordon, supra note 12, at 1566 (recommending that defined contribution plans
include an equity portfolio with a collar); Weiss & Sgaraglino, supra note 12, at 1213 (requiring
investment options in defined contribution plans to be adequately diversified). Moreover, edu-
cation can hardly address disparities arising from levels of compensation, which allow some to
save more than others, and from differences in employers' retirement plans. And it can not by
itself address the wealth disparity between those who can and can not save. Investor education
could at least give low-income individuals some basic saving and investing skills so that, when
they have funds available for saving, they know what to do with them.
68 Education is thus not captured well by the general economic concepts of "absence of
information" and "information asymmetry" between a consumer and financial professional.
Absence of information simply describes the situation in which an individual must make choices
and decisions without complete information, while information asymmetry refers to transactions
in which one contracting party has information that is not available to the other. See, e.g., White,
supra note 64, at 16.
69 See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 365 (1980) (discussing literary interpretation and observing that
when "we try to persuade others to our beliefs because if they believe what we believe, they
will, as a consequence of those beliefs, see what we see; and the facts to which we point in order
to support our interpretations will be as obvious to them as they are to us. Indeed, this is the
whole of critical activity, an attempt on the part of one party to alter the beliefs of another so
that the evidence cited by the first will be seen as evidence by the second") (emphasis in origi-
nal).
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follows from specific understandings). 70  For example, individuals
need more than a definition to make sense of a "stock" or "bond," for
they must learn why an enterprise raises funds in different ways and
what risks different investments pose for them. Again, it is important
to remember that, however designed, investor education must con-
centrate on imparting certain skills, at the expense of others, if it is to
be successful (i.e., to help individuals to save and invest well in this
society).71 '
It is also useful, for analytic purposes, to divide investor educa-
tion into different categories based upon the goals or purposes-basi-
cally economic and fmancial 2 -that the education should fulfill. A
curricular order makes sense in learning since education about sav-
ings logically precedes education about investing. Finally, in consid-
ering who can best accomplish the different kinds of investor educa-
tion, it is important to consider which party, whether a private firm or
a government agency, has the incentives to, and can iri fact, offer the
education most effectively and in a cost efficient way. Any identifi-
cation of appropriate parties must depend upon certain assumptions-
which will be stated-about the motivations and functioning of pri-
vate market actors and of government agencies.
A. What is Investor Education?
1. Education About Saving
Individuals must first learn to save, which means deferring pres-
ent consumption of income or assets to meet later financial goals or,
in economic parlance, adjusting consumption rationally over the life
cycle so that savings and income from savings can replace income no
longer available (or not available in sufficient amounts) from em-
ployment.73 They must be taught to set, and see the usefulness in set-
70 The Article does not discuss those who can not be educated (e.g., incapacitated or
lacking decision-making ability). See generally Edward D. Berkowitz, The Historical Develop-
ment of Social Security in the United States, in SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 17, at 22, 29-36
(describing federal and state government safety nets, such as disability insurance, welfare,
Medicaid, for persons who fall into the disabled or incapacitated category).
71 1 argue elsewhere that investor education should move from its primarily financial fo-
cus to make ordinary individuals active, responsible owners of their investment property, which
would encourage them to consider issues beyond their personal portfolio, such as the normative
behavior of firms. See Fanto, supra note 51. Given, however, the crisis in saving and investing
in the United States, educational efforts should first aim to improve an individual's saving and
investing performance.
7 As I explain elsewhere, there are other goals, political or social, relating to saving and
investing. See id. The primary goal of investor education, however, should be to improve the
economic well-being of individuals, and these activities are primarily in the domain of eco-
nomics and finance.
73 Cf Thaler, supra note 44, at 186-87 (arguing that psychological factors cause investors
to fail to perform optimal life-cycle investing). This Article's references will be primarily to
popular, or at least more accessible, finance and economic materials because its focus is on a
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ting, such goals, which could include maintaining a certain lifestyle
after retirement or having funds available for some specific future
consumption (theirs or their children's). 74 Education about saving
should convey the understanding that saving is an important way to
achieve these goals because other sources of income may contribute
less to future consumption, may not provide as large a return as in-
vested savings or, for whatever reason, may simply disappear. 75
Education about saving thus changes one's conceptual frame-
work and behavior regarding money and finances. To see saving as a
way of achieving goals, a person must first understand her financial
situation (income, expenses, assets and debts) and make a reasonable
assessment of its likely future outlook. The consumer must then con-
sider how to adjust this financial situation to meet these goals, which
could require setting aside a certain amount of funds each month
and/or limiting present consumption.76 Saving as a method of attain-
ing long-term goals should make a consumer think of herself (and
family) as an economic unit, and regard each activity in financial or
economic terms.77 As a complementary way of viewing saving, each
person should realize that she will have differing needs and resources
at different times in the life cycle. An investor must anticipate these
different needs and provide for these later life stages or "selves. 78
consumer's education. The following discussion of saving thus echoes standard advice given in
numerous consumer guidebooks. See, e.g., DOL, TOP 10 WAYS TO BEAT THE CLOCK AND
PREPARE FOR RETIREMENT (1997); National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Investor
Training, Taking Charge of Your Finances: Assessing Your Current Finances (visited Sept. 15,
1998) <http://www.nasd.com>; National Institute for Consumer Education, The Basics of Sav-
ing and Investing: A Teaching Guide, at Unit 1 (visited Sept. 20, 1998) <http:www.nasd.com>
[hereinafter, Basics of Saving and Investing] (providing a six-unit investment teaching guide);
New York Stock Exchange, You and The Investment World, at 38-43 (visited Sept. 15, 1998)
<http:lwww.nyse.comlpublic/educate/6al6aix.htm> [hereinafter You and The Investment
World] (presenting investors with advice on investment alternatives).
74 An ambitious educational program on saving would also teach that saving benefits the
entire economy (and thus individuals and their children) by making funds available to a coun-
try's firms, which improves the competitive position of these firms by increasing external re-
sources for new projects. See BERNHEIM, THE VANISHING NEST EGG, supra note 6, at 39; id. at
40-43, 54-61 (describing the general dependency of domestic firms on domestic financing and
risks associated with foreign financing, such as higher interest rates, under-investment in proj-
ects, and currency appreciation); see also White, supra note 64, at 32-33 (discussing how insuf-
ficient saving causes the demise of domestic industries in world markets and a general lack of
confidence in a country's financial markets, resulting in unemployment).
75 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 12, at 1534-36.
76 It would also involve planning for unexpected emergencies by means of insurance and
emergency funds. See, e.g., AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, RETIREMENT SECuRrrY
INFORMATION (1997) (describing various forms of insurance protection).
77 Cf. CoNTE, supra note 39, at 23-24 (suggesting that financial education about personal
goals and budgeting enables employees to better understand business financial decisions).
78 See POSNER, supra note 13, at 95 ("The concept [of multiple selves] can also be
used-though here great caution is necessary-to justify, nonpaternalistically, the conferral of
certain rights on the future self against the selfishness of the current self."); Sunstein, supra note
44, at 1184-86 (discussing the differences between one's prediction about a future event and
one's actual experience of it); Richard H. Thaler & H.M. Shefrin, An Economic Theory of Self-
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Education about saving should also include an explanation of the
many psychological pressures that undermine willpower regarding
saving, such as excessive focus on the present ("myopia") and impul-
siveness. 79 Appreciation of such pressures and of one's own particu-
lar psychological profile regarding saving and future planning in gen-
eral is critical since behavioral studies demonstrate that successful
saving involves issues of will as much as intelligence. 80 The educa-
tion should thus generate substantial self- and social knowledge, not
only about the goals one sets but also regarding the consuntion
temptations to which a typical American consumer is subject. A
person must also learn attitudes and behavior (even behavioral
"tricks") that help one resist such psychological pressures, such as
placing funds to be saved in separate accounts, and thus removing
them from the temptation of current consumption. Indeed, like other
behavior enabling people to function on a day-to-day basis, successful
saving involves following simplified, informal rules or "norms" that
can be easily applied, are reinforced by others and become almost
habitual.8
2
More specifically, this kind of education would also convey a
basic understanding about Social Security and the program's func-
Control in QUASI-RATIONAL ECONOMICS 77, 79 (1991) (assuming a "two-self' person; a
"planner" who is concerned with the future and a "doer" who experiences the present). People
must simply learn to imagine or anticipate their future views and needs.
79 See Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1179-84 (describing pressures such as aversion to loss
and to extremes of any kind, unrealistic optimism, overconfidence, etc.); Weiss, supra note 28,
at 1297-1311 (describing pressures).
8o See, e.g., EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 1998 RETIREMENT CONFIDENCE
SURVEY, RETIREMENT PLANNING PERSONALITIES: FROM DENIERS TO PLANNERS 1-3 (1998)
(categorizing kinds of personalities-deniers, strugglers, impulsives, cautious savers, planners,
retiring savers, and their saving strategies); Thaler, supra note 44, at 187 ("Saving requires
willpower, which humans (or at least men) have sometimes had trouble summoning since the
time of Adam and Eve.").
81 See BERNHEIM, THE VANISHING NEST EGG, supra note 6, at 66-92 (discussing how
popular culture encourages present consumption).
82 See Hersh M. Shefrin & Richard H. Thaler, The Behavioral Life-Cycle Hypothesis, in
QUASI-RATIONAL ECONOMICS, supra note 78, at 97 (describing usefulness of "habitual rules" in
enabling individuals to resist impulses, and explaining prominence of "mental accounts,"
whereby individuals divide their income and assets into various accounts, some of which they
consider unavailable for current consumption); Thaler & Shefrin, supra note 78, at 81 (observ-
ing that people often use learned "self-imposed rules of thumb" in saving because they reduce
decision-making discretion). Indeed, as part of education about saving, people should be taught
to establish, at least mentally, accounts for current vs. long-term expenditures. In a sense, these
rules are the informal norms that guide much human behavior. See generally Assar Lindbeck,
Incentives and Social Norms in Household Behavior, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 370, 375-76 (1997)
(discussing saving and consumption norms); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development,
and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 351 (1997) (defining "norms" as obligations
that are not imposed by law, but can be imposed either by decentralized groups or even
throughout society); Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87
AM. ECON. REv. 365, 365 (1997) ("By 'social norm' ('norm' for short) I shall mean a rule that
is neither promulgated by an official source, such as a court or a legislature, nor enforced by the
threat of legal sanctions, yet is regularly complied with (otherwise it wouldn't be a rule).")
(footnote omitted).
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tioning and terms of eligibility. 83  The education would also help a
consumer achieve an elementary understanding of tax-favored retire-
ment saving plans, such as employer pensions, IRAs and others, as
well as their availability. 84 In addition, it might train a consumer
about methods available from financial institutions for non-retirement
saving, such as automatic paycheck deposits or debits to accounts.
2. Education About Investing
Since a major goal of investor education is to have a consumer
achieve an optimal investment portfolio, the consumer must under-
stand how to invest well. Finance theory, which studies investment
strategy, should establish this basic understanding. Like any intel-
lectual discipline, finance presupposes a familiarity with a conceptual
framework and methodology, as well as with related sciences (e.g.,
economics, statistics and psychology).85 As in any rigorous intellec-
tual pursuit, moreover, its practitioners constantly re-examine and
test, empirically and conceptually, its theories and results.86 Yet a
person need not understand the nuances of the scientific debates to be
conversant with or, in Professor Hu's terms, "literate" as to the basic
teachings of finance. Rather, the goal of education about investing is
to produce consumers who are educated about the fundamentals of
investment theory, and who can knowledgeably converse with finance
professionals. In sum, consumers must become part of finance's
"culture" by assuming its basic conceptual framework, which estab-
lishes certain goals and methods of achieving them and thus sets sim-
ple, easily applied guidelines or "norms" for appropriate investingbehavior. 8
The basics of investing-in effect, the distilled wisdom of fi-
nance-are not beyond the grasp of an investor with a high school or
83 This is the kind of basic information available from the Social Security Administra-
tion. See, e.g., Social Security Administration, Understanding Social Security (visited Sept. 15,
1998) <http://www.ssa.gov>.
8 See, e.g., Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, What You Should Know About
Your Pension Rights (visited Sept. 20, 1998) <http://www.2dol.gov/dol/pwba/publiclpubs
youknowtoc.htm> (describing eligibility for pensions); DOL, WOMEN AND PENSIONS: WHAT
WOMEN NEED TO KNOW AND Do (1997) (educating women about rights regarding a spouse's
pension). In particular, individuals need to learn of the dangers to savings of not "rolling over"
withdrawals from one retirement vehicle into another. See generally William F. Bassett et al.,
How Workers Use 401(k) Plans: The Participation, Contribution, and Withdrawal Decisions 21
(1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (reporting that only 28% of workers actu-
ally rollover withdrawals from retirement plans).
85 See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE xxiii (5th ed. 1996) (pointing out that it is useful, in studying finance, to understand
accounting, statistics and micro-economics).
86 See, e.g., id. at 992-98 (identifying "10 unsolved problems in finance").
7 See supra note 82.
[Vol. 49:105
WE'RE ALL CAPITALISTS NOW
comparable education. 88 They are found, not only in the most ad-
vanced finance treatises, but also in numerous popular books, pam-
phlets and electronic media presentations prepared for the average
consumer.89 A consumer should understand elementary information
about available investment products, financial markets and the role of
investment professionals. The consumer, for example, should com-
prehend the basic differences between stocks and bonds as well as the
defining features of collective investing through a mutual fund (e.g.,
that numerous individuals pool their funds for investing in underlying
securities to take advantage of economies of scale, _rofessional
money management and diversification of investments). The con-
sumer should also become familiar with the background information
about these investments, which involves instruction about public se-
curities markets, the professionals, particularly brokers, with whom
investors may deal,91 and the regulation of markets and market par-
ticipants.
8s See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 49, at 650 ("Economists have frequently pointed out
that structuring an efficient portfolio is not all that difficult, involving primarily a buy-and-hold
(i.e., inactive) strategy with investments diversified among a set of individual securities or mu-
tual funds."); Bodie & Crane, supra note 59, at 4-5 (summarizing basic investing principles).
But see Hu, supra note 12, at 2367 (suggesting that only professionals can successfully invest);
Terrance Odean, Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses, 53 J. FIN. 1775 (1998) (dis-
cussing data indicating that investors hold losing investments too long and sell winning invest-
ments too soon); Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market
Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 666 (1995) [hereinafter Stout, Costly
Casinos] (suggesting that investors are irrational optimists); Lynn A. Stout, Technology, Trans-
actions Costs, and Investor Welfare: Is A Motley Fool Born Every Minute?, 75 WASH. U. L.Q.
791, 812 (1997) [hereinafter Motley Fool] (suggesting that investors, confused about differing
sources of securities information, will engage in excessive speculation); cf. Lynn A. Stout, How
Efficient Markets Undervalue Stocks: CAPM and ECMH Under Conditions of Uncertainty and
Disagreement, 19 CARDOzO L. REV. 475, 477-84 (1997) (surveying "postmodern finance" that,
according to the author, calls into question much of basic finance teaching).
89 See, e.g., BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 229 (1996);
see also Basics of Saving and Investing, supra note 73. Several law books presuppose that a law
professor can teach the basics of finance to law students completely unfamiliar with the subject.
See, e.g., ROBERT NV. HAMILTON, MONEY MANAGEMENT FOR LAWYERS AND CLIENTS:
ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS xxiii (1993) ("[The book] assumes that the reader has
little or no prior experience or knowledge [of finance]."); WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C.
COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES iii
(6th ed. 1996) ("As our audience, we have tried to keep in mind a bright young woman or man
from a family of musicians, with a college major in English, now entering a law school or a
graduate school of business--on the brink of discovering, with great surprise, that the study of
business can be interesting and enjoyable, as well as profitable, and that it need not be intimi-
dating.").
9°See, e.g., Basics of Saving and Investing, supra note 73, at Units 2, 3; MALKiEL, supra
note 89, at 441-56.
91 See, e.g., KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 89, at 380-92 (discussing securities markets);
Basics of Saving and Investing, supra note 73, at Unit 2; You and the Investment World, supra
note 76.
92 See, e.g., Basics of Saving and Investing, supra note 73, at Unit 2; You and the Invest-
ment World, supra note 76.
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A consumer must comprehend elementary finance to be able to
think about investing from a financial perspective. An investor
should understand the time value of money, investment return and
risks, liquidity, and the relationship of risk to return.93 Informed by
this training, an investor can understand the risks inherent in different
investment products and their related returns and can learn to com-
pare investments on these bases. 94 An investor should also be intro-
duced to some elementary investing strategies, such as portfolio di-
versification, which are designed to reduce or eliminate some risks. 95
This understanding would lead to an awareness of the potential value
of investing in market indices, an appreciation of the difficulties faced
by financial professionals in outperforming these indices, and the po-
tential harms of excessive s eculation, including the tax consequences
of securities transactions. Investors, moreover, should learn to
identify their personal risk preferences and appropriate investment
and asset-allocation strategies for themselves and, generally, for dif-
ferent stages of one's life cycle. Identification of risks and strategies
will ensure that, when investing, consumers design and implement an
optimal portfolio for their life stage and risk aversion, and overcome
93 See, e.g., Basics of Saving and Investing, supra note 73, at Unit 3; National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers, Inc., Investor Training, Taking Charge of Your Finances: An Intro-
duction to Investing (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http://www.nasd.com>. As Burton Malkiel ex-
plains,
Risk is the chance that expected security returns will not materialize and, in particular,
that the securities you hold will fall in price.
... A security whose returns are not likely to depart much, if at all, from its average (or
expected) return is said to carry little or no risk. A security whose returns from year to
year are likely to be quite volatile (and for which sharp losses are typical in some years)
is said to be risky.
MALKIEL, supra note 89, at 229.
94 See, e.g., MALKIEL, supra note 89, at 366-99 (discussing basic determinants of stock
and bond returns); id. at 321 (observing that "[e]very investor must decide the trade-off he or
she is willing to make between eating well and sleeping well"); id. at 324-25 (presenting chart
of kinds of investments keyed to ability to sleep, e.g., bank accounts correspond to "semicoma-
tose state").
95 Compare BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 85, at 154 ("Diversification works because
prices of different stocks do not move exactly together. Statisticians make the same point when
they say that stock price changes are less than perfectly correlated."), with Basics ofInvesting,
supra note 73, at Unit 3 ("The process of reducing risk by spreading money among various
types of investments is diversification."); and with MALKIEL, supra note 89, at 239 ("True di-
versification depends on having stocks in your portfolio that are not all dependent on the same
economic variables (consumer spending, business investment, housing construction, etc.).").
96 See, e.g., BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 85, at 323-46 (discussing diversification
through an index investment that helps an investor eliminate risk associated with individual
companies and the efficient capital markets hypothesis that emphasizes how difficult it is for
portfolio managers consistently to beat market indices); MALKIEL, supra note 89, at 422-32
(discussing advantages of index funds). See generally Stout, Costly Casinos, supra note 88, at
696-97 (discussing the dangers of excessive stock trading). But see Paul G. Mahoney, Is There
A Cure For "Excessive" Trading?, 81 VA. L. REv. 713 (1995) (replying to Professor Stout).
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unreasonable fears of risk preventing its implementation. 97 Like edu-.
cation about saving, education about investing must make an investor
aware of major psychological factors that can adversely affect in-
vesting decision-making (e.g., excessive fear of risk or undue opti-
mism and grandiose expectations about investment success) and of
"rules of thumb" that can help one counter them (e.g., following
asset-allocation strategies, ignoring daily securities movements). 98
A cultural education on finance and investing would teach a con-
sumer to identify, and to understand the languages of, the basic
documents and texts on the activity, as well as those that enable an
investor to educate herself further. The investor learns where to look
for information, so that she can apply, and refine, the acquired con-
ceptual framework, and how to read the presentation conventions of
this information. Investing education thus identifies the media that
provide information and training about investments, such as newspa-
pers, magazines and Web sites.9 It also introduces one to such con-
ventions as the presentation of price quotations in stocks, bonds or
mutual funds.1° As a simple example, a consumer educated about
investing should be able to read knowledgeably Section C of the Wall
Street Journal ("Money and Investing").
Education about investing should empower an individual to in-
vest alone and also to select and use financial professionals intelli-
gently. Financial planners, brokers, insurance agents or mutual fund
managers are individuals to whom investors may delegate some or all
investment responsibility. A consumer educated about investing, for
example, could evaluate whether a recommended investment is suit-
97 See Basics of Saving and Investing, supra note 73, at Unit 3; CONTE, supra note 39, at
25 ("Understanding the impact of pre-retirement withdrawals is key to accumulating adequate
savings for retirement."); MALKIEL, supra note 89, at 400-21 (discussing asset-allocation strate-
gies for different stages of the life cycle). But see Paul A. Samuelson, The Long-Term Case for
Equities, And How It Can Be Oversold, 21 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 15 (1994) (questioning ac-
cepted wisdom about long-term stock investing and asset-allocation strategies).
98 Indeed, consumers must learn not to use their new investing knowledge in such a way
as to play upon their excessive fears of risk. See CONTE, supra note 39, at 26. Moreover, just as
saving must become habitual, so also investing must involve simple "rules of thumb" that an
individual can apply almost mechanically. See, e.g., National Association of Investors Corp.,
NAIC's Four Easy Investment Principles (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http:l
www.better-investing.org> (offering simple investing principles); cf. Shefrin & Thaler, The
Behavioral Life-Cycle Hypothesis, supra note 82, at 107 ("Nearly all retirement saving is done
through some routinized program.").
. See Basics of Saving and Investing, supra note 73, at Unit 4 (listing common sources
of investment information, such as SmartMoney, Money and The Wall Street Journal). No list
of sources of such information would be complete without a reference to the World Wide Web,
where there has been a literal explosion of such resources. See, e.g., Basics of Saving and In-
vesting, supra note 73, at Appendix (listing written and on-line materials for educating inves-
tors); Robertson, supra note 40, at 362-74 (discussing information sources available on the
Internet).
10 See Basics of Saving and Investing, supra note 73, at Unit 4 (presenting worksheets
on reading stock, bond, and mutual fund quotations); You and the Investment World, supra note
73, at 22-25 (explaining how to follow investment performance).
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able for her personal risk preferences and whether a suggested asset-
allocation strategy fits her life-cycle stage. Similarly, an investor
should be taught to monitor a financial professional so as to receive
the best available "deal" for a particular kind of investment. 101 Not
only must a consumer be able literally to "speak the language" of a
financial professional, but also to know something about the financial
industry and its incentives. Knowledge about the kinds of investment
professionals and their incentive structure (e.g., full-service vs. dis-
count brokers, fee-only vs. fee-and-commission financial planners) is
critical to enable an investor to navigate profitably among them. 102
Finally, an investor should learn to recognize, and to resist, the well-
documented social and personal pressures that financial professionals
use in recommending investments. 103
101 A classic example is the decision whether to invest in mutual funds that professional
money managers actively manage, or those that adopt a passive investing strategy tracking a
given market index. See MALKIEL, supra note 89, at 422-32 (describing the benefits of index
strategy); id. at 441-46 (discussing the question of why some money managers consistently
outperform market indices). But see JUDITH CHEVALIER & GLENN ELISON, ARE SOME MUTUAL
FUND MANAGERS BETTER THAN OTHERS? CROSS-SECTIONAL PATTERNS IN BEHAVIOR AND
PERFORMANCE 4 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 5852, 1996) ("The
existence of funds that are expected to beat the market provides a potential justification for the
effort which many consumers expend in choosing between funds rather than simply investing in
indexes."). Because of their increased investing responsibility, consumers are likely to look
with more frequency to financial advisors, particularly as the value of their investment portfo-
lios grows. See Marilyn Harris, Time to Hunt for an Investment Pro?, BUS. WK., May 11, 1998,
at 106E2 (advice on finding a financial advisor); Money Managers: Take My Advice,
ECONOMIST, Jan. 31, 1998, at 78 (describing the growth in investment advisory business as
employees accumulate high value portfolios). Such reliance does not eliminate the need for
investing education since, as in dealing with any professional, consumers are likely to receive
the best service if they have enough training to monitor the advisor's performance.
102 See, e.g., American Ass'n of Retired Persons, Investors Age 50+ Know Little About
Investment Charges, New AARP Survey Shows (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http://www.aarp.org
/press/1998/042398.html> (describing survey results evidencing that a majority of the older
population does not understand broker commissions); Basics ofInvesting, supra note 76, at Unit
4 (describing kinds of professionals and their incentive structure); National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc., Investor Training, Taking Charge of Your Finances: How to Select a
Broker (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http://www.nasd.com>. A consumer must understand that a
broker may make an inappropriate investment recommendation because the broker personally
benefits more by this recommendation or because the broker is negligent. Cf. COX, supra note 8,
at 1102-10 (explaining legal rules addressing competence of financial professionals and their
fiduciary obligation to ensure that recommended investments are suitable to clients); NORMAN
S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION 2-I to 2-112 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing
fiduciary obligations of brokers). A broker may also steer a customer towards appropriate in-
vestments that give the broker a slightly higher commission, or a proprietary mutual fund com-
pany will push its funds over those of its rivals.
103 See generally Langevoort, supra note 49, at 634-69 (discussing such psychological
pressures as a broker's pressuring an investor into feeling she will lose social standing by not
making a particular investment and generating a trust that causes a client to accept any invest-
ment recommendation to please the broker).
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3. Education About Financial Fraud
Education about financial professionals leads to another kind of
investor education that teaches individuals to avoid becoming victims
of financial fraud and abuse. This kind of fraud, which has a long
pedigree, 104 arises from dealings between those who have assimilated
the investment culture and those who have not,105 the ease with which
financial transactions occur, the readily disposable nature of the assets
at issue (e.g., cash) and the unfortunate credulity and greed of many
victims.106 Court cases involving financial professionals, such as un-
scrupulous brokers and investment advisers, provide countless exam-
ples of this kind of fraud, or even of outright theft. 07 Since invest-
ments can be complex and financial criminals are profit-oriented, in-
vestment fraud and abuse will continue to take new forms.
Anti-fraud education simply teaches a consumer how to
recognize and avoid common forms of financial fraud and abuse.108
Here, even more than in the two preceding kinds of investor educa-
tion, it is important to provide individuals with simple rules or norms,
similar in nature to those given to neophytes in any human activity,
that they can apply without much thought. Children are warned not to
talk to strangers; similarly, consumers are instructed to "hang up" the
telephone whenever they hear certain selling pitches. 1°9 As further
education, consumers should learn the basic features and rationale of
104 See, e.g., CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES: A HISTORY
OF FINANCIAL CRISES 66-82 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing the effect of changes in the market on
occurrences of financial fraud).
105 Even persons sophisticated in investing fall prey to some fairly simple investment
fraud. See, e.g., Steve Stecklow, New Era's Bennett Gets 12-Year Sentence, WALL ST. J., Sept.
23, 1997, at B15 (discussing New Era "Ponzi scheme" whereby rich individuals and institutions
made contributions to a Pennsylvania organization that promised them that "wealthy benefac-
tors" would match their funds and forward the total amount to the donors' favorite charities;
needless to say, the matching benefactors did not exist).
106 This is the only explanation of the startling phenomenon of people actually sending
their account information to Nigerians who promise, by letter, free cash in return for use of
one's bank account. See Central Bank of Nigeria, Press Statement on Advance Fee Fraud Scam,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 13, 1997, at 25.
107 See, e.g., Thompson v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 709 F.2d 1413, 1416
(11th Cir. 1983) (discussing "chuming": "Churning occurs when a securities broker buys and
sells securities for a customer's account, without regard to the customer's investment interests,
for the purpose of generating commissions."). See generally POSER, supra note 102, at 3-1 to 3-
126 (describing broker fraud).
108 This Article does not suggest that education alone can deal with financial fraud or that
it should be used to lessen the scope of the duties of financial professionals toward consumers.
See generally Cox, supra note 8, at 1082-1135 (general survey of broker regulation); POSER,
supra note 102, at 4-1 to 4-22 (describing traditional compensatory damages available to con-
sumers as damages against broker-dealers).
109 See, e.g., Basics of Saving and Investing, supra note 73, at Unit 5 (listing abusive
sales techniques and recommending consumer action-generally that consumers hang up).
Indeed, hanging up the telephone is the only sensible response to many broker calls. See, e.g.,
Deborah Lohse, Tricks of the Trade: 'Buffett is Buying This' and Other Sayings of the Cold-Call
Crew, WALL ST. J., June 1, 1998, at Al (describing abusive broker sales behavior).
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the kinds of investment fraud that they are most likely to encounter. 10
They should also be taught how to prevent the kinds of fraud that un-
scrupulous financial professionals in reputable firms practice. Once
again, instruction on the psychological pressures used by financial
salespeople is important in improving one's resistance to financial
fraud or abuse. Further, continuing education on saving and invest-
ing, coupled with anti-fraud training, should enable a consumer to
predict the possibilities of fraud in new financial products.
B. Who Should Educate?
1. Families
Since saving is now a critical survival skill and since learning its
cognitive and behavioral aspects requires constant reinforcement, the
best educator is the family, however defined or constituted. That is, if
the goal of all three forms of investor education is to teach easily ap-
plied habits, norms or behavioral "rules of thumb," it makes sense to
look to the family, which can inculcate them in a durable way."'
From an early age, a child can be introduced to the culture of deferred
consumption through the teaching and example of other family mem-
bers, and even through compelled saving behavior.1 12 The same can
be said for investing. Families can teach over the years, by example
and through discussion adjusted for a young person's developing
abilities, the basics of investing, investment options and materials on
investing. Education against financial fraud could also be part of the
young person's socialization, no different from other protective guid-
ance given to children.
Although the above discussion may seem merely amusing to the
reader, the role of the family in each kind of investor education
should not be overlooked, or limited to inculcating basic saving be-
havior. The available empirical evidence suggests that family train-
ing produces educated investors in every sense of the term.113 While
110 See Basics of Saving and Investing, supra note 73, at Unit 5 (describing basic fraudu-
lent schemes).
111 See Thaler & Shefrin, supra note 78, at 85 ("The best predictors of which individuals
will fall into which groups [of savers] are probably related to family background, since the
family is the most likely place for the individual to learn (or not learn) the rules and norms nec-
essary to overcome the self-control problems.") (footnote omitted); cf Eric A. Posner, The
Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63
U. CHL L. REv. 133, 149-50 (1996) (discussing the results on ethnic groups of the different
kinds of rules used by the state to modify behavior).
112 As an amusing example, one thinks of the family saving lesson remembered by
Woody Allen's character in ANNIE HALL (United Artists 1977): "Never buy retail."
113 Some of this evidence is anecdotal. Cf Howard Gleckman, Generation $ Is More Like
It, BUS. WK., Nov. 3, 1997, at 44 (discussing the increased saving rate among young adults).
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giving the family an important role in investor education was ques-
tionable when few American households included investors, it is less
so today when more Americans do and must invest. Moreover, be-
cause ordinary individuals have increasing access to financial infor-
mation and educational materials, 114 the family has sufficient tools to
act as the primary financial educator of children. 115 Accordingly, any
governmental policy initiatives must include as a goal strengthening
the family as educator of investing and provider of saving and in-
vesting norms.
116
At present, however, it is not reasonable to rely completely upon
families to provide all the kinds of investor education. Although
more people save and invest than in the past, significant numbers of
Americans do not, and can not, engage in this activity.117 Some chil-
dren will not have the opportunity to receive this family education,
just as they lack other family educational advantages. Also one can
not be sure whether in consumption-oriented American society, even
financially sophisticated parents will take the time to educate their
children on saving and investing. The best-trained Wall Street pro-
fessional may have no time to provide education (or may decide that
it would be better simply to make more money so that her children do
not ever have to worry about saving and investing). In addition, al-
though families can educate children about common kinds of finan-
cial fraud, their informal, shared knowledge will not adequately ad-
dress its more innovative forms.
2. Schools
Because families can not in all cases provide investor education
to children, schools should supplement what education families can
furnish. Schools are major participants in the "acculturation" process
and can thus bring students into the saving and investing culture. As
in other forms of education involving critical skills for social survival,
Yet other evidence is more systematic. See BERNHEIM ET AL., EDUCATION AND SAVING, supra
note 6, at 24 (finding that exposure to school financial education does not increase saving in
students when they had frugal parents and observing, "[it also raises the following intriguing
possibility: if the children of frugal parents save more because they learn the basic elements of
household saving at home, then the impact of high school financial education may vary signifi-
cantly and systematically across the population"); Thaler, supra note 44, at 187 (noting that
individuals learn about retirement plans through role models); cf. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 19,
at 101 ("The strongest and most consistent finding in research on student achievement is that
family background is a major influence, perhaps even a decisive one.") (footnote omitted).
14 See infra Part ]H(B)(3).
15 Financial firms are now providing educational aids to families. See, e.g., MERRILL
LYNCH, THE FURTHER ADVENTURES OF SAVIN' DAVE AND THE COMPOUNDERS (1997) (comic
book with a saving and investing message, and promoting Merrill Lynch's National Saving
Month); STEIN ROE, YOUNG INVESTOR FUND: THE EDUCATIONAL INVESTMENT (1998) (bro-
chure describing equity fund designed for child investors).
116 See supra Part IlI(B)(1).
117 See generally Gordon, supra note 12, at 1534-38 (discussing data).
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the knowledge to be imparted by investor education is too important
to be left to families, for society has an obvious interest in training
individuals to provide for themselves throughout their lives.118 The
requirement of universal schooling ensures that investor education
will reach all students so long as it is part of a school curriculum.
Like other subjects, the kinds of investor education can be taught in
stages and adjusted for student abilities, as well as repeated and tested
to reinforce learning. Since American schooling is subject to cen-
tralized government control at the state level,1 9 the state educational
bureaucracy should adopt a standardized investor education model for
use in local schools, particularly high schools, and periodically update
it to reflect developments in law, finance and the financial markets.
In fact, basic investor education has entered the high school (and,
in some cases, the elementary and middle school 20) curriculum in
many states since the mid-1970s. As of 1997, thirty-seven states have
some policy on high school consumer education, which generally in-
cludes training in consumer decision-making, economics, personal
finance and consumer rights. Of these thirty-seven states, twenty-
nine mandate, in some fashion, that high school students receive con-
sumer education (with fourteen of the twenty-nine specifically re-
quiring instruction in personal finance).12' Educators have also de-
veloped standardized materials for this investor education curriculum.
The best example of this standardization is from the National Institute
for Consumer Education, under whose auspices educators, consumer
advocates, financial industry representatives and regulators have pro-
duced course materials designed to help educate students about basics
of saving, investing and avoidance of financial fraud.1
22
18 See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 28-33 (1987) (discussing the
dangers of placing all educational authority with parents).
119 See generally CHUBB & MOE, supra note 19, at 4-5 (discussing the structure of con-
trol in local schools). This Article does not address the rich literature on whether schools should
be subject to centralized government control or open to market competition. See generally Ha-
kim, supra note 19, at 1-15 (highlighting the benefits to be obtained from implementing a com-
petition-based educational system).
120 See generally Constance L. Hays, First Lessons in the Power of Money, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 12, 1998, § 3, at 1 (describing, among other things, basic economic and finance courses in
primary schools).
12' See BERNHEIM ET AL., EDUCATION AND SAVING, supra note 6, at 5-8, Table I (noting
that educational requirements vary in states, even for those mandating investor education; for
example, a state may require that consumer education be integrated into an existing course, that
it be developed as a separate course, or simply that consumer education materials be distributed
to students).
122 See Basics of Saving and Investing, supra note 73 (describing activity of the National
Institute for Consumer Education ("NICE"), its development of investor education materials
with the help of the National Association of Securities Dealers and the members of its advisory
committee, who include education specialists and financial industry representatives). Funding
for development of these educational materials came from private and public sources. This
Institute also acts as a clearinghouse for the numerous supplementary materials for this curricu-
lum. See id. at Appendix (listing free and inexpensive sources of investor education, including
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The available empirical evidence about the effects of this formal
iivestor education, while limited, is positive. 3 The evidence sug-
gests that the school consumer education has increased Americans'
exposure to investor education 124 and, more importantly, has actually
improved saving and investing behavior by those who have taken the
school finance courses.1 5 It is also not unreasonable to conclude that
the education has had other positive effects that are difficult to meas-
ure, such as decreasing students' susceptibility to fraudulent investing
schemes and improving their personal budgeting.
Given the social importance of investor education and the pre-
liminary success of school training, the question arises whether the
federal government should do more to compel the states to provide, or
to expand, investor education in schools. Since the federal govern-
ment administers Social Security and other welfare programs, over-
sees the pension system and is well-positioned to have a global per-
spective on national saving and investing behavior and its relation to
the national economy it should be concerned about investor educa-
tion.12 At the same time, it has little direct control over the national
education curriculum, and it is unlikely that investor education alone
would motivate Congress to face the constitutional questions that
would arise from an aggressive federal government move into this
area.127 Since, moreover, the number of states mandating some form
those available on-line); see also JumpStart Coalition for Personal Financial Literacy, Education
Materials (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http://www.jumpstartcoalition.org/searchl.html> (offering
"personal finance education materials for use in Kindergarten through 12th grade classrooms").
123 Some anecdotal evidence is negative, however. See, e.g., Scott Bernard Nelson, High-
School Seniors Get An F in Money Management, Kiplinger Online, News of the Day, May 22,
1997 <www.kiplinger.com/dailynewsldn052297.html> (reporting on the lack of financial liter-
acy in high school seniors).
' See BERNHEIM Er AL., EDUCATION AND SAVINGS, supra note 6, at 11-17 (discussing
the findings of a study that examined the impact of curriculum requirements on financial educa-
tion).
12 See BERNHEIM ET AL., EDUCATION AND SAVINGS, supra note 6, at 22-23 (describing
results suggesting an increase in the saving rate as a function of exposure to financial educa-
tion); id. at 27-28 (describing higher net worth of individuals exposed to the education). The
first generation of students subject to this education are those in "Generation X," and these
individuals are reported to be high savers and financially savvy. See, e.g., Tripp Baltz, Genera-
tion X-ers Favor Self-Investing Social Security Payments, Speaker Says, BNA PENSIONS &
BENEFITS DAILY, Dec. 8, 1997, available in LEXIS, pension library (describing saving prefer-
ences of younger workers); Gleckman, supra note 113, at 44 (reporting an increased saving by
the younger generation).
129 Indeed, the federal government is mandated by law to develop initiatives on investor
education, although these initiatives are not specifically aimed at schools. See infra Part
11r(B)(4)(a).
127 The provision of, and questions concerning, education have traditionally been left to
the states. A constitutional question relating to education, for example, would be whether edu-
cation, or a minimum level of education, is a fundamental right, entitling individuals to protec-
tion under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973) (holding that the strict scrutiny
test should not be used to examine the Texas school financing system because education is not a
fundamental right under the Constitution). See generally Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foun-
1998]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAWREVIEW
of investor education has increased, states may eventually have uni-
form investor education requirements and a curriculum.
128
Yet the federal government could strongly reinforce a role in
investor education schooling that it has already employed and for
which it is well-suited-that of facilitator and promoter of local edu-
cational efforts. Federal financial market regulators should encourage
financial market participants to continue to work with educators to
develop educational materials and to offer their services in schools,
129
and the regulators could supply curriculum guidance in their particu-
lar areas of expertise. The Department of Education could also sup-
port investor education in elementary, middle and secondary schools
by its available means (e.g., grants for teaching, sponsorship of con-
ferences and research in this area) without upsetting any state/federal
balance. This activity would signal the federal government's recog-
nition of the importance of this education and encourage the states to
develop further investor education requirements and curricula. 
130
3. The Market
Since families and schools do not yet uniformly educate their
children about saving and investing, another education provider is
needed. "Continuing" investor education would also provide con-
sumers with an opportunity to "refresh," update and improve their
financial knowledge. This kind of education is crucially important.
Although saving and investing have become critical activities, the
necessary level of investor education has not yet been attained, and
therefore many individuals reach adulthood having received no in-
vestor education or educational opportunities, which constitutes a so-
cial failure that needs to be addressed. The questions, of course, are
who should provide this education and how? More specifically,
should it be left to private educational providers or should the gov-
ernment ensure its provision?
Before considering the appropriate government role in investor
education outside the schools, it is important to review briefly
dations for a Right to Education Under the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the
National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 550, 563-73 (1992) (surveying U.S. Supreme
Court cases in this area).
128 See BERNHEIM ET AL., EDUCATION AND SAVING, supra note 6, at 6 (describing grad-
ual adoption of the investor education laws).
91d For example, the New York Stock Exchange sponsors extensive educational pro-
grams that attract students and teachers. See Claudia H. Deutsch, Goldman, Sachs Invests Time
in City Schools, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 14, 1997, at B8 (describing volunteer work of investment
bank's partners and employees in New York City schools); New York Stock Exchange, Invest
in Yourself. A Message to Educators (visited Sept. 20, 1998) <http://www.nyse.com/public/
educate16e/63ix.htm> (describing "Invest in Yourself' program to help educate middle and high
school students about investing).
130 See infra Part IV(A) (describing national saving and investing campaign coordinated
by state and local financial regulators).
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whether, from a theoretical perspective, private actors have incentives
to provide investor education, and what they are, in fact, doing. In-
vestor education appears to be the kind of service or product that pri-
vate parties in a market should supply. Since the basics of saving and
investing are straightforward, standardized and thus easy to reproduce
and package, they are a commodity. Economic theory suggests that,
under most circumstances, the market will produce and provide
commodities to consumers at favorable prices (e.g., not significantly
above marginal cost).131 It is, of course, necessary to keep in mind
potential circumstances that could undermine this "free market" re-
sult. Since investor education is a commodity, private actors may not
supply it in adequate quantities for, or in forms easily accessible to,
consumers, for they could not capture all the profits of their efforts
(i.e., other companies could copy the information or the format).132 A
few firms might dominate consumer financial services and, if this
market had high entry barriers, they could ignore investor education
altogether or charge anti-competitive prices for it.
133
No market problems in American consumer financial services
currently hinder the market's provision of investor education to con-
sumers at a low cost. Financial services are highly competitive be-
cause low start-up costs allow a relative ease of entry for new partici-
pants.I 4 Advances in communications technology enable new en-
trants to have access to information about markets, investment prod-
ucts and investors, formerly the main competitive advantage of estab-
lished firms.1 35  A financial firm or group of financial firms simply
can not dominate the retail or consumer investing industry so as to be
131 See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 61-63,
98-100 (1996) (demonstrating how different safeguards in the market produce low prices); Alan
Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A
Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630, 643-47 (1979) (explaining that, in a
market producing commodities for consumers, optimal pricing will occur as long as the market
is competitive, because market participants can not distinguish between, and discriminate in
pricing as to, informed and uninformed consumers).
137 See, e.g., White, supra note 64, at 15 (noting the external effect on the market when
one company adopts a new development idea of another).
13 See, e.g., id. at 12 (discussing the development of market power and its effects on
quantity of a product in the market).
34 See generally SMrTH & WALTER, supra note 40, at 14-15 (noting the increase in fi-
nancial businesses and the effects of competition in the financial market). Entering the financial
services industry does involve considerable costs, many of them regulatory in nature, as well as
a significant human capital cost. These human costs, as well as those arising from firms' efforts
to provide globally all financial services to their customers, have led to industry consolidation.
See Global Investment Banks: Fools' Gold, ECONOMIST, Dec. 13, 1997, at 61 (discussing the
benefits and problems associated with the merger of two large Swiss banks).
135 See FRANKLIN R. EDWARDS, THE NEW FINANCE: REGULATION AND FINANCIAL
STABILITY 8 (1996) ("The ability to retrieve, store, process, manipulate, and transmit large
masses of data at low cost made it easier for financial institutions to offer new products and
enter new markets to compete for customers."); SMITH & WALTER, supra note 40, at 394 (not-
ing that consumer financial services involve the provision of interchangeable products and
services).
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able to impose restrictions on, or to hinder, the provision of investor
education.
136
Indeed, financial firms vigorously compete specifically in con-
sumer "asset management" because ordinary people increasingly in-
vest through the industry, particularly in defined contribution plans
and IRAs.137 This competition ensures that the firms supply consum-
ers with investor education products and services at low cost and in
user-friendly formats and also constantly improve them. Asset man-
agement firms need to distinguish themselves from their competitors
for consumers. While the most attractive characteristic is superior
investment advice, strategy and returns, long-term investment per-
formance on an expense-adjusted basis is difficult to achieve. 138 Fi-
nancial firms must attract and maintain consumers as customers
through other means, primarily by providing ancillary investing serv-
ices.,
Investor education is one such service. Since it is standardized
and communications technology has lowered its cost of reproduction,
firms can supply it to consumers at little or no charge. Although a
firm cannot generate significant profits directly from a standard edu-
cational product or from any innovations to it (which competitors
easily and immediately imitate), the firm will supply the education
and continue its innovations because the service generates customer
goodwill and encourages consumers to invest through the firm. The
more consumers know about saving and investing, the more likely
they are to save and to invest through financial firms, and specifically
through one particular firm (as opposed to leaving their savings in
bank deposits or outside the financial services industry). 14° In addi-
tion, investor education enables consumers to understand the range of
investment products a firm has to offer, and encourages them to use
these products in their portfolio. The education may also lead con-
sumers to realize the potential benefits that they can receive from
brokers or other financial professionals employed by the firm. In
136 This situation could, of course, change. Numerous large consolidations and mergers
between banks and other financial institutions have recently occurred (e.g., Citibank/Travelers),
and these transactions could have an adverse effect on the provision of services, like investor
education, to consumers.
137 See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 135, at 73 (discussing investment growth in mutual
fund shares as opposed to bank deposits); SMITH & WALTER, supra note 40, at 381-82 (noting
changes in investment business created by competition); see also Investors, Unite, ECONOMIST,
(Supp.) Oct. 25, 1997, at 3, 3-5 (discussing competition in asset management).
138 Cf. supra note 101.
139 See EDWARDS, supra note 135, at 16 (describing how investment banks came to offer
customers check-writing and payment services formerly provided only by commercial banks).
140 See, e.g., BERNHEIM & GARRETT, supra note 6, at 19 (noting that educated individu-
als rely on financial professionals for information and advice, rather than their employers).
[Vol. 49:105
WE'RE ALL CAPITALISTS NOW
sum, education is a form of financial firm product advertisement, but,
as in most advertising, it benefits both firms and consumers.
141
There has been, in fact, a remarkable increase in the number of
investor education products and services offered by financial firms to
consumers at minimal or no cost.142 Mutual fund companies, 143 in-
vestment banks and brokerage houses, 144 financial industry trade
groups, 145 and self-regulatory organizations 146 supply retail investors
with tools and services enabling them to have a basic education in
saving and investing. These tools also help investors understand gen-
eral finance, risks, asset-allocation strategies, finance professionals
and the language of investing-in short, a useful introduction to, or
further familiarity with, the culture of saving and investing. Further,
consumers can also apply the educational tools to their own personal
circumstances in financial planning. If an investor requires additional
advice, some companies even offer personalized financial planning
141 See, e.g., Kevin J. Delaney, Mutual Funds Use a New Spin To Sell Wares, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 27, 1997, at Cl ("Mutual-fund companies have begun to sell their wares the way con-
sumer-goods companies market cereal and laundry detergent."). Not everyone is pleased with
the consumer characterization of investing. See, e.g., Don Phillips, Owner or Consumer? Open
Letter to the SEC (last modified May 2, 1997) <http://www.momingstar.netcgi-
bin/Getnews.exe?newsstory=ms/OpEd/letterToSECl/Lettertosec4.html> (president of rating
organization of mutual funds argues against regulatory actions accepting the view of ordinary
investors as consumers).
142 The following references cannot pretend to be exhaustive, but are only representative,
since new firm educational products and services appear on a daily basis, particularly on the
Internet.
143 See, e.g., Fidelity Investments, Know What You Own and Know Why You Own It
(visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http://www.fidelity.com> (educating consumers about the importance
of saving, particularly for retirement needs, elementary finance, kinds of investments, tax-
reducing retirement options, kinds of mutual funds, investment basics and asset-allocation
strategies); see also T. ROWE PRICE, T. ROWE PRICE RETIREMENT PLANNING ANALYZER (1997)
(CD-ROM retirement planner). 1
144 See, e.g., CharlesSchwab (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <www.schwab.com> (providing, in
the "Planning" section, materials of discount broker Charles Schwab on the basics of saving and
investing as well as retirement planning, with information about life-cycle investing); Merrill
Lynch, Investor Learning Center (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <www.plan.ml.comlinvestor> (pro-
viding information and interactive forms to design investment goals and portfolios).
145 See Investment Company Institute, Mutual Fund Connection (visited Sept. 15, 1998)
<www.ici.org> (offering, at the Web site of the Investment Company Institute ("ICr'), general
educational materials explaining the nature of a mutual fund, its risks and benefits (chiefly di-
versification), the kinds of mutual funds, the typical fees, expenses and services of a fund, and
the pricing and redemption of mutual fund shares).
146 See FACT BOOK, supra note 53, at 57 (explaining that, since individual investors still
generate much of the direct investing in securities, the Nev York Stock Exchange offers inves-
tor education on its Web site); You and the Investment World, supra note 73 (education on per-
sonal and macroeconomic reasons for investing, the functioning of stock exchanges, the lan-
guage of the financial press, kinds of investments and their risks and basic advice on asset-
allocation strategies and ways of investing); see also Investor Training, supra note 73 (educat-
ing investors as to reasons for investing, investment options, and providing guidance on assess-
ing one's personal financial situation and setting financial goals); NASDAQ, Investment Tips
(visited Sept. 15, 1998) <www.nasdaq.com/services/services.stm> (providing links to the
NASD's educational materials, including those of NICE, as well as sophisticated tools to track
the value of a portfolio).
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services and seminars.' 47 The firms and organizations deliver this
education in traditional ways (e.g., through written materials), 48 but
developments in information technology, particularly CD-ROMs and
the World Wide Web, have greatly enhanced its provision, sophisti-
cation and, significantly, its use by consumers.149
The commodity nature of investor education, the sophistication
of financial products and industry competition all ensure that the edu-
cational products and services of financial firms are more than "win-
dow dressing" to attract consumer funds. 150  Indeed, the education
would not be successful unless it offered consumers some under-
standing about a firm's investment products and strategies. Competi-
tion in financial services forces firms to do more than conduct a su-
perficial teaching in order to explain the superiority of their products
and services. Although there are superior educational products, it
generally does not matter what educational product a consumer uses,
since the products have become "standardized" through competi-
tion. 151
147 See James S. Hirsch, Fidelity, CBS Are Considering Finance Show, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 17, 1997, at BI (discussing Fidelity's proposed (but later abandoned) television show on
personal finance); Robert McGough, No-Load Fund Investors Still Buying Advice, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 11, 1997, at C1 (discussing advisory services provided by mutual funds); Money Manag-
ers: Take My Advice, supra note 101, at 78-79 (noting that increased advisory services are pack-
aged as investor education in financial firms).
148 See, e.g., CHARLES SCHWAB, THE ESSENTIAL INVESTOR (1997) (informational pam-
phlet on long-term investing); FIDELITY INVESTMENTS, MANAGING RISK IN YOUR PORTFOLIO:
A FIDELITY GUIDE FOR EXPERIENCED INVESTORS (1995) (describing risk, risk management and
asset allocation); Investment Company Institute, A Guide to Mutual Funds (visited Sept. 20,
1998) <http://www.ici.org/pdf/guide2mutualfunds.pdf>; MERRILL LYNCH, YOU AND YOUR
MONEY: A FINANCIAL HANDBOOK FOR WOMEN INVESTORS (1997) (informing women investors
about everything from kinds of credit to stock options); The Vanguard Group, Plain Talk: The
Vanguard Investment Planner (visited Sept. 20, 1998) <http:/lvanguard.com/educllib/plalnl
investplan.html>.
149 See supra text accompanying notes 14247 (providing examples of use of technology
in educational materials); see also YANKELOVICH PARTNERS, INC., supra note 55, at 12 (refer-
ring to growing numbers of investors who use personal computers to obtain investment infor-
mation). But see ARTHUR B. KENNICKELL & MYRON L. KWAST, WHO USES ELECTRONIC
BANKING? RESULTS FROM THE 1995 SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCES 18 (Federal Reserve
Board Finance and Economics Discussion Series No. 1997-35, 1997) (demonstrating that con-
sumer use of electronic means to make saving and investing decisions is very limited).
15o See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 131, at 638 (observing that competition in the edu-
cational services market protects consumers who do not regularly research market products).
151 Indeed, there might well be a cause for suspicion about firm-provided investor educa-
tion, for instance, if consumers heard only about the benefits of actively managed mutual funds
and nothing about indexed investing. As it is, the Vanguard Group, one of the largest mutual
fund companies, provides investors with training about indexing in its voluminous educational
materials. See The Vanguard Group, Learning Center (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http.//
www.vanguardtcom/educ/inveduc.html> (offering consumers a "University" with a course on
"The Fundamentals of Mutual Funds"); see also The Vanguard Group, Literature Library (vis-
ited Sept. 15, 1998) <http://www.vanguard.com/educ/lib/litlib.html> (offering viewpoints of
Vanguard's legendary founder, John Bogle, the champion of index investing, such as "Bogle on
Indexing" and "The Riddle of Performance Attribution"); The Vanguard Group, Plain Talk: The
Vanguard Investment Planner (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http://www.vanguard.com/educ/
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Competition in educational services from firms and organiza-
tions other than financial firms, whether nonprofit 152 or for-profit, also
compels financial firms to create "quality" educational products. Al-
most countless members of the financial press, 153 rating organiza-
tions,154 investor groups155 and others156 provide at little or no cost toconsumers investor educational materials and tools. 157 Moreover,
lib/plaininvestplan.html>. Similarly, a consumer can read about the advantages of discount
brokerage (e.g., through Charles Schwab) and of full-service brokers (e.g., through Merrill
Lynch). Competition among financial firms even results in financial firms discussing compet-
ing investing strategies, products, and financial services. See, e.g., The Vanguard Group, Plain
Talk About Index Investing (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http://www.vanguard.com/
educ.lib/plain/index.htmI>, at 5 (explaining that "[a] suitable compromise [between indexing
and an actively managed strategy] may be to build equity and bond portfolios (or even combine
them through a balanced approach) with a "core" holding in an appropriate index fund. Around
that core investment, an investor may select specific actively managed funds that appear likely,
in the investor's judgment, to add incremental investment performance over the long run.").
An obvious consumer problem, is the bewildering number of educational products, which
is exacerbated by computer technology. See Stout, Motley Fool, supra note 88, at 812 ("Inves-
tors' opinions will become increasingly fragmented as different individuals come to rely on an
ever-increasing number of different and disagreeing sources."); cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Brave
New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internet on Modern Securities Regulation, 52 Bus. LAW.
1195, 1200-01 (Aug. 1997) (arguing that financial professionals will still need to act as "gate-
keepers" for investors (i.e., insure that reputable companies offer securities), despite the access
of more information to consumers). My point is simply that most of these products provide the
necessary education. Consumers just need to be educated to use one product out of the many
available.
152 See, e.g., American Association of Retired Persons, Getting Answers: Information
and Research (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http://www.aarp.orglanswers.html> (providing links to
investment tips and other economic security programs); American Association of Retired Per-
sions, Smart Investing (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http://www.aarp/getans/smartinvest.html> (pre-
senting basic finance and investment advice, including tips'on dealing with a broker and evalu-
ating risk).
153 See, e.g., How To Retire Successfidly, Bus. WK., July 21, 1997, at 59-92 (special re-
port to help consumers invest).
1s4 See, e.g., Morningstar, Inc., Morningstar.Net (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http:ll
www.morningstar.net> (providing a rating service of mutual funds).
155 See, e.g., American Association of Individual Investors, AAII.com (visited Sept. 15,
1998) <http://www.aaii.com> (providing numerous educational materials, services and seminars
for consumers).
156 See Money Managers: Take My Advice, supra note 147, at 79 (reporting that Nobel
prize-winning economist William Sharpe is starting an Internet service to correct mistakes in
most financial advisory software).
157 As anyone knows who has "surfed the Net" or browsed through an investor section of
a large bookstore or software company, it may well be impossible to list all the investor educa-
tion tools and services. See, e.g., Edward C. Baig, For Investors ofAll Stripes, A Cornucopia on
the Net, Bus. WK., Dec. 22, 1997, at 104 (detailing consumer informational and educational
resources on the World Wide Web); Amy Dunkin, The Web User's Guide to Screening Stocks,
Bus. WK., Sept. 22, 1997, at 114-16 (describing Internet stock analysis tools); Daisy Maxey,
S&P to Introduce Customized On-Line Investment Advisory Service Today, WALL ST. J., Jan.
12, 1998, at B12B (describing new "Personal Wealth" venture of Standard & Poor's to offer
consumers on-line financial advice at <http://www.personawealth.com>); Michael R. Sesit,
Internet Site Offers Help to Investors, WALL ST. J., July 23, 1997, at C1 (describing Web site,
<http://www.riskview.com>, that permits individual investors at no cost to calculate the risk of
their portfolios); Stout, Motley Fool, supra note 88, at 807 (describing "Motley Fool" on-line
investment advisory service); Gary Weiss, Web of Hype and Glory, Bus. WY., June 16, 1997, at
108 (discussing web sites that offer investor education and information); see also supra note
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since new technology permits consumers to bypass financial services
firms 158 if they are helped by these independent educational services,
financial firms need to justify their value. The provision of superior
education is one possible justification.
Consumer financial services firms, as well as the financial mar-
ketplace in general, provide worthwhile investor education to con-
sumers at little cost and in accessible formats. Consumers can thus
easily continue whatever investor education they received at home or
in school, or if they never received such education, can acquire the
educational tools and services to begin their acculturation into the
saving and investing world. In light of all this private educational
activity, what investor education efforts, in addition to facilitating
familial development of saving and investing norms and encouraging
formal education in the schools, can the government usefully under-
take?
4. The Government
a. Education About Saving and Investing
State or federal financial regulators should not see as their main
tasks the establishment of a basic investor education curriculum and
the teaching of consumers. Not only do they not have the resources
to conduct this education, but there is no general need for their in-
volvement, on account of the activity of the market (broadly defined
to include nonprofit organizations). Active intervention by regulators
to set minimum standards of investor education (a "quality assurance"
role often undertaken by the government in other kinds of educa-
tion159) is also unnecessary since the standardization of the product
and the competitiveness of the financial services industry ensure this
quality. The regulators should, however, ensure that these standards
are being regularly applied. Because financial firms have strong,
profit-oriented incentives, which financial regulators lack, to make
their educational products and services as innovative and "user-
122; InvestorGuide (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http://www.investorguide.com> (advertising In-
vestorGuide as "the leading guide to investing on the web"); The Syndicate (visited Sept. 15,
1998) <http://www.moneypages.com> (investor service focusing on mutual funds).
158 See, e.g., Peter Galuszka, Guess Who's Courting the Beardstown Ladies?, BUS. WK.,
Sept. 22, 1997, at 90 (discussing direct investing movement and National Association of Inves-
tor Corporation that encourages this movement and educates investors); Barbara Hetzer, Direct
Stock Buying: A Load of New No-Loads, BUS. WK., June 16, 1997, at 152 (describing the in-
creasing opportunities of small investors to buy stock directly from companies and thus to by-
pass brokers). Financial firms are also feeling pressure from on-line brokerage and trading. See
Deborah Lohse, Wit Capital Will Launch On-Line Site, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 1997, at B12
(describing an on-line service proposing to bring initial public offerings directly to individuals
without financial firm involvement).
159 See HART ET AL., supra note 5, at 2-7 (discussing quality concerns as a justification
for government control of education).
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friendly" as possible, any models or standards that government offi-
cials would devise would likely add little to the "standard" product,
would quickly become outdated, and would retard industry experi-
mentation. 16° State or federal financial educators should simply en-
courage the continued market development of consumer educational
materials, which they could also review for minimum educational
qualification and for the prevention of investor fraud or abuse.
Although the exact contours of the role are not always easy to
define, the government has an important role in the delivery of in-
vestor education. Rather than being the chief conductor of saving and
investing education, the government should act as a "cheerleader" for
these activities and should promote and facilitate consumer use of the
educational services of for-profit and nonprofit providers. Federal
and state agencies could use their resources to conduct an active and
continuous publicity campaign to encourage consumer saving and
investing. Although incidental to the campaign's promotional pur-
pose, some elementary investor education should be part of this cam-
paign so as to reinforce basic saving and investing "norms," as well as
to reach members of the population overlooked by private education
providers. The federal executive branch should orchestrate a national
campaign, and each government agency or Congressional committee
should participate in areas within its jurisdiction and competency.
Private financial services firms also have incentives to support a
national saving and investing campaign since the industry can only
benefit from increased consumer saving and investing. Certainly the
industry's existing educational efforts have a hortatory or promotional
side,'61 but industry participants alone are unlikely to be the most ef-
fective campaigners. The government is an excellent "bully pulpit"
with many effective instruments of persuasion at its disposal. Since
citizens expect pronouncements on issues of general concern from the
government, financial firm publicity will produce better results if
supplemented with active government involvement in promoting
saving and investing. In fact, behavioral and economic research sug-
gests that the government's promotional efforts have a significant
positive effect upon saving and investing behavior. 62 Indeed, the
literature suggests that the government occupies a critical position in
creating and changing the kind of "rule of thumb" norms so important
160 The investor educational materials of government agencies are generally inferior to
those offered by private market parties. See infra Part IV(A).
161 See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Time to Save (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http://www.plan.
ml.comlpersonal/saving> (highlighting Merrill Lynch's sponsorship of a National Saving Month
campaign to encourage saving among students).
162 See BERNHEM, THE VANISHING NEST EGG, supra note 6, at 121 (explaining the im-
portance of a national government campaign for consumer saving).
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for saving and investing because it can publicize their importance and
help generate a "norm community" of savers and investors. 163
A good example of a federal agency's performance of the
"cheerleading" and market facilitator roles is the recent activity of the
Department of Labor's Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration
("PWBA"), which helps administer private pension plans subject to
ERISA.164 Because of the low rate of consumer saving and the im-
pending retirement of the "Baby Boomers," the PWBA began a Re-
tirement Savings Education Campaign in 1995 to educate Americans
about the importance of saving, investing and using pension plans. 165
Its extensively publicized campaign materials convey this promo-
tional message, provide some basic guidelines on saving and invest-
ing and refer consumers to financial and nonprofit firms for full edu-
cation. 66 The PWBA also enlisted financial firms in its campaign
through the nonprofit American Savings Education Council
("ASEC"), 167 which conducts research on saving, co-sponsors public
163 See generally McAdams, supra note 82, at 362-64 (discussing the importance of pub-
licity in establishing a norm consensus); id. at 400-07 (discussing how the law can be used to
signal, and thus to establish, a consensus around certain norms); Posner, supra note 111, at 149-
50, 187 (describing how the government can strengthen pre-existing norms and encourage gen-
eralized norm creation); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 CoLUM. L. REv.
903, 929-30 (1996) (discussing the government's ability to create and reinforce social norms).
See, e.g., David Charny, Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: 'Norms' in Contractual Relation-
ships, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1841, 1847-48 (1996) (suggesting that norm creation across large
populations needs centralized state intervention); cf Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social
Meaning, 62 U. CHt. L. REv. 943, 972-86 (1995) (discussing, among other things, the role of
government in the generation of social meaning).
164 The PWBA administers Title I of ERISA, which regulates reporting, disclosure and
fiduciary matters pertaining to plans. The Internal Revenue Service administers Title II, which
deals with eligibility of pension plans, vesting requirements and funding. The Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation manages an insurance program covering employees in the event of plan
termination. See generally FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS, supra note 23,
at 35-36.
165 See DOL, Retirement Savings Education Campaign (last modified May 1998)
<http://www.dol.gov/dol/pwbalpublilcpubslintroprg.htm>.
16 See id., at 1-4 (listing PWBA's educational activities and publications available to in-
vestors); see also DOL, Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, Protect Your Pension: A
Quick Reference Guide (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http:llwww.dol.gov/pwbalpubliclpubslprotectl
guietoc.htm> (presenting general facts about pensions); DOL, supra note 76 (explaining the
importance of inquiring about an employer's pension plans, using an IRA and recommending
that consumers set retirement goals, learn basic investment principles and ask questions of fi-
nancial advisors). The PWBA also provides references (or, on its Web site, hypertext links) to
providers of investor education, such as ICI and AARP. See supra note 165 (where links are
listed).
167 Founded in 1995 as part of the Employee Benefit Research Institute and funded by
the financial services industry, ASEC has "charter partners" or sponsors that include financial
companies like American Express, Bankers Trust, Fidelity, the Variable Annuity Life Insurance
Company and Prudential Investments, as well as trade groups of financial firms, such as the
American Council of Life Insurance and ICI. See Sponsors: American Savings Education Coun-
cil (visited Sept. 20, 1998) <http://www.asec.org/sponshm.htm>; see also ASEC, Strategic
Plan: Building Public Awareness and Understanding of Saving and Retirement Planning (vis-
ited Sept. 15, 1998) <http://www.asee.org/straplan.htm> (explaining that ASEC's mission is "to
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educational events about its importance with government officials and
develops tools for saving education that have a consciousness-raising
and general educational purpose. 168 Moreover, in a recent interpretive
bulletin on participant investment education, the PWBA specifically
facilitated private market educational efforts by adopting a regulation
that encouraged more employers to have financial firms provide in-
vestor education to employees participating in defined contribution
plans.1
69
Indeed, the PWBA's educational activities, coupled with a bi-
partisan national concern about adequate retirement saving and in-
undertake and encourage initiatives aimed at raising public awareness about what is needed to
successfully ensure long-term financial security in retirement.").
168 See DOL, supra note 73 (listing sources of information on saving, investing and se-
lecting a financial professional); ASEC, Ballpark Estimate, Definitions of Saving and Retire-
ment Terms (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http://www.asec.org/ballpark.htm> (providing a work-
sheet so that an individual can get a rough idea of how much he or she will need at retirement
and a glossary of saving and retirement terms); ASEC, What is ASEC? (visited Sept. 15, 1998)
<http'//www.asec.orgtpamphlet.htm>; ASEC, The Power to Choose (visited Sept. 15, 1998)
<http.//www.asec.orglasecpwrl.htm> (explaining retirement needs, the limitations of Social
Security and tax-favorable savings plans, particularly those provided by employers); ASEC,
How Do I Get There From Here? (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http.//www.asec.org/there2.htm>
(listing sources of information on saving and investing and also giving advice on selecting a
financial professional). See generally CONTE, supra note 39, at 28 (describing ASEC's recent
activities).
169 See Participant Investment Education, Interpretive Bulletin 96-1, 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-
21(c) (1997). The PWBA and employers were concerned that employees participating in de-
fined contribution plans did not understand enough about investing. Many employers, however,
declined to conduct, or to have financial firms conduct, programs to help employees because
they feared that they would increase their fiduciary liability-an avoidance of which is one
reason for establishing a defined contribution plan. Under ERISA, employers as plan sponsors
have fiduciary obligations to plan beneficiaries, which include an obligation to account for plan
losses due to a breach of fiduciary duties. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1103, 1104, 1109 (1996). Pursuant
to Section 404(c) of ERISA and to the applicable regulations, an employer can limit, but not
eliminate, such fiduciary liability by establishing individual participant accounts and allowing
participants to exercise control over them. See 29 U.S.C. § 1109(c) (1996). This limitation
requires that a participant have sufficient information on investment alternatives under the plan
to make an informed investment decision, but not that employers provide employees with gen-
eral investing advice or education. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550A04c-l(c) (1998). The Interpretive
Bulletin established a "safe harbor" for four kinds of information and education that employers,
and particularly financial firms operating the plans for them, can supply without triggering a
fiduciary obligation (i.e., without being deemed to be giving investment advice): (i) a descrip-
tion of the plan and its operation, the benefits of plan participation, the disadvantages in with-
drawing funds prior to retirement and basic information about alternatives under the plan, (ii)
general information on financial concepts, different rates of return on investments, inflation,
future retirement income needs, investment time horizons and risk tolerance assessment, (iii) the
presentation of asset-allocation models keyed to individuals with different time horizons and
risks (i.e., life-cycle investing), which essentially helps an employee grasp the general finance
information through specific examples and (iv) interactive materials and worksheets that allow
an employee to compare his or her own circumstances to the asset-allocation models. See Inter-
pretive Bulletin 96-1, supra. The PWBA also took the "market friendly" position of suggesting
that other kinds of educational information and services that these firms may develop would
likely fall within the safe harbor. Cf Lynn Asinof, Click & Shift: Workers Control Their Bene-
fits On-Line, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 1997, at Cl (observing that workers increasingly control
their benefits on-line).
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vesting, resulted in the recent enactment of the SAVER Act, which
has an explicit educational focus. 170 This Act specifically mandates
that the Department of Labor ("DOL") convey to the public informa-
tion about retirement saving and plans, particularly by means of a
permanent Internet site. 17 1 The Act's definition of such information is
essentially that provided by basic saving and investing education. 72
The Act seems to envision that the site will focus on a description of
retirement plans and will provide references to other Internet sites that
provide the education.'17  Even more importantly, it requires the
President to convene three educational summits to bring government
officials and private parties (both for-profit and nonprofit firms) to-
gether, to "facilitate the development of a broad-based, public educa-
tion program to encourage and enhance individual commitment to a
personal retirement savings strategy . ... 174
170 See Savings Are Vital to Everyone's Retirement Act of 1997, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1146-47
(Supp. 1997). The legislative history enumerates the following purposes of the Act:
(1) to advance the public's knowledge and understanding of retirement savings
and its critical importance to the future well-being of American workers and their
families;
(2) to provide for a periodic, bipartisan national retirement savings summit in
conjunction with the White House to elevate the issue of savings to national
prominence; and
(3) to initiate the development of a broad-based, public education program to en-
courage and enhance individual commitment to a personal retirement savings
strategy.
Id. § 1146 (Historical & Statutory Notes) (citing Savings Retirement Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
105-92, § 2, 111 Stat. 2139 (1997)).
171 See 29 U.S.C. § 1146(d) (1997).
172 See 29 U.S.C. § 1 146(c)(2) (requiring that the Secretary of Labor convey such infor-
mation as "(A) the forms of retirement income savings; (B) the concept of compound interest;
(C) the importance of commencing savings early in life; (D) savings principles; (E) the impor-
tance of prudence and diversification in investing; (F) the importance of the timing of invest-
ments; and (G) the impact on retirement savings of life's uncertainties, such as living beyond
one's life expectancy.").
171 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1146(c)(1), (d)(1)-(5) (specifying in (d)(5) that the DOL Web site
provide "links to other sites maintained on the Internet by governmental agencies and nonprofit
organizations that provide additional detail on retirement income savings arrangements and
related topics on savings or investing").
'74 29 U.S.C. § 1147(a)(2). The first of these summits was held on June 4-5, 1998 in
Washington. See The National Summit on Retirement Savings, Summit Agenda (visited Sept.
15, 1998) <http://www.saversummit.orglagenda.htm> (providing agenda for the summit); Em-
ployee Benefit Research Institute, Current State-Savings and Education Today (visited Sept.
15, 1998) <http://www.ebri.org/rcs/dallas> (providing material for presentation by EBRI presi-
dent Dallas Salisbury at the summit); see also CoNE, supra note 39 (providing the agenda
briefing book for the summit). Indeed, since the SAVER Act provides that the summits should
involve the participation of public and private parties and be privately and publicly funded, the
summits give a good example of government encouraging private market educators. See 29
U.S.C. § 1147(b),(e),(j); see also Alliance for Investor Education, Alliance Mission and Mem-
bers (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http://www.investoreducation.org/mismembers.htm> (Web site of
Alliance for Investor Education, a nonprofit organization sponsored by trade groups and assisted
by governmental agencies, that "is dedicated to facilitating greater understanding of investing,
investments and the financial markets among current and prospective investors of all ages").
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A difficult issue regarding the government's role in investor
education is how, and how much, government agencies, as part of a
national saving and investing campaign, should conduct some sub-
stantive education on important issues to which financial firms or
nonprofit organizations might not give adequate attention. For exam-
ple, should the government discourage consumers from excessive
stock speculation and risk-taking in investing and advocate a strategy
of portfolio diversification adjusted to an individual's life cycle and
risk preferences as an optimal investing strategy for most Ameri-
cans? 175 Similarly, if brokers and other financial professionals are
understood to exert excessive influence upon individual investors,
should an agency warn consumers to be on their guard about this in-
fluence when seeking advice from professionals?"'
A government agency, such as the Social Security Administra-
tion, the PWBA, the DOL, and federal bank regulators, 77 is certainly
Additionally, the Secretary of Labor must prepare a report on the summit. See 29 U.S.C. §
1147(g). For the report on the first summit, see DOL, FINAL REPORT ON THE NATIONAL
SUMMIT ON RETIREMENT SAVINGS (Sept. 3, 1992).
175 See Stout, Costly Casinos, supra note 88, at 696-97 (arguing that special quasi-
educational effort is required to discourage investors from engaging in excessive stock trading).
176 Cf Langevoort, supra note 49, at 693-94 (arguing, in effect, that financial profession-
als should have a duty to bring negative information about their recommendations to customers'
attention, a duty that would disrupt the psychological power of brokers in the sales process).
177 Federal banking regulators, for example, want consumers to understand that federal
government deposit insurance protects only bank deposits, not other investments made through
a bank or a bank affiliate. Federal deposit insurance provides up to $100,000 of insurance pro-
tection for a deposit account or accounts of an individual in any insured depositary institution.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which administers the insurance coverage program,
provides insurance to a bank if the bank complies with FDIC regulations and if it pays a pre-
mium that is adjusted for the "riskiness" 6f the bank. See JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P.
MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 279-300 (2d ed. 1997); EDWARDS, supra note 135,
at 152-55. Since the story of legal restrictions on bank sales of nondeposit investment products
and of the transformation of banking is complex, it suffices here to say that, in the last two dec-
ades, as investment banks and mutual fund companies began to attract consumer funds by of-
fering both payment system products, such as interest-bearing checking services, and numerous
investment products that offered possibilities of greater return (and risk) than savings deposits,
consumers moved their funds from banks. See generally id. at 13-34 (observing that banks'
asset bases shrank as borrowers turned to sources (e.g., capital markets) other than commercial
loans); ROBERT E. LITAN, THE REVOLUTION IN U.S. FINANCE 1-35 (1991). Bank regulators,
with the acquiescence of the courts, thus interpreted banking law more expansively to allow
banks and bank affiliates to provide customers the products and services offered by their finan-
cial services competitors. See generally MACEY & MILLER, supra, at 495-554. Congress has yet
to pass the necessary legislation repealing the legal separation between banking and investment
banking.
Bank regulators worry that consumer misunderstandings about insurance coverage could
undermine the soundness of the banking, payment and overall financial system in a stock market
downturn, with potentially disastrous consequences for the economy. If, for example, bank
customers purchase non-deposit investment products under the mistaken belief that the products
are insured for declines in market value, a significant market downturn might produce a panic
among customers as they learn of their mistake. The rush to withdraw funds from investments
could reinforce the downturn and lead to a massive crisis of confidence in the financial system,
i.e., a systemic failure. See EDWARDS, supra note 135, at 123 (defining a systematic crisis as "a
disturbance that severely impairs the working of the financial system and, at the extreme, causes
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justified in educating and, in some cases, is required to educate con-
sumers about its programs and about its regulatory authority. Further,
this activity could also include some kinds of basic saving and in-
vesting advice to consumers. Indeed, as part of the saving and in-
vesting campaign, government agencies should use their power to go
beyond specific messages related to their regulatory authority, and to
drive home certain key points about saving and investing, other than
that a consumer should save, invest and use available educational
materials. Their messages will lend weight to the educational activi-
ties of for-profit and nonprofit firms by reinforcing the basic saving
and investing rules of thumb, and they can target lower income
Americans often ignored by such firms.178 The line between accept-
able and unacceptable messages of government advocacy is not en-
tirely clear, however, which means that any agency must approach
this "education reinforcement" activity with care. An agency can
beneficially echo saving guidelines and generally accepted financial
principles. However, the agency must be careful about lending its
support to any particular investing strategy that is not universally ac-
cepted in the financial community as being superior to any other.
Even if an agency feels that, on the whole, one strategy (e.g., index-
a complete breakdown in it. Systemic risks are those risks that have the potential to cause such
a crisis"). Banking regulators, like all financial regulators, live in fear of financial "meltdowns"
for which blame can be laid partly or wholly at their door. Cf Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC
as a Bureaucracy: Public Choice, Institutional Rhetoric, and the Process of Policy Formulation,
47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 527, 530 (1990) (arguing that SEC regulators are irrationally risk
averse for purposes of self-preservation). And they realize that, locked into combat with other
financial intermediaries, banks might do little to dispel customer impressions (which would be a
competitive advantage) that bank non-deposit investment products are "safer" than those of
bank competitors. The regulators thus emphasize education about deposit insurance as more
consumers purchase non-traditional investment products from banks. See, e.g., Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Interagency Statement on Retail Sales of Nondeposit Investment Prod-
ucts, 1994 FDIC Interp. Letter LEXIS 16 (Feb. 17, 1994) (requiring, in a joint statement, issued
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the FDIC, the Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency, and the Office of Thrift Supervision, on bank sales of non-deposit in-
vestments, banks to adopt procedures (e.g., written disclosures and warnings, separate names for
investment products, separate location in bank and separate employees for sales of these prod-
ucts) designed to ensure that retail customers understand that these investments are not FDIC-
insured, are not obligations of the bank and are subject to investment risk, including loss of
principal); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Insured Or Not Insured-That is The Ques-
tion (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http://www.fdie.gov/consumer/ins-not.html> (pamphlet empha-
sizing the non-deposit product/deposit distinction); Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Deposits and Investments: There's a Critical Difference (visited Sept. 15, 1998)
<http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/depvsinv.txt> (same). If banks continue their affiliation with
other financial firms specializing in consumer-oriented investment products, bank regulators
may have to consider whether they should undertake other kinds of investor education. See, e.g.,
Videotape: It's Your Money (Federal Reserve Board (video seminar on saving and investing by
members of the Federal Reserve Board); Charles Gasparino, Do Fund Mergers Hurt Small
Investors?, WALL ST. J., July 8, 1997, at C1 (discussing links between banks and fund compa-
nies).
178 Admittedly, some of the best educational materials come from financial firms that are
targeting people with significant disposable income. Yet it is critical that education also reach
those who can save only small amounts. See CONTE, supra note 39, at 16-17.
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ing) is better for consumers, it should not publicly favor it, provided
consumers can receive adequate education about the strategy from a
forceful private advocate.
As a pragmatic matter, a government agency, such as the SEC,
cannot warn consumers generally to be on their guard against brokers
and financial professionals. This warning would not only alienate
powerful constituencies, but it would also undermine the welfare of
the many consumers who benefit from these professionals. 179 The
best way to ensure that consumers resist any psychological selling
pressures used by financial professionals is to have consumers edu-
cated in the basics of saving and investing, which includes the appro-
priate psychological education.
b. The Government as Anti-Fraud Educator
Consumers also need first-time and continuing education about
financial abuse and fraud from a provider other than families and
schools. The financial services industry, broadly defined to include
trade associations and participating nonprofit groups, could conduct
this kind of investor education. Since its members are already in-
volved in general saving and investing education, they could add this
task to their educational efforts. Given their position, financial firms
could identify and understand new permutations of abusive or
fraudulent behavior. They also have incentives to police their indus-
try. Legitimate firms want consumers to distinguish them from
fraudulent organizations, and their provision of education to counter
abusive practices provides a sign of legitimacy. Firms may educate
consumers about fraud typical of financial professionals, since this
misbehavior undermines customer confidence in financial services
that is so critical to the industry's well-being.180 In addition, con-
sumer organizations that supply education naturally want to protect
their members from abuse and fraud by educating them to be aware of
their forms.
Yet even the most reputable financial firms do little to educate
consumers about abusive or fraudulent financial practices. Rather,
the only detailed private education on this subject comes from the
quasi-governmental self-regulatory organizations, such as the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") 8' and the New
179 See YANKELOVICH PARTNERS, INC., supra note 55, at 6 (noting that the majority of
investors surveyed are pleased with their brokers).
180 See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 49, at 630 n.6 ("There is no doubt that the securities
industry has a strong economic incentive to promote the impression that manipulative sales
practices are limited to a small subset of brokers, for their entire business is built on customer
trust:).
181 See, e.g., Basics of Saving and Investing, supra note 73, at Units 5, 6; NASD, Investor
Training, Taking Charge of Your Finances: How to Select a Broker, Investor Protection (visited
Sept. 15, 1998) <http://www.nasd.com>.
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York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"), 82 and from nonprofit consumer
organizations.1 83 This is not surprising given that conflicting interests
make even legitimate financial professionals unsuitable to undertake
investor education about consumer abuse or fraud. Despite concerns
about legal sanctions and adverse publicity that will affect their mar-
ket position, firms may be tempted by profit to engage, directly or
indirectly, in clearly prohibited practices. 184 The line between ille-
gitimate and legitimate financial practices, moreover, is also not al-
ways easy to draw, particularly regarding innovations in financial
products, and practices can move from the legitimate to illegitimate
category over time. 185 If certain practices or products are profitable
and if their legality is uncertain (or not even questionable), it is not
reasonable to expect that financial professionals will educate the pub-
lic about ways of avoiding them, thus reducing their own profit.
While competition in financial services helps ensure that financial
firms will offer adequate saving and investing education to consum-
ers, the same competition makes it unlikely that these firms will be at
the forefront of educating consumers about innovative, potentially
fraudulent financial practices, or simply about legitimate, but poten-
tially abusive, sales tactics. 86  Furthermore, although consumer fi-
nancial organizations can (and do) educate consumers about abuse
and fraud, they do not have all of the expertise or resources necessary
wholly to take on this educational burden.
The government in one or more forms, through agencies and
self-regulatory organizations, as well as in partnership with consumer
groups, should therefore be the primary educator about financial
abuse and fraud, including fraud and deception in firm investor edu-
cation materials. Unlike financial firms, it suffers no disabling con-
flict-of-interest in warning consumers against new fraud or abusive
practices, although it may initially lack the knowledge and expertise
to identify them. 87 Its educational efforts, moreover, follow from its
enforcement of the laws and other regulatory responsibilities. A gov-
182 See You and the Investment World, supra note 73, at 33-37.
183 See, e.g., AARP, At Your Fingertips (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http.//www.aarp.org/
program/finance> (discussing telemarketing fraud).
184 See Langevoort, supra note 49, at 647-48 (describing the tendency of supervisors in
financial firms to focus on the "bottom line" in an effort to be able to deflect legal and moral
responsibility for prohibited behavior by their employees); see also Is This Marriage a Mis-
take?, ECONOMIST, Jan. 31, 1998, at 75-77 (describing the lack of supervision in a Swiss bank
that led to enormous losses).
185 See, e.g., SELIGMAN, supra note 55, at 397-416 (describing the abolition of fixed
commission rates at the NYSE).
186 See, e.g., In the Matter of NationsSecurities and Nationsbank, N.A., Securities Act
1998 SEC LEXIS 833 (May 4, 1998) (settling charges against these financial institutions al-
leged to have engaged in fraudulent sales practices to consumers that blurred the distinction
between insured bank deposits and non-government insured securities).
187 Part of this education will thus be to inform consumers how to contact the govern-
ment to bring new abusive or fraudulent schemes to the relevant agency's attention.
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eminent agency identifies prohibited behavior regarding saving and
investing and counteracts it by prosecuting offenders for violations of
their fiduciary or other duties, 88 and by licensing and supervising
investment professionals.189 Publicizing these activities both deters
future violators and educates investors about existing fraudulent or
abusive schemes. 190 As new schemes appear, whether versions of old
ones or genuinely innovative fraud, the government addresses them
and, through the media publicity of its action and court decisions,
further alerts investors.19' An explanatory list, or summary of past
successful prosecutions regarding abuses of investors, would resem-
ble the kind of list of common crimes affecting children that police
officers distribute in schools. 192 The cost of this education, moreover,
is relatively small since communication technology makes it increas-
ingly easier and cheaper for the government to communicate this in-
formation.
Americans also expect the government to perform this educa-
tional task, which state and federal financial regulators have tradition-
ally fulfilled.193 Consumers respect financial market authorities who
have a reputation for integrity in policing financial fraud and abusive
practices.194 They look to government agencies for protection from,
"" See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1271, 1273 (1995) (discussing broker's implied representation of fair dealing or "shingle the-
ory"); Langevoort, supra note 49, at 669, 675-76, 680-81, 691 (discussing duties imposed on
brokers).
,s9 See H.R. REP. No. 104-864, at 39-40 (1996); S. REP. No. 96-293, at 2-5 (1996) (ex-
plaining how the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 addressed the problem
of lack of regulatory supervision of many investment advisors by dividing supervisory responsi-
bility over advisors between the SEC and state authorities). The government can also "publi-
cize" its enforcement through regulatory responses to questionable behavior. See, e.g.,
Langevoort, supra note 49, at 686-88 (discussing special regulatory response to "penny stock"
fraud-requiring enhanced disclosure in sales of these stocks).
190 See Langevoort, supra note 49, at 658 n.97 (referring to SEC and NASD efforts to
publicize broker disciplinary information); cf. V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What
Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1492, 1531 (1996) (discussing the powerful
message-sending role of corporate law).
'9, See, e.g., NASAA (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http.//www.nasaa.org> (Web site of the
North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc. ("NASAA") warning about recent
rise in "ethnic affinity fraud" (financial fraud targeted to particular ethnic groups by members of
same group) and providing a list of recent fraudulent schemes, including "Cyberspace Fraud and
the Small Investor").
192 State or federal government financial regulators or members of self-regulatory or-
ganizations could also discuss with students the dangers of financial fraud. See infra Part
IV(A).
193 See generally STEPHANIE W. KANWIT, 2 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 22-1 to 22-59
(1995) (describing Federal Trade Commission regulation of false and deceptive advertising).
The available government materials against securities fraud are voluminous. See, e.g., NASAA,
supra note 191; Basics of Saving and Investing, supra note 73, at Appendix (listing numerous
governmental agencies, together with their materials and Web sites).
194 See KRIPKE, supra note 4, at 8. But see ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY
PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 187-
92 (1982) (discussing problems of SEC overreaching in law enforcement).
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and guidance about, such practices and are likely to cooperate with
these agencies in helping to identify perpetrators of fraudulent
schemes. Just as the government has a critical role in reinforcing op-
timal saving and investing norms, it plays a significant part in main-
taining the bounds of acceptable and prohibited investing behavior.
Social expectations thus reinforce the conclusion that the government,
generally through financial regulators, should conduct continuing in-
vestor education designed to protect ordinary people against abuse
and fraud in saving and investing.
IV. AN EVALUATION OF SEC INVESTOR EDUCATIONAL INITIATIVES
This Part of the Article evaluates the SEC's investor educational
initiatives from the above theoretical framework. It focuses on the
SEC because the Commission has been the most active federal
agency in this area. Most of these initiatives significantly extend the
SEC's traditional mission, which is, simply put, disclosure related to
securities transactions.195 It is one thing for the SEC to ensure that
companies offering and selling securities, or engaged in transactions
affecting their securities, disclose, among other things, information
about their business, management, the features of the securities and
any major transactions. It is quite another thing for the SEC to train
consumers how to save and to invest, which involves their intelligent
use of the disclosed information. Any SEC education about fraud or
abusive practices, however, is less of a regulatory stretch, since it is
ancillary to the SEC's law enforcement role.
The current SEC chairman (1993 to present), Arthur Levitt, has
been the catalyst for the SEC's educational initiatives. In 1993 he es-
tablished an Office of Investor Education and Assistance and has
himself reached out to ordinary investors through town meetings (a
format popular with the man who appointed him, President
Clinton). 96- Under his direction, the Office prepares educational
pamphlets for consumers, makes them available on its Web site, has
recently been engaged in a national (and even international) investor
education campaign and has itself greatly increased the contact be-
tween the SEC and ordinary consumers, through electronic and other
means. 197 It has also been involved in an important initiative to sim-
plify the language of all disclosure documents filed with the SEC, by
195 See generally ANNE M. KHADEMIAN, THE SEC AND CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION:
THE POLITIcs OF EXPERTISE 83-87 (1992) (discussing the enforcement of SEC disclosure regu-
lations).
196 See Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Government Af-
fairs, 105th Cong. 18 (1997) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC) (describing town
meetings as "typically well-attended (often over 1,000 investors attended each meeting) and
feature a series of seminars for investors on a wide variety of topics").
197 See infra Part IV(A).
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transforming them into "plain English."'19 In addition, the SEC's Di-
vision of Investment Management, which oversees the mutual fund
industry, has recently sought to make mutual fund disclosure more
instructive for consumers by focusing on important fund issues and
facilitating the comparison of funds.199 The SEC staff has even sug-
gested that, given the subject's importance, Congress pass legislation
on investor education.2
These SEC educational efforts may be little more than a passing
political trend2°1 and, from a "public choice" perspective, an example
of an often-used strategy of regulatory agencies justifying their exis-
tence by dramatizing an issue that demands their regulatory interven-
tion.202 Yet the SEC, as the primary government agency regulating
the securities markets, should be involved in investor education and
should expand its disclosure mission to include education. The pres-
sures leading to the importance of investor education-the problems
with Social Security, the growth of defined contribution plans, and
the decline of saving in the United States. amid changing demo-
graphics 3---are not of the SEC's making. The focus on disclosure
was appropriate when few Americans were investors and they mainly
relied upon full-service brokers; it is inadequate when investing has
become an everyday, yet important, activity for over half of the
American population, many of whom invest without a financial pro-
fessional. The SEC would also incur considerable political risk if its
lack of attention to education contributed to a market disaster (e.g.,
small investors left financial markets in a panic in a market downturn
or out of concern of market fraud, partly because of their educational
deficiencies).2 4
19 See infra Part IV(B).
199 See infra Part IVCC).
2oo See Christine Williamson, ICI Talks Up Education, Expectations, PENSIONS &
INVESTMENTS, June 9, 1997, at 35 ("Barry P. Barbash, director of the Division of Investment
Management... warned if the industry does not itself regulate its educational efforts and pro-
vide more disclosure, and regulators are unable to persuade vendors to provide more informa-
tion, Congress will be forced to deal with investor education, particularly as it relates to retire-
ment planning.").
201 Democratic administrations often exhibit classic American populism in government,
which translates into renewed SEC regulatory attention to the small investor. See, e.g.,
SELIGMAN, supra note 55, at 548-50 (discussing initiatives after the election of Jimmy Carter).
Since, under present political conditions with a Republican-controlled Congress, the Democratic
administration is wary of proposing significant market regulatory initiatives, investor education
is a politically acceptable program; it emphasizes aid to small investors pleasing to Democratic
populists and the self-help orientation acceptable to free-market Republicans.
2o2 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest
Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOzO L. REv. 909, 914 (1994).
This "crisis" presentation does at times characterize the SEC's "plain English" initiative. See
infra Part IV(B).
203 See supra Part 1(A).
2'4 See Langevoort, supra note 177, at 530 (discussing risk aversion by regulators).
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The SEC likely now has the regulatory authority to be involved
in investor education, although its staff s references to the possible
need for legislation may reflect their acknowledgment that the perti-
nent statutes do not clearly address this issue. This authority is ar-
guably incidental, and even unnecessary, to the SEC's statutory mis-
sion in various securities acts to ensure adequate disclosure in the
public interest.2 5 If many ordinary investors can not even understand
how disclosed information relates to investing, disclosure cannot
achieve its communicative purpose.20 6 Moreover, if the central pur-
pose of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is to create "fair and
honest [securities] markets," 2°7 this purpose cannot be achieved with-
out investors being educated not only about fraud, but also about the
functioning of these markets, the securities traded on them, the role of
the markets in personal investing and wealth creation-in short, about
all of the knowledge that investor education should impart.
While the SEC's educational efforts have been useful, it could
greatly improve them if it redirected its activities, in accordance with
the Article's guidance, to concentrate on anti-fraud education and to
do more to promote and facilitate the educational services of financial
and nonprofit firms.208 In the general educational materials and ac-
tivities of the Office of Investor Education and Assistance, the SEC
appropriately educates consumers about illegal and abusive practices
in financial services and markets, and usefully provides means for
consumers to contact it about these practices. Yet its saving and in-
vesting education does not measure up to the educational activities of
private firms. Therefore, this education should be redesigned to be
part of a federal government campaign to encourage saving and in-
vesting, and to publicize and facilitate access to private educational
resources and services while still itself providing investors with basic
25 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1994) (empowering the SEC to determine what informa-
tion is needed in registration statements as being "necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors"); 15 U.S.C. § 78m (empowering the SEC to require the filing
of information "as necessary or appropriate for the proper protection of investors and to insure
fair dealing in the security"); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b)(1) (justifying regulation of mutual funds
because investors purchase their securities "without adequate, accurate, and explicit informa-
tion, fairly presented").
206 That many ordinary investors do not read disclosed information and instead rely on
market price and recommendations of financial professionals would not change the analysis, for
the securities acts do not authorize the SEC to assume that only professionals participate in
securities markets and that all ordinary investors hand their portfolios over to professionals-a
situation that, in any case, bears no connection to reality.
207 See 15 U.S.C. § 78b; see also Cox, supra note 8, at 653-55.
208 A general problem with the SEC's educational efforts is that, unlike market partici-
pants, the SEC does not fully feel cost pressures, although Congress reviews its budget and it is
required both to review its regulations from a cost/benefit perspective and to consider the bur-
dens they imposes upon businesses. See, e.g., Small Business Regulation Fairness Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857 (1996) (encouraging the effective participation of small
businesses in the federal regulatory process). But see KRIPKE, supra note 4, at 59 (contending
that the SEC's cost/benefit analysis is often perfunctory).
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saving and investing norms. The SEC's "plain English" initiative and
mutual fund disclosure simplification and presentation exhibit a valu-
able partnership with the financial services industry, which will allow
consumers to understand basic information about investing in a for-
mat to which they can easily apply the investor education provided by
others. The SEC, however, should explicitly recognize the necessary
relationship between the consumer-oriented disclosure and the firms'
educational services and make the firms link their disclosure docu-
ments to these services. Finally, the SEC should begin a sustained
reflection on its role in investor education and heighten awareness of
education's importance by issuing a "concept release" on investor
education, and inviting comment from all those involved and inter-
ested in the subject.20
A. <www.sec.gov/invkhome>
The "Investor Assistance & Complaints" section of the SEC's
Web site,210 the "virtual home" of the Office of Investor Education
and Assistance, exemplifies both the usefulness of the SEC's investor
education efforts and its need for redirection. The introduction by the
Office's Director suggests its educational ambitions: "We provide a
variety of services to address the problems and questions you may
face as an investor. We cannot tell you what investments to make,
but we can tell you how to invest wisely and protect your hard earned
investment dollars from securities fraud or abuse."21' In much of its
material, the Office appropriately provides education about fraud and
questionable financial practices, particularly by finance professionals,
and facilitates communication from consumers to the SEC. The Of-
fice, for example, urges investors to contact the SEC if they have
"suffered wrongdoing at the hands of a bad broker or investment ad-
209 In a companion piece, I argue that, once it has refocused its saving and investing edu-
cational activities, the SEC should do more to teach people about governance and corporate
morality. See Fanto, supra note 51.
210 See Investor Assistance & Complaints (last modified August 21, 1998)
<http://www.sec.gov.invkhome.htm> [hereinafter Investor Assistance & Complaints]. The SEC
also provides the information on its Web site in written materials that it distributes.21 1 Nancy M Smith, The SEC's Office ofInvestor Education and Assistance (last modified
August 7, 1997) <http:llwww.sec.gov/consumer/abotoiea.htm> [hereinafter SEC's Office of
Investor Education andAssistance] (the section's hypertext links lead to other documents whose
titles suggest the SEC's educational ambitions: About the Office of Investor Education and
Assistance, Ask Questions, Invest Wisely: Advice From Your Securities Industry Regulators,
Invest Wisely: An Introduction to Mutual Funds, How to Use the Edgar Database of Corporate
Information, SEC Division of Enforcement Complaint Center); see also Investor Assistance &
Complaints, supra note 210. The SEC also provides hypertext links to other government, SRO
and nonprofit Web sites of interest. See, e.g., Other Sites of Interest (last modified June 18,
1998) <http://www.see.govlothers.htm> [hereinafter Other Sites] (listing other U.S. govern-
ment, market regulator, self-regulatory organization, educational institution and professional
organization Web sites).
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viser .... ,212 The section also provides links to the SEC's Division
of Enforcement complaint hotline and to Division notices that alert
investors about recent questionable financial practices or investments
targeted at consumers.
The SEC does not limit its educational efforts, however, to fraud
prevention but also offers general saving and investing education; one
of the purposes of the Office is, after all, to tell people "how to invest
wisely."21  It is unquestionably difficult for the agency to conduct
anti-fraud education without saying something about investing, in-
vestments and securities markets. Yet the SEC's saving and investing
education is uneven when compared to the educational materials of
financial and nonprofit firms, because the SEC has not always identi-
fied what kind of investor it is addressing (i.e., sophisticated vs. unso-
phisticated). Furthermore, the SEC sometimes mixes elementary
points about investing with issues demanding some sophistication.
The SEC's most basic educational brochure, What Every Inves-
tor Should Know, has a clear, useful discussion of securities markets,
basic financial instruments, investment companies and instructions
about opening brokerage accounts and stock trading.215  Yet in the
212 SEC's Office of Investor Education and Assistance, supra note 211. The Web site
also observes that investor complaints may lead to investigations and expose such obvious
fraudulent practices as "a bad broker, an illegal boiler-room operation, a ponzi scheme or an
insider trading ring." Id. This quotation exhibits an occasional problem in the SEC's educa-
tionai materials: the SEC fails to explain what it is talking about. Do all investors, for instance,
understand what a "ponzi scheme" is?
213 See Investor Assistance & Complaints, supra note 210. To target specifically "cold
calling," for example, the SEC recently prepared a pamphlet (on-line and in written form) that
explains to investors cold calling and the kinds of firms from which it is practiced, alerts them to
cold-calling tactics and advises them of their rights and organizations to contact for help. See
Cold Calling (last modified June 16, 1998) <www.sec.gov/enforce/alertstcoldcall.htm>.
214 SEC, Ask Questions (last modified June 16, 1998) <http:llwww.sec.gov/consumerl
askqinv.htm> [hereinafter Ask Questions]. Even these materials include education on fraud
prevention. For example, the brochure entitled Ask Questions gives consumers a list of ques-
tions to ask brokers or financial professionals, some of which are designed to head off abusive
practices and prepare the investor for the psychological pressure exerted by brokers. See id. The
advice is sometimes comically paternalistic. See id. ("Taking notes [in response to answers to
questions] also sends a signal to your broker: I'm a smart and serious investor who wants to
know more about the risks and rewards of investing."). It also strains credulity that a dishonest
broker would answer some of the SEC's suggested questions truthfully (e.g., "Is this purchase
really in my best interest, or are you trying to win a prize?"). See id. The brochure Invest
Wisely: Advice From Your Securities Industry Regulators similarly gives the kind of basic in-
formation about detecting fraud that one would expect from a securities market "cop":
"NEVER send money to purchase an investment based simply on a telephone sales pitch ....
NEVER make a check out to a sales representative .... BE ALERT FOR: Representations of
spectacular profit, such as, [y]our money will double in six months .... Remember, if it sounds
too good to be true, it probably is!" Invest Wisely: Advice From Your Securities Industry
Regulators (last modified December 12, 1997) <http:l/www.sec.govlconsumerinws.htm>
[hereinafter Advice from Your Securities Industry Regulators] (emphasis in original).
215 See What Every Investor Should Know: A Handbook from the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission (last modified October 21, 1996) <http:llwww.sec.govlconsumerl
weisktc.htm> [hereinafter What Every Investor Should Know]. This brochure also discusses
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Ask Questions brochure, a consumer is given a list of useful questions
to ask about financial products, the progress of investments and
problems with brokers, but many of them make little sense unless the
investor is already familiar with basic finance concepts, such as asset
allocation, diversification and risk, that are absent from the brochure
(and are not found on the SEC's Web site).216 Moreover, in its Invest
Wisely brochure on brokers, after disclaiming that it will provide any
general investor education,217 the SEC offers congumers its own in-
vesting advice ranging from simple anti-fraud remarks 218 to state-
ments requiring some finance knowledge219
Despite their problems, these SEC saving and investing educa-
tional efforts involve only the limited activity of organizing and
maintaining a Web site and printing documents, which also supply
useful anti-fraud education. An obvious answer to the above criti-
cisms is that the SEC spend more time, effort and money on saving
and investing education, particularly on finance and investing strate-
gies.22° Although Chairman Levitt has admirably tried to make the
SEC more responsive to the needs of consumers, the SEC can not
produce educational products and services superior to those supplied
by private firms in a highly competitive environment. The SEC staff
SEC supervision of brokers and other financial professionals, which brings it within the SEC's
anti-fraud ambit. See id.
216 See Ask Questions, supra note 214 ("Does this investment match my investment
goals? ... Why is this investment suitable for me? ... What are the specific risks associated
with this investment? ... What is the maximum I could lose?") Similarly, while the brochure
What Every Investor Should Know provides useful descriptions of basic financial instruments, as
well as a glossary of investment terms, it, too, offers little finance explanation. See e.g., What
Every Investor Should Know: Section 4. How to Choose an Investment (last modified October
22, 1996) <http://www.sec.gov/consumer/weisklweisk4.htm> [hereinafter How to Choose an
Investment] ("One of the more basic relationships in investing is that between risk and reward.
Very often, investments that offer potentially high returns are accompanied by relatively higher
risk factors. It is up to you to decide how much risk you can assume.").
217 See Advice from Your Securities Industry Regulators, supra note 214 (encouraging
readers to get "[i]nformation regarding the fundamentals of investing and basic financial termi-
nology... at your local library."); see also How to Choose an Investment, supra note 216 (re-
ferring investors to other sources for information about securities, while downplaying the obvi-
ous sources, such as financial services firms).
218 See Advice from Your Securities Industry Regulators, supra note 214 ("Investments
in securities issued by a company with little or no operating history or published information
may involve greater risk.").
219 See Advice from Your Securities Industry Regulators, supra note 214 ("The higher the
expected rate of return, the greater the risk .... In some cases, such as partial or two-tier tender
offers, failure to act can have detrimental effects on your investment."); see also Invest Wisely:
An Introduction to Mutual Funds (last modified Oct. 21, 1996) <http://www.sec.gov/
consumer/inwsmf.htm> [hereinafter An Introduction to Mutual Funds] (warning that
"[a]lthough past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance, volatility of past
returns is a good indicator of a fund's future volatility," while also stating in a simple maxim,
"[a] mutual fund is a company that brings together money from many people and invests it in
stocks, bonds, or other securities").
= See Investor Assistdnce & Complaints, supra note 210 (promising more information,
which could include more general education: "More To Come! Watch this space for future
developments!").
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simply lacks the continuous contact with consumers, the strong profit
motive and/or the need to justify its existence that would enable it to
design and tailor general educational efforts to consumers' needs.221
More importantly, extensive education efforts, as well as any
substantial increase in these efforts, distract the SEC from the tasks
for which it is better suited. The SEC should continue to focus the
investor assistance section of its Web site and general investor publi-
cations on alerting investors about new and regularly occurring kinds
of securities fraud and abuse, as it has successfully done. It should
also perform the significant "cheerleading" function of encouraging
consumers to save and invest, a function that (as the PWBA has dem-
onstrated) is appropriate for government agencies, but that, until re-
cently, the SEC has all but ignored in its educational materials. 
2
The SEC has several brochures describing itself and its reglatory
authority that could contribute to this educational function.23 For
example, in outlining its authority over new securities issuances and
securities trading, the SEC could also describe the importance of pri-
vate securities markets and personal investing for the economy and
the well-being of citizens. The SEC should not underestimate the
effect that publicizing its regulatory authority will have on encourag-
ing saving and investing, for evidence suggests that consumers are
encouraged to invest if they realize that securities markets are subject
to laws and that an active agency is enforcing themY'2
4
The SEC should therefore conduct saving and investing educa-
tion as ancillary to its fraud prevention education and to its "cheer-
leading" activities so as to drive home to investors saving and invest-
ing norms. 2s Rather than attempting to design the optimal educa-
tional product, the SEC would do better to consult with the financial
industry on its members' educational products, encourage continued
product and services development and review educational materials
221 Even nonprofit organizations, like AAH, owe their very existence to satisfying the
needs of individual investors and thus have a strong motive to design services attractive to them.222 In his town meetings, however, Chairman Levitt has always admirably performed this
"promotional" educational task.
223 See, e.g., The U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission: What It Is, What It Does
last modified November 18, 1996) <http://www.sec.gov/aseclasecart.htm>; The Work of the
SEC (last modified August 5, 1997) <http:llwww.sec.gov/asec/wot.htm>.
224 See RAFAEL LA PORTA ET AL., LAW AND FINANCE 40-42 (National Bureau of Econ.
Research Working Paper No. 5661, 1996) (describing importance of law in permitting capital
markets to function); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN.
1131, 1149-50 (1997) (same).
225 For example, in summarizing its oversight over mutual funds and investment advi-
sors, the SEC could briefly discuss the nature of a mutual fund, the kinds of funds, and their
basic features and advantages. The SEC could also combine some of its current brochures into
an "investor's handbook" that explained the SEC's regulation of different investment products
and markets and provided an elementary description of them.
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for any abuses.226 In addition, it should limit itself to echoing several
basic, but important, saving and investing rules.227 Indeed, the SEC
exemplified the correct balance between promoting saving and in-
vesting and conducting basic investor education in its sponsorship of
a week-long "Facts on Saving and Investing Campaign" from March
29 to April 4, 1998, with the participation of other government agen-
cies, state securities regoulators, consumer organizations and financial
industry trade groups. '  Not only did the SEC and the other partici-
pants focus on simple saving and investing norms through high visi-
bility events,'m but it also produced educational materials designed to
convey and reinforce these norms.230
Most importantly, the SEC should inform consumers that finan-
cial and nonprofit firms are supplying investor education, and repeat-
edly encourage them to use these educational materials and services.
As a regulator, the SEC may not think it appropriate to publicly high-
2 In fact, the SEC should undertake a general review of educational materials produced
by consumer financial services firms for abuses or irregularities in them. Cf. Ellen E. Schultz,
Employees Looking for Advice on 401(k)s Often Face Obstacles, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 1998, at
CI (discussing potential abuses in investor education relating to mutual fund expenses and fees).
227 See, e.g., Securities Industry Association, Understanding Market Risks: What Every
Investor Should Know, at I (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http://www.sia.com/investorinformation/
html/publications.html> (referring to consultations with the SEC's Office of Investor Education
and Assistance in preparing the brochure). While there is no great need for the SEC to recom-
mend to consumers a particular investment strategy, in its general educational messages the
SEC could give warnings to the effect that, despite the many different investing strategies, it is
difficult for any one person (including a professional) consistently to beat the market and that
diversification should characterize most investors' portfolios. See Stout, Costly Casinos, supra
note 88, at 692 n.271 ('The government might, however, require all stocks to carry the follow-
ing label: 'WARNING: Self-Selection Ensures that You Probably Are Not Going To Be as
Talented at Trading as You Think You Might Be."'); Robert B. Thompson, Securities Regula-
tion in an Electronic Age: The Impact of Cognitive Psychology, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 779, 782
(1997) (discussing possible investor warnings to address cognitive weaknesses and pressures
resulting from the use of framing in securities regulations). In fact, the SEC occasionally makes
such statements in its materials. See, e.g., How to Choose an Investment, supra note 216 ("Don't
speculate. Speculation can be a useful investment tool for those who can understand and man-
age the risks involved and those who can afford to lose money. For the average investor, more
conservative investment strategies are generally appropriate."); An Introduction to Mutual
Funds, supra note 219 (suggesting that higher expense funds are not necessarily more profit-
able, which is an indirect reference to the benefits available from no-load, index funds).
ng See Overview: Get the Facts. It's Your Money. It's Your Future (last modified Feb.
24, 1998) <http'//www.sec.gov/consumer/cosralaboutlfacts.htm> (describing campaign, cam-
paign partners, events in nearly twenty states). The campaign, in fact, involved activities in
twenty-one countries in the Western Hemisphere, which highlights the growing importance of
investor education in other countries as market capitalism increases worldwide.
m See, e.g., id. (describing SEC-hosted National Roundtable on Saving and Investing on
Mar. 30, 1998).
230 See, e.g., SEC, Get the Facts on Saving and Investing: A Roadmap to Start You on a
Journey to Financial Security Through Saving and Investing (visited Sept. 15, 1998)
<http:llwww.sec.gov/consumer/cosra/brochure.htm> (providing some basic guidelines on sav-
ing and investing, such as a financial plan, the benefits of saving, elementary concepts of in-
vesting, fundamentals about mutual funds and brokers and ways to avoid fraud and abuse).
Moreover, the SEC's campaign Web site provides a hyperlink to the site for the Alliance for
Investor Education.
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light the educational efforts of a particular firm.231 Yet it now refers
investors, by hypertext links on its Web site, to other Web sites that
might be of interest to them. Some of these "quasi-public" sites, like
those of the NYSE and the NASD, have good educational materi-
als. 232 The SEC could take the additional step of openly referring in-
vestors, with appropriate disclaimers, to these sites and to others, such
as those of trade groups. 23 It should then encourage the SROs and
trade groups to point consumers to excellent sites of their member
firms, which would give an additional spur to the already existing
firm competition to provide consumer educational services.
B. Plain English
The "plain English" movement began in law over a decade
ago. 235 Its appearance in securities regulation is again due to the par-
ticular interest of Chairman Levitt and to the fact that, since investing
is now a consumer area, adequate communication to ordinary inves-
tors is critical, just as it was earlier in leases, loans and insurance
contracts. The more specific reason for the SEC's attention to "plain
English" came from the results of a report of a task force of private
and government lawyers studying simplification of securities disclo-
sure.236  Recognizing that much disclosure language was opaque, the
231 As noted below, in its "plain English" initiative, the SEC does publicly praise private
firms that have produced plain English disclosure documents. Since many educational materials
now exist, the SEC may fear slighting one or more firms by omitting mention of their educa-
tional materials if it lists those of other firms.
232 The SEC also has a hyperlink with the ASEC. See Other Sites, supra note 211.
233 The SEC's "Facts on Saving and Investing Campaign" clearly involved the high-
lighting for consumers of the availability of private investor educational resources, if only be-
cause of the involvement therein of many financial industry trade groups and consumer organi-
zations specializing in advising consumers on saving and investing. Moreover, Chairman Levitt
has recently publicly praised the educational activities of private firms. See Remarks by Arthur
Levitt, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (May 15, 1998) (visited Sept. 15, 1998)
<http:llwww.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch2l2.txt> [hereinafter Levitt Remarks]. Is it too much
to suggest that he may have taken some inspiration for this recent focus from a reading of an
earlier draft of this Article? See Letter from Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, to James A. Fanto,
author (Mar. 24, 1998) (thanking author for article).
234 SROs or trade groups, like the ICI or the Securities Industry Association, could peri-
odically highlight and praise the educational materials of one or more firms or firms' educa-
tional innovations.
235 See Plain English Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 7380, 62 Fed. Reg. 3152,
3154 (Jan. 21, 1997) [hereinafter Proposing Release] (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 228, 229,
230 and 239). For a general discussion of the legal "plain language" movement, see LAWRENCE
M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 118-38 (1993).
236 See SEC, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON DISCLOSURE SIMPLIFICATION (1996)
[hereinafter DISCLOSURE SIMPLIFICATION]. Appointed by Chairman Levitt, the task force was
chaired by a private lawyer, Philip Howard, a named partner in Howard, Darby & Levin and
author of the book, DEATH OF COMMON SENSE, and included staff members from different SEC
divisions.
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task force recommended that the SEC "enhance [the] readability [of
disclosure documents] by individual investors. ' 2 7
It is difficult not to regard the SEC's "plain English" initiative
with some cynicism. The "crisis" of opaque disclosure will lead to
more work (and continued employment) for the securities bar and
SEC staff-that is, for those who are in large part responsible for the
obfuscatory legalese in disclosure documents in the first place.238 The
initiative also confirms the late Professor Kripke's observation that,
since lawyers, rather than economists and finance professionals, are
most influential in the SEC staff, the agency invariably emphasizes
the importance of law and rhetoric, rather than economics and fi-
nance, in its regulations.239 Even if the SEC staff and securities law-
yers should shoulder much of the blame for a securities disclosure
that generates opaque documents, they are at least trying to remedy
the problem.24°
The SEC's "plain English" initiative not only helps simplify dis-
closure, but also highlights the importance of, and contributes to, in-
237 Id. at 17 ("Develop a 'plain English' introduction to the prospectus to enhance its
readability by individual investors, by eliminating boilerplate 'legalese' and requiring a sum-
mary of key information.") (emphasis in original); see also Proposing Release, supra note 239,
at 3152 n.17.
23 For example, Howard, Darby & Levin is primarily a securities firm, and the SEC ac-
knowledges the help of securities lawyers in its "plain English" initiative. See, e.g., SEC, A
Plain English Handbook: How to Create Clear SEC Disclosure Documents (visited Sept. 15,
1998) <http://www.sec.gov> [hereinafter Plain English Handbook] (listing securities lawyers
who aided the SEC's efforts). The SEC downplays that the state of disclosure documents owes
much to the bar's compliance with SEC regulations and the staffs guidance. See, e.g., Propos-
ing Release, supra note 235, at 3153-54 ("Recognizing that many of our rules have contributed
to the legalistic language and tone of these documents.. .", but describing at length its numer-
ous attempts through the years to require companies to simplify disclosure). The securities bar,
however, has not been uniform in its support of the initiative. See, e.g., Letter of Committee on
Securities Regulation of the Business Law Section of the New York State Bar Association to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (Mar. 21, 1997) (visited Sept. 15, 1998)
<http:/www.sec.gov/ruleslporposedls7397/gumall.htm> (offering qualified support for the
initiative); Letter of Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Section of Business Law of
the American Bar Association to the Securities and Exchange Commission (Mar. 31, 1997)
(visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http://www.sec.gov/rulestproposed/s7397/liftinl.htm> (questioning
aspects of initiative).
239 See KRiPKE, supra note 4, at 18. "Plain English" is, in fact, a way for rhetorically-
trained lawyers to reassert their usefulness and expertise in an investment world dominated by
mathematicians and economists. The SEC's writing and organizing recommendations at times
appear to come from high school English teachers who are not particularly conversant with, and
somewhat fearful of, the latest computer technology. See Plain English Handbook, supra note
238, at 55 (recommending that a writer take sections of a disclosure document and "tape or tack
to the wall the pages" as an aid in considering the best order of presentation). The drafters seem
to be unaware of word processing programs that allow multiple configurations of documents.
m In the past, the SEC has urged practitioners to write simpler disclosure documents.
See, e.g., Clarification of Prospectuses, Securities Act Release No. 4844, 31 Fed. Reg. 10,667,
10,668 (Aug. 11, 1966) ('The chief goal of registration is disclosure for the benefit of investors
and that involves, among other things, the use of language that can be understood readily by the
persons to whom it is addressed. Failure to use language that is clear and understandable by the
investor may operate to defeat the purpose of the prospectus.") (footnote omitted).
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vesting education.24 Simplifying information to promote effective
communication in securities disclosure inevitably raises questions as
to whether consumers have the necessary background or "culture" to
understand even this information.242 Yet the SEC does not always
squarely face, nor clearly think through, the connections between the
initiative and investor education. Thus, the initiative's educational
implications appear haphazardly, with the result that educational tasks
are inappropriately placed upon parties, such as individual companies,
when others, such as financial services firms, are already performing
them. Unless it is integrated into a well-conceived SEC educational
initiative, "plain English" will simply be "window dressing," bringing
few ordinary people into the investment world.
In the "plain English" releases,24 the SEC appears not to realize
fully the educational implications of its initiative, and thus offers con-
fusing signals to companies preparing disclosure documents. It states
that "plain English" and disclosure simplification involve clarifying
language and improving presentation. Since a disclosure document
addresses investors with different levels of financial sophistication,24
the SEC requires that a company generally adopt language under-
standable to the least sophisticated among them and presentation
techniques that satisfy both sophisticated and unsophisticated inves-
tors. Under the final rule, a company must use "plain English" writ-
ing principles in initial parts of prospectus, where a company often
summarizes important information, and ensure that the language and
presentation of the rest of the document are "clear, concise, and un-
derstandable.' 245 There is no question that the SEC's "plain English"
241 Others have discussed the advantages and disadvantages of "plain English." See,
e.g., SOLAN, supra note 235, at 129-38 (discussing misguided effort to simplify necessary legal
complexities).
242 The Task Force on Disclosure Simplification made this connection. See DISCLOSURE
SIMPLIFICATION, supra note 236, at 17 (observing that in prospectuses "[t]rivial points some-
times receive as much attention as material information, and in the end may bury points signifi-
cant to an investment decision" and recommending better writing and presentation to remedy
the problem; but also making the general educational recommendation, i.e., "the use of a 'plain
English' glossary to explain technical terms used in the document"). See, e.g., Isaac C. Hunt,
Jr., Plain English-Changing the Corporate Culture, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 713, 714 (1997)
(quoting a Commission member observing that disclosure does not achieve its purpose if it fails
to communicate with the investor).
243 See Plain English Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 7497, 63 Fed. Reg. 6370
(Feb. 6, 1998) [hereinafter Final Release] (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 228, 229, 230, 239 and
274); Proposing Release, supra note 235.
2 See Proposing Release, supra note 235, at 3155 ("The educational background and fi-
nancial sophistication of your current or prospective investors should dictate the language you
use."). The Final Release omits discussion of kinds of readers, but implies that the new disclo-
sure will reach a wider audience, i.e., consumers. See Final Release, supra note 243, at 6370
("Prospectuses will be simpler, clearer, more useful, and we hope, more widely read.").
245 Final Release, supra note 243, at 6384. Under the adopted "plain English" rule, a
company must use "plain English principles in the organization, language, and design of the
front and back cover pages, the summary, and the risk factors section" of a prospectus. Id.
These principles are six: "(i) Short sentences; (ii) Definite, concrete, everyday words; (iii) Ac-
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writing principles and clarification standards, which are the founda-
tions of good writing, will lead to, and have produced clearer, more
understandable disclosure.246 Yet the examples of the !'plain English"
or clarifying redrafting of poor prospectus disclosure, although much
better written,247 do not always help an ordinary investor who is un-
familiar with many financial, accounting and business terms in the
prospectus or with investing in general.m
The SEC suggests the educational implications of its initiative
when, like the Disclosure Task Force, it recommends the inclusion of
glossaries in prospectuses for "[t]erms that are not clear from the
context [and to] facilitate understanding of the disclosure." 249 But its
support for these tools is qualified because it fears that reliance on
glossaries and the necessary cross-references will interrupt the flow of
writing and discourage ordinary investors from reading the docu-
ments (since it takes time and effort to move back and forth through
them), although these are the very people that a glossary is designed
to help. Rather, the SEC recommends that documents provide, at ap-
propriate places, a "concise explanation" of complex provisions or
terms 50 Yet the SEC's examples of explanations would not effect
complete communication to the financially uneducated. It is not al-
ways clear where any particular explanation would stop and this rec-
ommendation does not entirely avoid the problem of cross-references.
The SEC offers yet another standard, which states that a company
tive voice; (iv) Tabular presentation or bullet lists for complex material, whenever possible; (v)
No legal jargon or highly technical business terms; and (vi) No multiple negatives." See id. at
6384. The rule encourages the use of pictures and charts to make this part of the document
accessible to ordinary investors. As for the rest of the prospectus, the rule demands that a com-
pany present the information in a prospectus "in a clear, concise and understandable manner,"
following four standards: (1) "Present... clear, concise sections, paragraphs, and sentences ...
[with the use of] ... short, explanatory sentences and bullet lists; (2) Use descriptive headings
and subheadings; (3) Avoid frequent reliance on glossaries or defined terms as the primary
means of explaining information in the prospectus. . . ; (4) Avoid legal and highly technical
business terminology." See id.
246 See DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE ET AL., BEFORE & AFTER EXAMPLES FROM
THE PLAIN ENGLISH PILOT PROGRAM AND A PlAIN ENGLISH HANDBOOK (1998) [hereinafter
BEFORE & AFTER EXAMPLES] (contrasting disclosure before and after it was rewritten with
"plain English" writing principles); see also Proposing Release, supra note 235, at 3156-58
(giving similar examples). Numerous companies participated in a "pilot program" to use "plain
English" in their disclosure documents. See Final Release, supra note 243, at 6370.
247 See, e.g., Proposing Release, supra note 235, at 3156-58.
248 For example, the rewritten sentence "[o]ur losses were caused, in part, by the annual
write-off of a portion of the goodwill resulting from the ten acquisitions we made during this
period" does not communicate much to an investor who has no knowledge of accounting. See
Proposing Release, supra 235, at 3157, 3159 (declining to discuss how to improve disclosure of
financial ratios, which clearly raises the question of explanations to unsophisticated investors).
29 See Proposing Release, supra note 235, at 3159.
250 See id; see also Final Release, supra note 243, at 6384 ("[Alvoid frequent reliance on
glossaries or defined terms as the primary means of explaining information in the prospectus.
Define terms in a glossary or other section of the document only if the meaning is unclear from
the context. Use a glossary only if it facilitates understanding of the disclosure .... ").
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should "[a]void legal and highly technical business terminology."5 1
The elimination, rather than the explanation, of complex information
does not enhance effective communication. And the SEC affirms that
"plain English does not mean 'dumbing down' complex informa-
tion." '
z5 2
In its Plain English Handbook: How to Create Clear SEC Dis-
closure Documents,23 the SEC acknowledges the connection between
disclosure simplification and investor education, without giving much
guidance on how far the education should extend.2 The Handbook
states that a "plain English" document must satisfy the needs of the
audience255 and thus recommends that a company identify its inves-
tors and ask such questions as "How familiar are they [i.e., typical
investors] with investments and financial terminology? [and] What
investment concepts can you safely assume they understand? '
' 56
Recognizing that unsophisticated investors are ubiquitous in the pub-
lic securities market, the Handbook assumes that disclosure must tar-
get and educate them. A company can do this, while still addressing
sophisticated investors, by making "basic, educational information
visually distinctive from the rest of the text .... ,7 The Handbook
also recommends that a company take an explicitly educational ap-
proach in the organization of its disclosure documents.258 The Hand-
book does not merely recommend eliminating "jargon and legalese,"
but observes that, when there is "no plain English alternative" for a
word or term, the company should provide a meaningful explanation
of it.259 Yet the Handbook does not indicate how much background
information a company must provide for financially unsophisticated
251 Final Release, supra note 243, at 6384.
252 Proposing Release, supra note 235, at 3155; see also Final Release, supra note 248, at
6374 ("Using plain English does not mean omitting important information. These rules only
require you to disclose information in words investors can understand and in a format that in-
vites them to read the document.").
23 Plain English Handbook, supra note 238.
m4 Warren Buffett, who wrote the Handbook's preface, underscores its educational pur-
pose in his explanation that, when writing Berkshire Hathaway's annual report, he imagines that
he is addressing his sisters who, "[tihough highly intelligent ... are not experts in accounting or
finance." Id. at 2.
255 See id. at 5 ("Plain English means analyzing and deciding what information investors
need to make informed decisions, before words, sentences, or paragraphs are considered. A
plain English document uses words economically and at a level the audience can understand.").
256 Id. at 9. It even tells companies to ask: "What are [investors'] demographics--age,
income, level of education, and job experience?" Id.
257 Id. at 10 (emphasis added). The SEC observes that some companies know, through
their investor relations department, the exact demographics of their investors. See id. at 9. Few
public companies, however, are likely to have onlyfinancially sophisticated investors as capital
providers.
258 See id. at 16 ("[Y]our audience's degree of investment expertise will also affect how
you organize the document. If you are writing for financially unsophisticated investors, your
document's overall organization may take an educational approach. You may need to explain
industry terms or concepts where they first appear.") (emphasis added).
t9 Id. at 30.
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investors or how many different kinds of investors it must target in its
disclosure.
The SEC's "plain English" initiative thus potentially places
vague educational requirements on all companies selling securities
that do not have the justification traditionally offered for mandatory
disclosure. Even more importantly, these requirements do not take
account of the market reality that financial firms and others are al-
ready providing educational services and products. Mandatory dis-
closure has always provoked considerable debate and disagree-
ment,260 but scholars and practitioners have generally agreed that it
makes sense when it requires companies to provide easily verifiable
and comparable information for the sophisticated analysts (and plain-
tiffs lawyers) who typically read prospectuses. 261 Requiring compa-
nies to assess the characteristics of diverse investors and conduct fi-
nancial education for them cannot rely upon this justification.262 No
doubt, some companies will provide education to attract investors,
with or without legal requirements. 263 But others may decide that any
educational efforts for consumers are not worth the costs, because
they find enough capital from educated investors (including the finan-
cial intermediaries through which many ordinary people invest).
Companies registering or listing their securities on an exchange may
also justifiably ask why they are being compelled to provide investor
education in disclosure documents, when financial and nonprofit
firms are already supplying this educational service.
Yet the "plain English" initiative usefully directs companies to
clarify language and organization throughout disclosure documents,
20 Compare Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure
System. 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 52-53 (1983) (arguing that compulsory disclosure encourages saving
and benefits investors by reducing security price variance), with Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory
and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763, 770-73 (1995) (arguing that
competitive pressure and penalties for inaccurate disclosure reduce the amount of information
produced under mandatory disclosure law).
26 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection ofInvestors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 679, 685, 689-90 (1984) (discussing theoretical
and actual benefits of mandatory disclosure). The courts have also so read disclosure require-
ments. See, e.g., Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1989). But see
MacMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entertainment, Inc., 900 F.2d 576, 579 (2d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 501 U.S. 1249 (1991) (holding that "the disclosure required by the securities laws is
measured not by literal truth, but by the ability of the material to accurately inform rather than
mislead prospective buyers") (citation omitted).
Companies are likely to pass along the costs of the new disclosure to all investors,
particularly to the investment professionals and financially sophisticated, who would be forced
to subsidize this consumer educational effort. Additionally, because investment companies act
as intermediaries for many investors, consumers may actually end up paying much of the costs
of a "plain English" disclosure that they do not in fact use, but that is supposed to benefit them.
In addition, every regulation can affect the competitive ability of firms. That is, if "plain Eng-
lish" imposes net costs on American firms and others raising funds publicly in the capital mar-
kets of the United States, it could harm these firms and markets.
263 See Galuszka, supra note 158, at 90 (discussing firms that encourage direct consumer
investing in their stock).
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and essentially requires them to create a valuable, simplified con-
sumer-oriented part of a prospectus. 264 Despite their mutual fund in-
vestments, consumers are investing directly in companies and are
likely to increase this activity as technology facilitates this type of
investment.265  They do not read lengthy disclosure documents, no
matter how plainly written, and it makes no sense to encourage them
to do so. Yet they benefit from an understandable summary of key
company and securities information, and the development of a pro-
spectus outlinetsummary designed for consumers is a valuable contri-
bution of the initiative. In essence, the SEC requires a company to
provide consumers with the equivalent of a "profile" disclosure
document.
266
The simplified consumer format, however, is only the first step,
and the educational issue remains. The SEC should have used the
"plain English" initiative to make consumers realize that they need to
consult the investor education tools and services provided by financial
service firms, so as to understand any particular investment in a
broader financial context. In effect, this connection can now occur
since many consumers invest through brokers, fund companies or
other on-line services that offer educational materials and financial
advice. The SEC should revise its "plain English" format to make
consumers aware of the importance and availability of investor edu-
cation. It could require that, in the consumer-oriented prospectus
sections, companies provide consumers with some elementary warn-
ings about the generic risks of the particular kind of investment and
then encourage them to educate themselves about the potential place
of this investment in their portfolio.267 A "plain English" prospectus
would then have to point--or, in electronic prospectuses, provide a
direct hypertext link-to specific educational providers, such as the
264 The creation of a simplified consumer section of a disclosure document is a central
thrust of the initiative because plain English writing principles apply only to the cover pages,
summary and risk factors sections of the prospectus, which introduce, and summarize the mate-
rial in the entire document. See Final Release, supra note 243, at 6370; Proposing Release,
supra note 235, at 3160-63.
265 See Lohse supra note 158, at B12; AAl.com, supra note 155 (providing numerous
services for consumers).
266 See infra Part IV(C); see also Final Release, supra note 248, at 6374 (requiring that
an investment company apply plain English principles to its profile). In fact, the SEC should
have gone farther in designing a consumer prospectus section by requiring companies to pro-
vide a summary section and a discussion of an investment's risk factors; under the new rule, it
must draft these sections using "plain English" principles only if it decides to supply them in a
disclosure document. See id. at 6373 ("We decided against this [requirement of a summary]
because a summary may not be helpful in all prospectuses."). In practice, however, most com-
panies do provide prospectus summaries.
267 In effect, the SEC requires such risk discussion when a company provides a risk dis-
closure summary. See Final Release, supra note 243, at 6373 ("You should place any risk factor
in context so investors can understand the specific risk as it applies to your company and its
operations."). while the SEC discourages a discussion of risk in purely generic terms, such a
general discussion could be useful to consumers.
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self-regulatory organization where the company lists its securities,
and to the SEC for referrals to other providers and for anti-fraud edu-
cational materials. 68 While this mandatory connection would not
resolve all uncertainties about "plain English" disclosure, it should at
least make clear to companies that their primary obligation is to pro-
vide a straightforward consumer prospectus summary, and to con-
sumers that they need investor education to invest safely and wisely.
C. Investment Company Disclosure Formats
Because of the popularity of mutual funds, and their use in re-
tirement plans, consumers need to receive education about them so
that they understand the advantages of mutual fund investing and the
benefits of particular kinds of funds and fund investment strategies.
Investments by Americans in mutual funds have grown exponentially,
both in retirement and non-retirement accounts. 9 This growth is not
surprising, because mutual funds provide consumers with the profes-
sional money management and investment options that were previ-
ously available only to the wealthy. More importantly, by their na-
ture, mutual funds raise basic finance issues critical to wealth en-
hancement (e.g., diversification, specialized investing, strategies
ranging from passive indexing to active management and changing
asset allocation over life cycles) that consumers need to understand.
Two recent and significant SEC changes to investment company
disclosure270 implicate investor education because they are designed
26 For example, a prospectus summary dealing with stock might contain the following
warning:
This investment makes you an owner of a "share" of the company's assets
and subjects you to risks particular to the company, as discussed below, and to
stock investing in general. You should decide whether the investment is suitable
to your personal circumstances and fits with your other investments. For help in
making this decision, you should consult investor educational materials and your
financial advisor, if you have one.
To obtain information on investor education and education providers,
please contact [specify the NYSE, the NASDAQ, or any other exchange where the
company's securities are listed]. The Securities and Exchange Commission will
also direct you to educational services, as well as help you protect yourself against
investment fraud and abuse (please call [telephone number] or go to its web site,
www.sec.gov).
26 See 1998 Mutual Fund Fact Book, supra note 41, at 1 (describing increase in total as-
sets in mutual funds from $1.07 trillion in 1990 to $4.5 trillion in 1997); id. at 16 (noting that
the number of mutual funds has more than doubled since 1990). Approximately 16% of the
$7.9 trillion of total retirement assets are invested in mutual funds. See id. at 44.
270 See Registration Form Used by Open-End Management Investment Companies, Secu-
rities Act Release No. 7398, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,898 (Mar. 10, 1997) [hereinafter Registration
Proposal]; Registration Form Used by Open-End Management Investment Companies, Securi-
ties Act Release No. 7512, 63 Fed. Reg. 13,916 (Mar. 23, 1998) [hereinafter Final Registration
Release]; New Disclosure Option for Open-End Management Investment Companies, Securities
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to make the disclosure more useful and understandable to consumers,
specifically by enabling them to grasp the basic features of a fund and
by enhancing their ability to compare it to similar funds.271 That is,
by focusing consumers' attention on certain fund features and their
comparability, the revised disclosure helps them understand that they
can not view any investment in isolation, but must view it in compari-
son to similar investment products and as part of an optimal portfolio.
The amended disclosure format thus has mutual funds provide con-
sumers with some knowledge that comes from investing education-a
general understanding about kinds of investments, advantages of
combining of investments and the need for their portfolios to change
over time and circumstances. At the very least, it requires the funds
to put information into a format to which consumers could easily ap-
ply the education about saving and investing that the funds already
provide. In a third proposed change to investment company names,
the SEC justifiably targets an anti-fraud educational issue: preventing
an investment company from misleading consumers by its use of an
inappropriate name.
The two amendments resulting in the new disclosure format
originate from a valuable cooperation between mutual fund compa-
nies and the SEC.273 In designing the new fund disclosure format, the
SEC staff took the advice of firms in an area where they are likely to
offer the best solutions, since fund companies communicate daily
with, and have an interest in satisfying, consumers. As in the "plain
Act Release No. 7513, 63 Fed. Reg. 13,968 (Mar. 23, 1998) [hereinafter Final Profile Release];
see also Proposed New Disclosure Option for Open-End Management Investment Companies,
Securities Act Release No. 7399, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,943 (Mar. 10, 1997) [hereinafter Profile Pro-
posal].
271 See Final Registration Release, supra note 270, at 13,917 (observing that the two
major disclosure initiatives are "intended to: improve fund disclosure by requiring prospectuses
to focus on information central to investment decisions; provide new disclosure options for
investors; and enhance the comparability of information about funds."); Final Proposal Release,
supra note 270, at 13,969-70 (requiring "[s]tandardized [flund [s]ummaries ... [i]mproved
[r]isk [d]isclosure ... [g]raphic [d]isclosure of [v]ariability of [r]eturns. and other fund
information in plain English).
272 Investment Company Names, Investment Company Act, Release No. 22,530, 62 Fed.
Reg. 10,955 (Mar. 10, 1997) [hereinafter Names Proposal]. The SEC has not yet released a
final rule on this proposal.
273 The SEC has tried to standardize and simplify mutual fund disclosure because it rec-
ognizes that fund investments are mainly designed for consumers. See, e.g., Investment Com-
pany Act Release No. 13,436,48 Fed. Reg. 37,928 (Aug. 22, 1983) (adopting a two-tier disclo-
sure format for mutual fund registration with a prospectus and a "Statement of Additional In-
formation"); Investment Company Act Release No. 16,244, 53 Fed. Reg. 3, 192 (Feb. 4, 1988)
(adopting uniform fee table in funds); Investment Company Act Release No. 16,245, 53 Fed.
Reg. 3,868 (Feb. 10, 1988) (adopting a uniform formula for calculating fund performance);
Investment Company Act Release No. 19,382, 58 Fed. Reg. 19,050 (Apr. 12, 1993) (adopting a
uniform presentation of management's discussion of fund performance); Investment Company
Act Release No. 21,216, 60 Fed. Reg. 38,454 (July 26, 1995) (proposing amendments to sim-
plify money market fund disclosure). See generally Registration Proposal, supra note 275, at
10,899-901 (discussing these developments).
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English" initiative, however, the SEC's amendments would have been
more valuable if it recognized the relation of the disclosure format to
fund educational products and services. The SEC should improve its
initiatives by taking the next logical steps of requiring fund compa-
nies to link the new disclosure format to their-and SEC anti-fraud-
educational materials, and of alerting consumers about the existence
and importance of these materials. 274
The Registration Final Release, developed from industry ex-
perimentation with different disclosure formats, 275 requires a fund to
provide investors with a standardized, simplified summary of a
fund.276 The educational implications of the format are significant
since, under the Release, funds would provide information in a way
that facilitates a consumer's use of investor education. A fund pro-
spectus would summarize the fund's basic investment objectives and
the general strategies of its fund advisor for achieving them (e.g., that
the equity fund has adopted a "growth" approach and that it achieves
this objective through purchases of securities of companies with spe-
cific characteristics).z The risk disclosure requires a fund to identify
in general terms the risks to which it is subject because of its portfo-
lio, objectives and strategies.278 The disclosure thus encourages a
274 One problem with the new disclosure format is that, like much of investor education,
it encourages investors to concentrate only on their portfolios and to ignore "larger' social is-
sues relating to company activity. See Fanto, supra note 51. Again, it is appropriate that the
SEC focus first on ensuring that investors understand the connection between an investment in a
particular fund and their overall portfolios before it encourages them to consider such issues.
275 See Registration Proposal, supra note 270, at 10,899 n.16, 10,909 n.101 (discussing
experimental approaches and pilot plans); see also Letter from Paul Schott Stevens, Senior Vice
President, General Counsel, Investment Company Institute to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary,
Securities and Exchange Commission (June 9, 1997) <http://www.ici.org/nlacomment.html>
(commenting on Registration Proposal).
276 The SEC relates the proposal to its "plain English" initiative because the SEC ob-
serves that mutual fund prospectuses have grown too complex and legalistic and fund share-
holders do not find them useful in making investment decisions. See Registration Proposal,
supra note 270, at 10,899 n.6; Final Registration Release, supra note 270, at 13,918.
277 See Registration Proposal, supra note 270, at 10,910 ("The information might de-
scribe, for example, whether an equity fund emphasizes value or growth, or blends the two
approaches, or whether the fund invests in stocks based on a 'top-down' analysis of economic
trends or a 'bottom-up' analysis that focuses on the financial condition and competitiveness of
individual companies") (footnote omitted); id. at 10,902 (requiring a fund to disclose whether it
intends to concentrate on particular kinds of securities and/or on an industry or group of indus-
tries); id. at 10,910 (discussing requirement that a fund disclose whether it expects to have a
yearly turnover rate equal to or greater than 100% and the tax consequences of this turnover for
investors); see also Final Registration Release, supra note 270, at 13,920 (discussing generally
how investors will be able to determine the strategy of a fund).
278 See Registration Proposal, supra note 270, at 10,903; Final Registration Release, su-
pra note 270, at 13,919-20. This risk presentation arose out of the SEC's consideration of re-
sponses to an earlier concept release in which it asked the fund industry for its views on what is
the appropriate disclosure of risk. See Investment Company Act Release No. 20,974, 60 Fed.
Reg. 17,172 (Apr. 4, 1995) (requesting views and comments); see also supra note 270, at
10,900 (discussing response to this release). The SEC does not propose any quantitative risk
disclosure, such as standard deviation, beta and duration, which could help investors numeri-
cally evaluate and compare fund risk. See Registration Proposal, supra note 270, at 10,911 &
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consumer to think about the relationship between risk and return in a
fund. Indeed, a fund may, but is not required to, identify the kind of
investor for which it is suitable, depending upon an investor's risk
tolerance and preferences.2 79 Such disclosure makes sense in the as-
set-allocation and life cycle decision-making that is a fundamental
part of knowledgeable investment decisions.2 ' 0 A requirement that a
fund also provide a bar chart of risk/return information comparing the
fund's returns over the last ten years to those of an appropriate market
index, 1 pushes consumers to compare a fund's performance to that
of other funds, particularly to a market index. This comparison in
effect leads consumers to consider whether a particular actively man-
aged fund does better than a passive indexing investing strategy.
2
The SEC's related Final Profile Release particularly underscores
the educational implications of the revised fund disclosure format, as
well as the format's origin in market experimentation. The Release
permits a fund to provide investors with a short, readable profile of a
fund that facilitates comparison of funds, allows them to judge the
fund's appropriateness for their investing strate , 2 83 and on the basis
of which they can make an investment decision. " 4 The purpose of the
profile is clearly to help the ordinary consumer who invests in funds
for retirement and other savings, who "face[s] an increasingly diffi-
n.136 (explaining that the fund industry's response to its concept release on risk disclosure
showed that firms disagree about appropriate quantitative risk measurement standards and about
the ability of consumers to understand and to use effectively quantitative risk measurement, but
allowing continued industry experimentation with risk disclosure).
279 See Final Registration Release, supra note 270, at 13,921. The original proposal re-
quired that the disclosure form include an identification of an appropriate investor for a fund.
See Registration Proposal, supra note 270, at 10,903. In response to opposition by commenta-
tors who thought that the requirement would conflict with suitability rules imposed on brokers
and investment professionals (i.e., that brokers determine whether an investment is suitable for a
client), the SEC made such identification optional in the new registration form.
280 See Registration Proposal, supra note 270, at 10,903 (requiring a fund to identify risks
peculiar to it, the most prominent being that funds offered by banks are not FDIC-insured);
Final Registration Release, supra note 270, at 13,921-22 (same).
281 See Final Registration Release, supra note 270, at 13,922-24.
282 The bar chart comparison would not include returns adjusted for sales loads, but only
a general warning that, if the loads were included, the funds' returns would be lowered. See
Final Registration Release, supra note 270, at 13,923 n.62, 13,924-25 (requiring a table of sales
loads and expenses associated with the fund that would allow fund shareholders to compute
easily the differences between sales fees and fund expenses). There is an increasing SEC con-
cern with fund fees and disclosure regarding them, and it is likely that the SEC may revisit the
subject of fee disclosure. See Levitt Remarks, supra note 233.
283 See Profile Proposal, supra note 270, at 10,945 ("Requiring profiles to present infor-
mation in a standardized format should help investors identify key information about a fund and
make comparisons among different funds."); Final Profile Release, supra note 270, at 13,968
(adopting proposed rule).
284 The profile would alert investors that they could obtain from the company a full pro-
spectus (which, in any event, would be sent to them upon confirmation of purchase). See Final
Profile Release, supra note 270, at 13,969; see also Profile Proposal, supra note 270, at 10,944
("The profile would allow investors to choose the amount and format of information they want
before making an investment decision.").
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cult task in choosing among different fund investments," 5 and who
has limited financial sophistication. Since many of these investors
cannot understand the lengthy, financially and legally complex fund
prospectuses, 6 they increasingly look to simple comparisons,
evaluations and ratings of funds offered by market services, 287 or to
the more accessible materials supplementary to a prospectus, such as
sales literature and advertisements, supplied by fund companies.n8
Under SEC and ICI supervision, fund companies conducted an ex-
periment with fund profiles and found them to be popular with con-
sumers, which led to the proposal and final rule.289
The format and manner of distribution of the profile comple-
ments any consumer investor education. A fund can provide in the
profile only nine items of information in a set order,295 with the first
four items covering fund goals, strategies, risks and fees. The profile
would thus have the same basic educational purposes of simplified
disclosure, fund comparability, portfolio suitability and "ease of fit"
with education about investing that characterize the Registration Final
Release.291 To enhance access to profiles, a fund company could dis-
tribute them to consumers widely through various media, including
through mass mailing, newspapers and electronic delivery. 292 In fact,
the SEC recognizes the suitability of the profile to the growing Inter-
2s Final Profile Release, supra note 270, at 13,968 ("In the Commission's view, the
growth of the fund industry and the diversity of fund investors warrant a new approach to fund
disclosure that will offer more choices in the format and amount of information available about
fund investments.") (footnote omitted).
216 Cf. Robert Barker, Just How Juicy Is 7hat IPO? Bus. WK., Oct. 6, 1997, at 168, 168-
69 (giving investors "tips" about skipping through lengthy prospectuses).
2 See Morningstar.Net, supra note 154 (referring to Morningstar's fund service).
28 See, e.g. Clifford E. Kirsch et al., Mutual Fund and Variable Insurance Products
Performance Advertising, 50 Bus. LAW. 925, 933-35, 952-59 (1995) (summarizing the law,
regulation and problems with simplified fund prospectuses and fund advertising); Paul S. Stev-
ens & Craig S. Tyle, Mutual Funds, Investment Advisers, and the National Securities Markets
Improvement Act, 52 Bus. LAW. 419, 425-27, 459-60, 468 (1997) (discussing development of
simplified fund disclosure and advertising).
289 See Profile Proposal, supra note 270, at 10,944 (describing history of experimentation
with profiles by large fund companies). See generally INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTIrTUTE, THE
PROFILE PROsPECrUs: AN ASSESSMENT BY MUTUAL FUND SHAREHOLDERS (1996) (presenting
to the SEC results of consumer attitudes regarding fund profiles).
290 See Final Profile Release, supra note 270, at 13,972. In the rule proposal, the SEC
suggested that a fund present the items in a simplified, popular question-and-answer format.
See Profile Proposal, supra note 270, at 10,945. To allow for industry experimentation in the
profile, the SEC omitted this requirement from the Final Release. See Final Profile Release,
supra note 270, at 13,972. The "plain English" principles would still apply to the profile. See
id. at 13,969-70, 13,972.
291 See Final Profile Release, supra note 270, at 13,975-76 (declining to require a fund to
identify the "ideal" investor in it (although recommending that a fund make such an identifica-
tion)). The other items would provide information on the fund's investment advisor and portfo-
lio manager, purchase and sale of fund shares (two items), fund distributions and their taxation,
and fund services-all items that the industry has found to be important to consumers. See id. at
13,978-79, 13,986.292 See Final Profile Release, supra note 270, at 13,981 n.115.
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net use by fund companies and fund customers, since a company
could electronically provide a profile and a hypertext link to the full
prospectus and other fund information.
293
While the Names Proposal, which requires that a fund invest at
least 80% of its assets in a specific kind or kinds of securities if its
name suggests a fund focus on them,294 provides an example of the
SEC's traditional mission of ensuring accurate disclosure, it also has
an anti-fraud educational purpose related to the SEC's role in pro-
tecting and educating consumers against illegal and/or abusive prac-
tices of financial professionals. The SEC explains that consumers
increasingly use mutual funds to meet their retirement and other in-
vestment needs, and base their fund investments, as is proper, on as-
set-allocation theory-a primary component of investing education.295
Furthermore, in making asset-allocation decisions, they use well-
defined kinds of funds, such as stock, bond and money market funds
to meet their target portfolio composition. Yet, in the SEC's view,
investors rely too much on fund names in arriving at these deci-
sions.296 If a mutual fund implies through its name that it specializes
in particular investments, but does not in fact do so, it undermines the
293 See id. at 13,981 n.120. On electronic delivery of disclosure documents, see generally
HOWARD M. FRIEDMAN, SEcuRrr=s REGULATION IN CYBERsPACE 2-1 to 3-40 (1997). Fund
companies could also tailor profiles used in retirement plans to the plans' needs and partici-
pants' investment limitations. See Final Profile Release, supra note 270, at 13,981-82. A con-
troversial issue in the profile project was the potential liability of a fund and fund distribution
participants because of the potential use of the profile to sell fund shares. See id. at 13,970-72.
Given my focus on the educational import of the profile, I do not examine this issue.
294 See Names Proposal, supra note 272, at 10,956. The SEC promulgated this rule pro-
posal pursuant to the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, which amended
Section 35(d) of the Investment Company Act to empower the SEC to address potentially mis-
leading company names by its rule-making authority. See Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 208, 110 Stat.
3416, 3432 (1996). Section 35(d) now provides as follows:
(d) Deceptive or Misleading Names. It shall be unlawful for any registered in-
vestment company to adopt as a part of the name or title of such company, or of
any securities of which it is the issuer, any word or words that the Commission
finds are materially deceptive or misleading. The Commission is authorized, by
rule, regulation, or order, to define such names or titles as are materially deceptive
or misleading.
Prior to this amendment, the SEC prohibited, by order, names of specific investment companies
pursuant to its power under a prior version of Section 34(d) to bar materially deceptive or mis-
leading names. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-34(d) (1988). The SEC's proposed new Rule 35d-1 re-
quires a "floor" investment amount for fund companies advertising themselves as specializing in
certain kinds of securities (e.g., stock, bond, Treasury, government, tax-exempt) or securities of
issuers in a particular industry (e.g., utilities) or countries or geographic regions. See Names
Proposal, supra note 272, at 10,957-58. The SEC proposes that the rule not apply to funds for
which it has already provided guidance about appropriate portfolio composition, such as index,
balanced, and small capitalization. It would also exempt bond funds from the rule since it is
studying the proper characterization of these funds, a subject related to quantitative risk disclo-
sure. See id. at 10,959-60.
295 See Names Proposal, supra note 272, at 10,956-957.
296 See id. at 10,956.
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beneficial effects of consumers' asset allocation and thus of investor
education generally. The SEC hopes consumers avoid this deception
by reading disclosure documents (as simplified by the Registration
and Profile Proposals, as well as by the "plain English" initiative), but
it feels that consumers' excessive reliance on fund names justifies its
addressing the problem through substantive regulation.
297
As in the "plain English" initiative, the SEC should improve the
new fund disclosure format by explicitly linking it to investor educa-
tion provided by financial and nonprofit firms. Although the new
format invites a consumer to apply a basic education about investing
to the disclosed information, a fund company does not provide that
education in a profile. Even the Names Proposal presumes that an
investor understands the basic differences between a stock and bond
fund. The SEC should thus take the additional regulatory step of re-
quiring a mutual fund to tie the revised fund disclosure to investor
education materials supplied by the fund-or by some other financial
intermediary-as well as to SEC anti-fraud education and its refer-
ences to education providers.298 In fact, linkage between information
and education should occur throughout a profile: when, for example,
a fund discusses its risks and identifies the appropriate kind of inves-
tor for the fund, it should point the investor specifically to educational
materials on risk, asset allocation and life-cy6le investing.2 99  While
the SEC must work out the details of the linkage,3°° additional mutual
fund disclosure reform could thus be another significant opportunity
for the SEC to recognize publicly the developments in investor edu-
297 This Proposal may implicitly conflict with the SEC's two fund disclosure format
amendments. It is one thing to simplify and shorten disclosure to facilitate consumer reading; it
is quite another thing to justify substantive regulation because of an assumption that, since in-
vestors read only a few words (i.e., the names of funds), the SEC must ensure the accuracy of
these words. One could argue, in the SEC's favor, that investors may read a profile, or a pro-
spectus, but still place too great reliance on a name because they justifiably regard it as an im-
portant sign that "trumps" sections of the prospectus contradicting it.
298 See supra note 268 (presenting possible prospectus language). A significant differ-
ence between company and fund disclosure is that many, but not all, fund companies, unlike
non-financial companies, provide educational services and materials to which they could easily
link a profile or prospectus. If, like a non-financial company, a fund company does not provide
such services, it could link its disclosure documents to the services of the ICI or of the broker-
age firms through which the fund is sold (as well as to the SEC Web site, where further educa-
tional references are available).
299 In its disclosure simplification, whether in company or fund prospectuses, the SEC
worries about confusing a consumer by providing cross-references, etc. Yet the electronic de-
livery of disclosure documents and educational materials, with the availability of hypertext
links, ensures that the use of glossaries and cross-references does not impede reading and com-
prehension, since a reader can easily access them.
300 For example, the SEC would have to address any concerns of fund companies that
they would increase their liability if they provided links to their educational materials. See, e.g.,
15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994) (prospectus liability under the Securities Act of 1933); cf 15 U.S.C. §
77b(a)(10)(b) (exempting supplementary sales literature from the prospectus definition); 17
C.F.R. § 230.135a (1997) (restricting advertising for mutual funds).
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cation by financial firms and nonprofit organizations and to encour-
age consumers to use these educational services.
D. A Concept Release on Investor Education
In light of the SEC's educational and education-related efforts, it
may well be time for the SEC to issue a concept release on investor
education. The SEC typically circulates a concept release as a result
of a significant development in the securities markets and explains
therein its regulatory response, or offers potential responses, to the
development and asks interested persons for their views on appropri-
ate SEC action.301 A release thus serves two important functions: (1)
It focuses SEC attention on the development, and its regulatory
authority to address it, and (2) it stimulates reflection by all kinds of
parties-financial firms, their lawyers, economists, legal scholars,
consumer groups and private investors. With the information gath-
ered from the concept release, the SEC can intelligently decide
whether to undertake further regulatory initiatives to address the mar-
ket development.
The SEC now needs to adopt a formal position on investor edu-
cational developments in the securities markets (or at least to discuss
them in detail), and to take a critical look at its own valuable, but not
entirely coordinated, educational activities. If the SEC engages in
this public reflection, it should recognize the value of the educational
efforts of financial arid nonprofit firms, and redirect its own activities
in cooperation with them to provide consumers with the best opportu-
nity to receive saving, investing and anti-fraud education. A release
will also lead firms, consumer organizations and other regulators to
bring to the SEC's attention additional educational materials, services
and research on investor education, as well as possibilities of joint, or
separate, government and market educational activity. The concept
release will also require the SEC to justify its statutory authority in
this field, and thus highlight any need for additional legislation. Fi-
nally and most importantly, the release would greatly contribute to the
ongoing national campaign to encourage saving and investing, and to
make consumers understand the importance of investor education for
their financial future.
302
301 See, e.g., Investment Company Act Release No. 20,974, supra note 278.
302 The release would thus fit well within the national campaign and activities generated
by the SAVER Act and by the SEC's own "Facts on Saving and Investing Campaign."
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V. CONCLUSION
Numerous pressures and events have made it important that or-
dinary Americans save more and invest their savings well. The major
government safety net, the Social Security program, can not entirely
fund the income needs of the elderly, and the aging of the "Baby
Boom" generation seriously threatens the solvency of the program.
For a number of reasons, companies are increasingly likely to offer
their employees retirement plans where, at best, they and the employ-
ees contribute funds to retirement accounts, and where employees
themselves have the responsibility to direct the investment of the
funds. An individual's financial well-being in retirement thus de-
pends much upon her own saving and investing decision-making. In
an age where government programs are generally not expanding, in-
dividual Americans also need to save and invest outside retirement
programs for other goals, such as their children's education and their
own aging parents' welfare.
A growth in investment opportunities, which allows ordinary
investors to meet their saving and investing goals, has accompanied
these pressures for enhanced investment performance. No longer is
investing restricted to the wealthy, who alone can benefit from pro-
fessional money management. Rather, funds offer consumers an ex-
traordinary choice of investment options and professional manage-
ment, whether inside or outside retirement plans. Technology facili-
tates an investor's access to these collective vehicles and the services
they provide, as well as to direct investing in companies. Yet the
range of investment choices and financial services poses a problem
for consumers, who must navigate among a bewildering number of
selections, now that saving and investing have become everyday, but
necessary, activities.
Investor education should assist consumers in meeting their new
saving and investing responsibilities. As a cultural matter, this edu-
cation is an inevitable part of the solution to the financial problems
facing ordinary Americans, and to the growing wealth disparity be-
tween Americans, which the new responsibility of ordinary people for
investment decision-making may exacerbate, although it is neither the
only solution, nor the one most likely to help the many lower-income
individuals without any real means of savings. The Article thus be-
gins the necessary work of identifying the kinds of investor education
and the appropriate party or parties to conduct them. Indeed, since
the importance of investor education can only increase, as consumer
mutual fund and direct investing grows inside and outside retirement
plans and perhaps even within Social Security itself, and as saving
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and investing become even more a part of everyday life, additional
reflection on this subject is needed, particularly on the proper alloca-
tion of educational responsibilities between the government and pri-
vate parties. It is best that this reflection not occur in a haphazard
fashion or as a result of a crisis, such as a major stock market correc-
tion, but, if at all possible, through a careful observation, analysis and
evaluation of market experimentation and government efforts. 3
303 Securities markets worldwide have recently become more volatile. This market development
makes reflection on investor education even more critical because, if investors are not "trained"
to understand such volatility, they can panic with potentially adverse consequences to the mar-
kets.
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